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     Law firms maintain and store voluminous amounts of highly confidential and 
proprietary data, such as attorney-client privileged information, intellectual properties, 
financials, trade secrets, personal, and other sensitive information. There is an ethical 
obligation to protect law firm client data from unauthorized access.  Security breaches 
jeopardize the reputation of the law firm and could have a substantial financial impact if 
these confidential data are compromised.  Information security policies describe the 
security goals of a law firm and the acceptable actions and uses of law firm information 
resources.   
 
     In this dissertation investigation, the author examined the problem of whether 
information security policies assist with preventing unauthorized parties from accessing 
law firm confidential and sensitive information.  In 2005, Doherty and Fulford performed 
an exploratory analysis of security policies and security breach incidents that highlighted 
the need for research with different target populations.  This investigation advanced 
Doherty and Fulford’s research by targeting information security policies and security 
breach incidents in law firms.  The purpose of this dissertation investigation was to 
determine whether there is a correlation between the timing of security policy 
development (proactive versus reactive policy development) and the frequency and 
severity of security breach incidents in law firms of varying sizes. 
 
     Outcomes of this investigation correlated with Doherty and Fulford’s general findings 
of no evidence of statistically significant relationships between the existence of a written 
information security policy and the frequency and severity of security breach incidents 
within law firms.  There was also a weak relationship between infrequency of 
information security policy updates and increase of theft resources.  Results demonstrated 
that, generally, written information security policies in law firms were not created in 
response to a security breach incident.  These findings suggest that information security 
policies generally are proactively developed by law firms. 
 
     Important contributions to the body of knowledge from this analysis included the 
effectiveness of information security policies in reducing the number of computer 
security breach incidents of law firms, an under represented population, in the 
information assurance field. Also, the analysis showed the necessity for law firms to 
become more immersed in state security breach notification law requirements. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduction 
 
     Law firms are entrusted with highly confidential and privileged client documents 
containing personal data that may include financial, shareholder, personally identifiable 
information (PII), trade secrets, and/or attorney-client privileged information. Reinstein 
and Seward (2008) define attorney-client privileged information as confidential 
communications between clients and their attorneys to allow truthful disclosure when 
seeking legal advice that cannot be discovered by other parties, including adverse parties 
in lawsuits.   Law firms have an obligation to maintain, store, and secure this sensitive 
information and to ensure their clients’ privacy (Comerford, 2006; Nelson, Isom, & 
Simek, 2006).  Security breaches are incidents consisting of unauthorized access to 
sensitive or confidential data of the law firm (Kraemer & Carayan, 2007; Schwartz & 
Janger, 2007; Silverman, 2007).  Information security policies describe the security goals 
and procedures of a law firm (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Metzler, 2007; Robinson, 2005). 
     Information security policies are specifically designed to safeguard network resources 
from security breaches (Doherty & Fulford, 2005).  Information security policies outline 
the responsibilities and acceptable use actions of law firm employees (Baker & Wallace, 
2007; Ries, 2007) when using law firm computers and networks.  Security controls 
include management controls, operational controls, and technical controls. Information 
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security policies are considered management controls and define appropriate security of 
the network infrastructure (Post & Kagan, 2007).  Incorporated in the security policy is a 
clear explanation of the rules with regard to how the network can be accessed, with a 
concentration on maintaining confidentiality and identifying the ramifications of a 
security breach (Greene, 2006; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  Other management controls 
include vulnerability assessments and security plans implemented to manage the security 
(Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2006; Salmela, 2008) of the law firm.  Operational controls 
include physical security, personnel security, business continuity planning, incident 
response, hardware and software maintenance, confidential data protection, and security 
awareness training  (Bowen, et al.; Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 2008) that are 
implemented by law firm personnel rather than automatically by computer software.   
     Technical controls include firewalls, anti-virus, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), 
intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), and access controls.  Farn, Lin, and Lo (2008) define 
defense-in-depth as a way to overlap security policies, technical controls, management 
controls, operational controls, and procedures in order to provide layers of protection to 
the network infrastructure (Kamal, 2008; Hagen et al., 2008).  Whitman and Mattord 
(2008) further explain that defense-in-depth provides redundancy throughout the network 
architecture by using technical controls.  Firewalls are software and hardware that 
prevent unauthorized users from accessing the law firm network (Weaver, 2007).  Anti-
virus software scans files for potentially harmful viruses and sequesters these files to 
prevent their propagation (Lin, 2006) to other computers on the network.  IDSs are 
software programs that identify possible unauthorized access to files (Basta & Halton, 
2008).  IPSs are software programs like IDSs that identify possible access to files but flag 
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the activity in real-time (Whitman & Mattord).  Authorized users are those users who 
have permission to access the computer files and network of the law firm (Comerford, 
2006).  Access controls provide permissions to allow users access to network assets, such 
as database files or law firm networks based on their carefully delineated access 
privileges, making sure that only authorized users are allowed to access certain data on 
the law firm’s network (Comerford).     
     Kamal (2008) further includes the use of information security policies, security 
awareness, and employee training to deflect social engineering schemes as other security 
layers to be included in the defense-in-depth process.  Social engineering is the act of 
people attempting to coerce or trick someone into divulging secrets, such as their 
username and password to circumvent security protocols (Kamal; Basta & Halton, 2008; 
Medlin, Cazier, & Foulk, 2008). This can be accomplished by pretending to be an 
employee or someone knowledgeable (Kamal) about the law firm to gain the trust of the 
law firm employee in an attempt to retrieve sensitive information or bribing an employee 
to be unfaithful to the law firm (Basta & Halton). 
     Individuals who access law firm data without security measures in place may 
unknowingly put confidential information at risk (Salmela, 2008).  Im and Baskerville 
(2005) found in their longitudinal study, as did Post and Kagan (2007) in their survey 
study, that human errors can be based on an individual’s computer skill level.  Errors can 
result in mistakes involving rules, or malfunctions of knowledge-based systems and can 
be intentional, accidental, malicious, direct attacks, or indirect attacks (D’Arcy & Hovav, 
2009; Im & Baskerville; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Post & Kagan).  LaRose, Rifon, and 
Enbody (2008) define self-efficacy as “the belief in one’s own ability to carry out an 
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action in pursuit of a valued goal” (p. 72).   In order to safeguard law firm data, an 
individual law firm employee has to believe that he/she is capable of making the proper 
security decisions (Chan, Woon, & Kankanhalli, 2005; LaRose et al.; West, 2008).   
Despite technical controls (i.e., firewalls, IDSs/IPSs, anti-virus, and access controls) that 
automatically assist in providing security measures, the provision of optimal security is 
challenging because humans are involved (Kraemer & Carayon; Post & Kagan; West).  
For example, a firewall can be misconfigured by a law firm employee resulting in a 
possible security breach or an e-mail attachment containing a virus can be opened 
without first scanning it causing a security breach incident (Comerford, 2006; Keller, 
Powell, Horstmann, Predmore, & Crawford, 2005).  Security policies aid in defining how 
law firm employees should set up the firewall or when it is necessary to scan an attached 
file with anti-virus software prior to opening the file (Keller et al.; Verdon, 2006).   
     The design, implementation, and enforcement of security policies can be 
accomplished through a risk assessment such as an external or internal vulnerability 
assessment (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006).  An information 
security assessment typically consists of a risk assessment that identifies potential 
cyberthreats to a law firm’s mission critical resources and a vulnerability scan of 
applications, ports, and systems (Batista, 2006; Bowen et al., 2006).  An information 
security risk assessment examines how law firm employees are actually following the 
information security policies and procedures (Bowen, et al.).  A risk assessment can aid 
in determining the strength of the defense-in-depth of the multiple technologies installed 
to protect confidential and sensitive information residing on law firm networks (Batista).  
Typically, law firms perform an information security risk assessment to identify potential 
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threats, determine the likelihood (ranked high, medium, or low) that these threats will 
occur, and evaluate the impact (ranked high, medium, or low) on the law firm’s functions 
should these threats transpire (Bowen et al.).   
     A vulnerability assessment consists of scanning the network and systems to identify 
exploitable vulnerabilities of the installed applications and to identify what patches and 
controls are needed to mitigate exposure of the confidential data to unauthorized users 
(Batista, 2006; Myler & Broadbent, 2006).  Vulnerability assessments also scan the ports 
to identify whether there are exposed ports open that should be closed (Batista; Bowen et 
al., 2006) to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to the law firm network 
infrastructure (Comerford, 2006).  This vulnerability assessment can also aid in 
determining the effectiveness of law firm security policies and procedures (Batista; 
Bowen et al.; Ross, 2007).   
Problem Statement and Goal  
 
Problem Statement 
 
     With the proliferation of electronic documents in the legal world, the volume of 
documents held by law firms has increased significantly (Gorga & Halberstam, 2007).  
Document-intensive cases also contribute to the need to share data and other content of a 
client’s case with roaming law firm users, the client, and/or with co-counsel for 
collaborative purposes (Gorga & Halberstam).  A security breach can result in the risk of 
an intrusion into the law firm’s sensitive information (Comerford, 2006; Kraemer & 
Carayan, 2007; Ries, 2007; Schwartz & Janger, 2007).  For instance, the intruder could 
potentially gain access to attorney-client privileged documents that may contain 
proprietary information, trade secrets, shareholder information, PII, and/or other private 
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data that may be damaging to a law firm if it were to become public (Comerford; 
Johnson, 2008; Ries).  Lawyers have an ethical obligation to protect confidential 
information from inadvertent disclosure, including data stored on law firm networks, as 
well as data accessed remotely (Comerford; Johnson).  Such disclosure can contribute to 
a loss of confidence in a law firm (Schwartz & Janger) and/or liability from malpractice 
claims against lawyers and the firm.  Therefore, the problem examined in this 
investigation was determining whether information security policies assist with 
preventing unauthorized parties from accessing this sensitive information.   
     The author further investigated the exploratory analysis study of Doherty and Fulford 
(2005) in this dissertation investigation to determine whether security policies aid in 
abating security breach incidents against law firm data and networks.  The author 
advanced the 2005 study by identifying whether information security policies were 
developed in response to security breach incidents or whether concern for security 
breaches prompted the development and implementation of security policies.  Thus, in 
this dissertation investigation, the author posited questions relative to whether security 
policies are proactively or reactively developed. 
Goal 
 
     The goal of this dissertation investigation was to develop an analysis of the survey 
data to determine whether law firms are proactive in their security policy development or 
reactive to security breach incidents.  In this dissertation investigation, the author also 
investigated whether law firms utilize risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, 
and/or penetration tests to validate the intended information security policies and ensure 
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the existence of adequate safeguards from attackers and/or prevention of unauthorized 
access to law firm confidential information (Myler & Broadbent, 2006).   
     Effective security practices by law firm personnel may be realized through the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of security policies.  Information security 
policies outline the acceptable actions and uses of law firm computers and networks, and 
articulate procedures for secure access to the law firm’s information resources (Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2007; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Kamal, 2008).  Information security policies are 
identified as an integral part of information security best practices (Baker & Wallace, 
2007; Da Veiga & Eloff; Doherty & Fulford; Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2006; Keller et 
al., 2005; Metzler, 2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006).    
     The likelihood that law firm employees will implement security measures is inversely 
proportional to the security measures’ difficulty and/or complexity.  For example, if law 
firm employees must download and install a software patch before opening a file, they 
may find it too time consuming and as a result find a way to by-pass performing this 
action in the future (LaRose, et al., 2008; Post & Kagan, 2007).  Consequently, the 
complexity of computer safety measures may weaken security (Furnell, Jusoh, & 
Katsabas, 2006; LaRose et al.; West, 2008).   
     A practical example of this phenomenon can be seen in the use of computer 
passwords.  A weak password is a password that can be easily guessed and typically 
consists of common words found in the dictionary (Basta & Halton, 2008; Beaver, 2007; 
Fordham, 2008; Garrison, 2008; Richardson, 2006). A password cracking software tool 
can quickly and easily discover a weak password (Garrison; Richardson).   In contrast, a 
strong password consists of a combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers 
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and/or alphanumeric special characters (not at the end of the password). Additionally, the 
length of the password should be longer than eight characters and should not form a word 
in the dictionary (Basta & Halton; Harrison, 2006; Keller et al., 2005; Richardson).  An 
example of a strong password that uses a combination of special characters, lower and 
upper case letters, and numbers is Nov@South3@$t3rnUniv3r$ity.  However, if strong 
passwords become too difficult to remember, the law firm employees will write them 
down and carry them about or place it near the computer, thus resulting in weakened 
security (Comerford, 2006; Fordham; Keller et al.).   Therefore, to be effective, security 
solutions must be perceived as practical and not unduly burdensome (Cannoy, Palvia, & 
Schilhavy, 2006; Fordham; LaRose et al.; Metzler, 2007; Post & Kagan, 2007).  As a 
consequence, the perception of self-efficacy of security technologies was examined as 
well.   
Relevance, Significance, and Need for the Study  
 
     Doherty and Fulford (2005) examined the role of information security policies in 
relation to the number and severity of security breaches.  This survey was mailed to 2,838 
information technology (IT)  directors from large United Kingdom (U.K.) based 
organizations (employing more than 250 people) with 219 valid responses (7.7% 
response rate) returned.  The majority of responses were received from those 
organizations employing fewer than 1,000 employees (44%) and between 1,000 and 
5,000 employees (33%) with 23% of the respondents employing more than 5,000 
employees (Doherty & Fulford).  The survey instrument was validated by Doherty and 
Fulford through two pre-tests and a pilot study exercise distributed to experienced 
information security researchers and senior IT professionals with information security 
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duties (Doherty & Fulford).  Doherty and Fulford found there was “no statistically 
significant relationship between the existence and application of information security 
policies and the incidence or severity of security breaches” (p.36).  According to Doherty 
and Fulford, further research with different targeted samples was urgently needed.   
     The author included the original Doherty and Fulford (2005) survey instrument (N. 
Doherty, personal communication, January 13, 2007) in this dissertation investigation.  
Permission to use the Doherty and Fulford instrument in this dissertation investigation 
was received from Neil Doherty on January 13, 2007 with a confirmation of permission 
received again on December 8, 2008 (see Appendix A).  Additionally, questions to 
determine the timing of security policy development in conjunction with security breach 
incidents have been developed by the author and reviewed by subject matter experts, 
Mark Thorogood, M.S., Ruth S. Stevens, M.L.S, J.D, and Anne K. Abatte, Ph.D.   
Surveying members of the legal community (Wiant, 2005) in this dissertation 
investigation facilitated the discovery of how this community, which is a different 
population from the Doherty and Fulford study, compared to the results from their 2005 
study (Doherty & Fulford, 2005).    
     Wiant (2005) also recommended further research regarding the effect information 
security policies have on reducing the number of security breaches.  Kraemer and 
Carayon (2007) urged additional research with regard to how security policies influence 
computer security and information security in organizations.  Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen (2007) recommended additional qualitative studies regarding high level 
information security policies from an organizational perspective. 
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     With security breach incidents announced on a regular basis in the media (Conger, 
2009), research regarding the impact of information security policies on reducing the 
number of security breaches is highly relevant.  Security breach notification laws in 45 
United States (U.S.) states (excluding Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and 
South Dakota), and the District of Columbia, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico (Greenberg, 
2009) mandate in the event of the compromise of personal data that clients be notified of 
the security breach incident (Heitzenrater, 2008; Johnson, 2008; Kugele & Placer, 2007; 
Schwartz & Janger, 2007; Silverman, 2007).  Many of these laws define compromised 
PII as unencrypted customer information (Schwartz & Janger).  PII is a combination of a 
person’s first name or initial with last name, Social Security Number (SSN), driver’s 
license number or state issued identification card, debit/credit card number with or 
without the security code, and/or medical information (Heitzenrater; Kugele & Placer; 
Silverman).  Law firms collect some PII from their clients and also retain employee PII.  
In the event of a security breach wherein this information is exposed to or compromised 
by unauthorized parties, including insiders, the requisite notification procedures go into 
effect (Johnson; Kugele & Placer; Schwartz & Janger; Silverman). 
     On September 19, 2008, the Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business 
Regulation issued a set of Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR), referred to as “201 
CMR 17.00: Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the 
Commonwealth” which describes the expectations and requirements on how to safeguard 
residents’ personal information in both paper and electronic formats (Massachusetts 
OCAB, 2008).  These regulations were initially set to be effective on January 1, 2009.  
However, due to the overwhelming requirements contained therein, this date was delayed 
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initially to May 1, 2009, and most recently on November 4, 2009 delayed to March 1, 
2010 (Lefferts, 2009).  Law firms with clients who are residents of Massachusetts must 
comply with these regulations. 
     These security breach notification laws are similar to the California Senate Bill 1386 
(SB 1386) (2002), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (1999), the Health Insurance 
and Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (CMS, 2003), and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) (2002).  On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 which included a section 
entitled Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) 
Act.  Pursuant to the HITECH Act, there is now a federal security breach notification 
requirement for the healthcare industry requiring notification of a breach involving any 
type of personal information retained by a healthcare entity (Congress, 2009; Holloway 
& Fensholt, 2009).  Law firms have clients who must comply with these regulations.  
When protected data are transferred to the law firm by the client, the law firm must also 
comply with the regulations and provide adequate safeguards (Comerford, 2006; 
Johnson, 2008; Ries, 2007).  For example, if the law firm receives PII, such as electronic 
protected health information (ePHI) from a healthcare client, the law firm would become 
a business associate under HIPAA and must share in providing protections to the ePHI 
while it is in the law firm’s possession (Li & Shaw, 2008; Swire & Bermann, 2007).   
Law firms also must abide by applicable state security breach notification laws with 
regard to their employee records in the event employees’ SSNs or bank accounts, or other 
financial information is breached (Johnson; Kugele & Placer, 2007; Schwartz & Janger, 
2007). 
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Barriers and Issues 
 
     Law firms consist of lawyers and members of their support staff, such as paralegals 
and legal secretaries (Hadfield, 2008) whose primary concern is the practice of law. In 
the legal profession, paralegals and lawyers generally have little, if any, formal training in 
the use of security applications, such as encryption or IDSs (Hadfield; Nelson et al., 
2006; Ries, 2007). They may have little desire to engage in this type of training since 
their focus is on the practice of law. This lack of interest and training may result in 
reluctance to budget funds for IT staff, computer security risk and vulnerability 
assessments, and/or security products to ensure data security (Baker & Wallace, 2007). 
The lack of funds and management buy-in may result in a law firm having minimal IT 
personnel and, therefore, may not support security measures for its documents and/or 
databases and information resources (Nelson et al.).   
     According to Cannoy et al. (2006), typically organizations are unwilling to share 
security information with researchers. As a result, law firms may be reluctant to disclose 
their security breach incidents and security issues as well.  
     Roster, Rogers, Hozier, Baker, and Albaum (2007) state that having the survey e-mail 
link perceived as spam is a major potential barrier of online surveys.  In an effort to 
combat this weakness, ILTA agreed to send out e-mail invitations with an introduction to 
the author and a link to the ILTA Website where ILTA members could preview a copy of 
the Zoomerang online survey in Portable Document Format (PDF) format prior to 
agreeing to participate in the survey.  ILTA also included in the e-mail message, a link 
directing potential ILTA participants to the anonymous Web-based survey on 
Zoomerang.com.  By providing a link to the survey on Zoomerang.com rather than 
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obtaining an e-mail list from ILTA to import into Zoomerang, the results of the survey 
were anonymous.  Since ILTA members receive numerous survey requests from ILTA 
each year, they should have ILTA on their whitelist to prevent the e-mail from going into 
their spam e-mail. 
Research Questions Investigated 
     The Web-based survey used in this dissertation investigation consisted of 10 primary 
research questions.  The first five questions were derived from Doherty and Fulford’s 
(2005) research on the relationship between written information security policies and 
security breaches in an exploratory analysis of U.K. organizations employing more than 
250 people.  The author converted their hypotheses into research questions for this Web-
based survey in order to discover how law firms compare to the subjects in the Doherty 
and Fulford study.  The additional five research questions were designed to investigate 
how information security policies impact law firms.  The 10 primary questions 
investigated included: 
1. Do law firms that have written information security policies have fewer security 
breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those that do not have 
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?  
2. Are law firms that have had information security policies in place for numerous 
years likely to have fewer computer security breach incidents in terms of both 
frequency and severity than those that do not have information security policies in 
place (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?   
3. Do law firms that have updated their information security policies on a regular 
basis have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than 
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those that have not updated their information security policies (Doherty & 
Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
4. Are law firms that have an information security policy with a broad scope likely 
to have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those 
organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of best practices likely to have 
fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those 
organizations that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
6. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, are law firm employees more 
likely to by-pass security measures in order to complete the task (Post & Kagan, 
2007)? 
7. Are law firm security policies created in response to an information security 
breach incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)? 
8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests a part 
of law firms’ validation of the intended security policies (Myler & Broadbent, 
2006; Verdon, 2006)? 
9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and smaller law firms (less than 250 
users) differ in whether they have written information security policies (Gibney & 
Corham, 2008)? 
10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) and larger law firms (more than 
251 users) differ in whether written information security policies were due to 
information security breach incidents (Gibney & Corham, 2008)? 
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Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
     This investigation is limited to a select population of law firm IT professionals who 
are members of the International Legal Technology Association (ILTA).  The author 
determined that ILTA would provide the most purposeful sampling available (Creswell & 
Clark, 2007; Patton, 2002). This study was limited by law firms who were ILTA 
members and by those who chose to answer the survey questions presented to them 
(Cannoy et al., 2006; Post & Kagan, 2007). 
    ILTA’s 2008 Technology Survey defines the size of law firms by total number of users 
of the law firm’s computers (Gibney & Corham, 2008).    These law firm sizes are 
quantified as small (less than 151 users), medium (between 151-250 users), large (251-
500 users) and very large (greater than 500 users) law firms (Gibney & Corham).  Other 
measures of size of law firm may be number of lawyers rather than total number of users.  
Thus, this investigation was limited by the ILTA definition of law firm size as total 
number of users (Cannoy et al., 2006; Post & Kagan, 2007). 
     Small law firms with less than 150 employees may not dedicate resources to security 
or have information security policies as compared to large law firms of over 500 
employees, who may invest more fully in security and security personnel (Doherty & 
Fulford, 2005).  Thus, personnel in small law firms may not be aware of security breach 
incidents.  External factors such as budgeting for security or security personnel may 
adversely impact the ability of smaller law firms to purchase and implement security 
technologies (Doherty & Fulford).   
     A vast body of international data privacy laws exists (Swire & Bermann, 2007).  
International law firms and law firms with global clients need to be cognizant of these 
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laws (Wugmeister, Retzer, & Rich, 2007).  The delimitation of this research is that an 
exhaustive survey of global privacy laws was beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, an overview of some key international privacy laws was discussed in this 
dissertation.   
Definition of Terms 
 
     The key terms utilized in this investigation are defined in this section.  A list of 
acronyms is included in Appendix B. 
     Access control – Permission granted to authorize users to read and/or write to files on 
a computer or network through programs and information security policies (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2008). 
     Anti-spyware – Software detection program that alerts the computer user of software 
programs attempting to secretly collect confidential information from the computer user’s 
files (Lin, 2006).   
     Anti-virus – Software that scans files to identify and quarantine harmful files that 
could compromise data (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).   
     Authorized user – A person who has been granted read and/or write access to a 
computer or network (Comerford, 2006).   
     Confidential information – Personal data that may include PII, trade secrets, and 
financial, shareholder, or attorney-client privileged information (Comerford, 2006; 
Nelson et al., 2006; Ries, 2007).   
     Electronic Networks – Use of computer-based technology, such as a personal digital 
assistant (PDA), listserv, social networking Websites, blogs, and/or e-mail, to 
communicate with others (Taylor & Murthy, 2009). 
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     Encryption – Software that uses mathematical algorithms to hide the content of a 
computer file or hard drive through the use of ciphertext (Stream & Fletcher, 2008).   
     Firewalls – Software or hardware that filters the traffic of the network to prevent 
unauthorized access (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).   
     Human error – Mistakes or incorrect security decisions made by law firm personnel 
that expose the law firm computers and/or network to security breaches (Kraemer & 
Carayon, 2007).      
    Identity theft – Stealing the identifying credentials such as PII of another person to 
obtain credit cards for the monetary gain of the thieve (FTC, 2007; Rey, 2008). 
     Information security policies – Written documentation outlining the structure of the 
law firm’s security posture.  Security policies outline the acceptable actions and uses of 
law firm computers and networks by their employees (Baker & Wallace, 2007; Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2007; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Metzler, 2007; Ries, 2007; Verdon, 2006). 
     Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) – Software programs that scan the perimeter of the 
network as well as the network to identify possible intruders to the computer systems and 
alert the user of this unauthorized access (Basta & Halton, 2008).   
     Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) – Software programs similar to IDSs that include 
an additional feature of alerting the user in real-time of a possible unauthorized access 
attempt against the network or computer files (Whitman & Mattord, 2008).   
     Law firm size – Law firm size is measured by the number of employees using 
computers in a law firm (Gibney & Corham, 2008). 
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     Management controls – Vulnerability assessments, security policies, and security 
plans, implemented to manage the security (Bowen et al., 2006) of the law firm’s 
computer systems and network.   
     Network vulnerability scans – Use of a variety of software tools to scan law firm 
computers and networks to identify whether software vulnerability patches are and if so, 
which ones, that may allow unauthorized persons to breach the security of law firm 
computers and networks (Batista, 2006).      
     Operational controls – Physical security, personnel security, business continuity 
planning, incident response, hardware and software maintenance, confidential data 
protection, and security awareness training  (Bowen, et al., 2006) that are implemented 
by law firm personnel rather than automatically by computer software.   
     Penetration tests – Use of software tools to exploit vulnerabilities found in software 
applications (Bowen, et al., 2006) to gain access to law firm networks. 
     Personally identifiable information (PII) – Information that is unique to an individual 
and used to specifically identify a person (Kugele & Placer, 2007; Ries, 2007; Silverman, 
2007).  This information includes the combination of a person’s first name or initial with 
that person’s last name, and with any of the following: SSN, account number, driver’s 
license number, debit/credit card number, and/or medical information (Heitzenrater, 
2008; Kugele & Placer; Silverman; Swire & Bermann, 2007). 
     Risk assessments –Examination of security policies and identification of potential 
security threats to a law firm’s mission critical resources through interviews of law firm 
personnel, as well as the use of a vulnerability scan of applications, ports, and systems 
(Batista, 2006; Bowen, et al., 2006; Ries, 2007).   
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     Security breach incidents – Exposure of sensitive or confidential data, such as PII, 
trade secrets, intellectual properties, business processes, or other proprietary information 
to unauthorized persons (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Heitzenrater, 2008; Schwartz & 
Janger, 2007; Wiant, 2005).  These incidents can be accidental, intentional, malicious, or 
human error (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
     Security controls – Software products for access control, anti-virus, anti-spyware, 
encryption, firewalls, IDSs and IPSs (Kamal, 2008; Whitman & Mattord, 2008) installed 
on law firm computers and networks. 
     Security measures – Incorporation of management controls, operational controls, and 
technical controls in an effort to safeguard data on law firm computers and networks 
(Bowen et al., 2006; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007). 
     Self-efficacy – An individual’s belief that he/she is capable of making the proper 
security decisions to safeguard data (Chan et al., 2005; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009; LaRose 
et al., 2008). 
     Social engineering – Coercing, tricking, or manipulating behavioral changes of 
another person (Kamal, 2008; Medlin et al., 2008). 
     Technical controls – Security controls, such as access controls, audit logs, biometrics, 
and user authentication that assist with the detection of security violations by automated 
software programs (Bowen et al., 2006).  Technical controls, such as anti-virus software, 
anti-spyware software, IDSs/IPSs, and data leakage content filtering, assist with 
enforcement of law firm security policies (Batista, 2006; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).   
     Threats – Anything with the potential to cause harm to the data residing on the law 
firm network or on any other computer device of the law firm (Comerford, 2006).  There 
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are natural, human, and environmental threats (Bowen et al., 2006).  Threats can include 
deliberate acts, physical attacks, remote penetration attacks, human errors, acts of God, 
technical control failures, operational issues, or social engineering wherein someone is 
tricked into divulging his/her username and password (Furnell et al., 2006; Kraemer & 
Carayon, 2007; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).   
      Vulnerability Assessments – Security assessments based on the use of software tools 
to determine whether the controls that a law firm has implemented have any security 
holes potentially enabling a user to gain access to data without authorization (Batista, 
2006).  
Summary 
     A large volume of highly confidential and sensitive information is stored on law firm 
computer hard drives and servers (Comerford, 2006).  In the event that an unauthorized 
individual gains on-site or remote access to this equipment, the information could be 
compromised and the firm’s reputation destroyed (Bisel, 2007; Comerford; Johnson, 
2008).  The financial losses associated with the disclosure of sensitive information can be 
staggering (Bisel).  Ever increasing use of laptops and other portable media devices by 
the attorney workforce (Comerford; Gibney & Corham, 2008) raises the risk of 
inadvertent disclosure.   
     Doherty and Fulford (2005) performed an exploratory analysis of security policies and 
security breach incidents that highlighted the need for follow-up research with different 
target populations.  This dissertation investigation advanced the research of Doherty and 
Fulford by targeting information security policies in law firms.  Included in this 
dissertation investigation were Doherty and Fulford’s original survey questions along 
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with additional questions posited to determine the timing of security policy development 
in conjunction with security breach incidents in a survey distributed by the author to 
ILTA members.   
     As clients continue to entrust their intellectual property, trade secrets, PII, and other 
proprietary material to their attorneys, law firms have a corresponding ethical obligation 
to safeguard this information from any type of security breach (Comerford, 2006; 
Johnson, 2008; Ries, 2007).  Security policies and procedures specify what is expected of 
authorized users in protecting law firm database content and documents (Comerford).  
This dissertation investigation determined the effectiveness of law firm information 
security policies, implemented either proactively or reactively (Cannoy et al., 2006), in 
reducing the number of security breach incidents. The perception of self-efficacy of the 
use of security technologies by law firm employees as security measures was also 
discovered (Post & Kagan, 2007).  Capabilities of risk assessments, network vulnerability 
scans, and/or penetration tests to validate the intended security policies and controls 
(Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006) to assist with safeguarding law firm data were 
noted. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
     In this literature review, the author provides an analysis of the impact of information 
security policies on computer security breaches in law firms.  Next, the author examines 
information security policies and computer security breach incidents in relation to 
safeguarding client data. Then, the author reviews topics relevant to security breach 
notification laws, U.S. and international privacy laws, data breach incidents, data leakage 
threats, and information security assessment procedures.  The chapter concludes with 
what is known and unknown regarding this topic along with the contribution this study 
makes to the field. 
The Theory and Research Literature Specific to the Topic 
 
Security Policies 
 
     According to Baker and Wallace (2007), a security policy defines actions that can and 
cannot be taken with company computers.  Security policies outline the acceptable 
actions and use of law firm computers and networks by law firm employees (Doherty & 
Fulford, 2005; Metzler, 2007; Verdon, 2006).  Information security policies consist of 
written documentation outlining the structure of the organization’s security posture.  
Typically, security policies provide guidance with regard to the physical and remote 
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access to data of the law firm. According to Doherty and Fulford (2006), information 
security policies should be in line with the law firm objectives.  
    Verdon (2006) found that “threats continually evolve, and the countermeasures must 
evolve too” (p. 47).  After reviewing the potential threats to the law firm network, the law 
firm CSO (Chief Security Officer) and/or CIO (Chief Information Officer) should 
develop, implement, and distribute a security policy or policies to all employees.  
According to Whitman and Mattord (2008) and Greene (2006) an effective security 
policy must establish key goals for ensuring that authorized users can access the network 
and information resources.  Additionally, the security policy must ensure employees 
know the penalties of inappropriate behavior when using the law firm information 
resources and/or assets.  Within the policy, each law firm employee’s information 
security responsibilities to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the law 
firm PII and confidential data (Whitman and Mattord; Greene) must be communicated. 
     Security policies are generally a snapshot in time (Belsis & Kokolakis, 2005).  Thus, 
Metzler (2007) suggested using standards or security processes rather than just security 
policies to address the continual need to update the requirements as part of security policy 
maintenance.  According to Metzler, organization stakeholders’ involvement is critical in 
order to produce longevity and effective security policies.  In order to achieve these 
security goals, law firm managing partners and IT staff must be actively involved in 
developing these policies.  If the security failure can be equated to a monetary figure, 
then the seriousness of developing an applicable security policy is more readily accepted 
by the managing partners (Greene, 2006; Nelson et al., 2006; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).   
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     Security policies cover topics such as: acceptable use, access control, business 
continuity and disaster recovery, change control management, confidentiality, data 
classification, data backup and recovery, disposal practices, e-mail practices, encryption, 
information protection, information systems security, Internet use, network security, 
privacy, physical security, remote access, system administration security, incident 
response, and termination (Greene, 2006; Metzler, 2007; Rotvold, 2008; Verdon, 2006). 
All of these information security policies provide a legal defense in lawsuits and 
regulatory compliance (Nelson et al., 2006).   Metzler suggests developing a separate 
security policy for each topic in order to quickly update and approve procedures.   
Therefore, smaller separate documents rather than one large document would expedite 
revisions and approval of necessary revisions to the individual topic policies since they 
would be shorter and therefore easier to review. 
     Incorporated in the security policy is a clear explanation of the rules with regard to 
how the network can be accessed, with a concentration on maintaining confidentiality 
and identifying the ramifications of a security breach (Greene, 2006; Whitman & 
Mattord, 2008).  Distribution of the security policy to all law firm employees (Chen, 
Shaw, & Yang, 2006; Metzler, 2007) is of paramount importance.  Security awareness is 
a topic all law firm employees must understand so their actions will not jeopardize 
confidential data in their possession (Nelson et al., 2006).  Therefore, law firm employees 
must be informed as to the applicable security policy pertinent to their job and understand 
why it is important to protect the information located on their computers from 
unauthorized access (Baker & Wallace, 2007; Chen et al.; Metzler).   
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     Insider threats consisting of the disgruntled or curious employee must be addressed in 
the security policies to outline the ramifications of accessing data not relevant to the law 
firm employee’s job description (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Lin, 2006).  Insider threats 
are one of the most common causes of security breaches (Bowen et al., 2006; Chan, et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2006; Ramim & Levy, 2006).   Incident response procedures and the 
method for reporting information security incidents relative to insider breaches should be 
included in law firm security policies (Chen et al.; Goldberg, 2008; Nelson et al., 2006).   
     Attendance at security policy awareness training sessions on information security 
incident reporting should be required of all law firm employees (Chen et al., 2006; Gupta 
& Hammond, 2005; Kim, 2005; Rotvold, 2008) on an annual basis.  Rotvold suggests 
training attendance be a mandatory requirement incorporated into employee evaluations 
in order to assure enforcement of the security policy.  Rotvold further found with regard 
to security policies that, “the top three personal motivators reported for compliance were 
individual motivation, followed by employee responsibility for information security, and 
importance placed on information security” (p. 37).  Thus, communication of the 
seriousness of information security responsibilities by law firm management to law firm 
employees is critical in building a culture wherein it is second nature for employees to 
apply security measures (Rotvold). 
     Verdon (2006) underscores the importance of monitoring practices and the 
implementation of standards such as, ISO 27001:2005  (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical 
Committee, 2005), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CoBIT) and Build Security In (a 
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Department of Homeland Security initiative).   While other practices and standards are 
relevant to information security, the most recognized standard and controls are ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee)and ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
(ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).  The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 27001:2005 Information Technology – Security Techniques –
Information Security Management Systems - Requirements is an international security 
standard (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee) that specifies a framework of 
developing, establishing, utilizing, and maintaining an information security management 
system (ISMS).  The relevant controls for ISO 27001:2005 that specify a framework of 
controls for structuring development of security policies (Humphreys, 2007; Myler & 
Broadbent, 2006) are described in detail in the ISO 27002:2005 Information Technology 
– Security Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management 
(ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee).  These 12 controls include (1) risk 
assessment and treatment, (2) security policy, (3) organization of information security, 
(4) asset management, (5) human resources security, (6) physical and environmental 
security, (7) communications and operations management, (8) access control, (9) 
information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, (10) information security 
incident management, (11) business continuity management, and (12) compliance  
(ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee).  These specifications describe a framework 
for developing an ISMS and the controls required to implement administrative, 
operational, and management safeguards necessary to provide data protection and 
regulatory compliance (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint 
Technical Committee).  This international framework delineates a comprehensive outline 
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of what controls law firms should use to validate the effectiveness of their ISMS 
(Humphreys, 2007) protecting the client and law firm employee PII.   
     Siponen and Iivari (2006) examined six design theories focusing on when it would be 
acceptable for individuals to violate security policies for the good of the organization.   
While security policies are written for organizations as a whole, individuals are the ones 
who must abide by them.  Exceptions are rare incidents of acceptable security policy 
violations (Siponen & Iivari; Verdon, 2006; Wugmeister et al., 2007).  Wugmeister et al. 
point out that these exceptions outlined in the European Union (EU) Data Directive are 
only met: 
. . . when one of the following exceptions is met: consent from the individual; 
contract necessity (that is, data may be used if necessary for the performance of 
the contract with the individual); compliance with (local) legal obligations; or the 
legitimate interests of the entity collecting the personal information outweigh the 
privacy interests of the individual (p. 456).   
According to Siponen and Iivari, the EU has established data privacy directives 
predicated on an opt-in clause requiring an individual’s permission prior to disclosing 
sensitive data.  Each EU Member State is a country belonging to the EU (Swire & 
Bermann, 2007).  Each of the Member States are encouraged to adopt their own privacy 
laws based on the European Commission Data Directive.   Finland is an EU Member 
State with this opt-in requirement for permission from an individual prior to using his/her 
sensitive data (Wugmeister et al.).  However, an acceptable exception to this clause was a 
Finnish tsunami victims’/survivors’ Website which placed Finnish residents’ names on it 
without consent since this action provided a higher level of service for the greater good of 
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the public (Siponen & Iivari).  According to Verdon, exceptions should be included as an 
integral part of security policy development since they are valuable in demonstrating how 
employees should handle exceptions to achieve the greater good of the law firm.    
U.S. Data Privacy Laws  
     In the U.S., state privacy laws require the review of security policies on an ongoing 
basis to ensure compliance with security breach notification requirements (Lin, 2006; 
Metzler, 2007; Verdon, 2006).There are security data breach notification laws in 
numerous states, as well as children protection laws and sections of federal laws 
protecting consumer’s PII in finance and healthcare.   Currently, no comprehensive 
federal data privacy laws in the U.S. directed specifically at law firms or private 
industries exist (Cassini, Medlin, & Romaniello, 2008; Jones, 2008; Otto, Antón, & 
Baumer, 2007).  However, if law firms are entrusted with client information that contains 
PII from the client’s customers, the law firm must protect this PII (Li & Shaw, 2008).   
     Several states recently passed specific data privacy laws (Worthen, 2008).  Nevada 
passed Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 597.970, a data privacy law that went into effect 
on October 1, 2008 (Greenberg, 2008).  This law mandates encryption for the 
transmission of Nevada customer PII through electronic means other than via a fax or on 
an internal secured system (Worthen).    Massachusetts General Law (M.G.L.) 93H 
regarding security breach notifications became effective October 31, 2007.  In 
conjunction with this law, on September 19, 2008, the Massachusetts Office of Consumer 
Affairs and Business Regulation issued a set of Regulations, referred to as “201 CMR 
17.00: Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the 
Commonwealth” originally slated to go into effect on January 1, 2009, but now due to the 
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economic climate will go into effect on March 1, 2010 (Lefferts, 2009), regulating PII of 
Massachusetts residents, whether or not that business maintains a presence within 
Massachusetts (Worthen).  The development of a written comprehensive information 
security plan that includes security policies and security breach notifications is outlined in 
this Massachusetts regulation (Massachusetts OCAB, 2009).  Like all businesses, law 
firms must comply with this Massachusetts law by encrypting laptops and removable 
media devices containing PII, as well as encrypting e-mail messages containing PII.   
Thus, if the law firm collects credit card payments or SSNs from their Nevada or 
Massachusetts clients, they must comply with these laws. 
     Law firms must be cognizant of many laws that relate to their clients.  A non-
exhaustive sampling of some of the most significant laws and regulations that must be 
complied with in the U.S. are as follows: 
Security Data Breach Notification Laws 
     A landmark security breach event occurred in 2005 when ChoicePoint, a data 
aggregator of PII headquartered in Georgia, announced it had unknowingly sold close to 
145,000 people’s PII to a criminal (Greenberg, 2008; Jones, 2008; Miller, 2007; Otto et 
al., 2007).  The penalties for disclosing this PII were severe for ChoicePoint with 
penalties totaling $15 million and an additional $9 million in legal fees (Foley, 2008). 
With the ever increasing number of computerized PII records along with other data 
collected and subsequently retained by various organizations, including law firms, the 
odds of this data being compromised is high.  As a result, in 2005, many states began to 
create data security breach notification laws similar to California Senate Bill (1386) of 
2003 (Greenberg).    
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     In the U.S. as of October 2009, 45 states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands have data security breach notification laws (Greenberg, 
2009). Many of these laws define compromised PII as unencrypted customer information 
(Greenberg).  PII is a combination of a person’s first name or initial with last name, SSN, 
driver’s license number, debit/credit card number, account number, and/or medical 
information (Kugele & Placer, 2007; Silverman, 2007).  As depicted in Figure 1, the six 
states that did not have these types of laws as of December 2008 were Alabama, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and South Dakota (Greenberg). Missouri 
added a data breach notification law in late July 2009 (Greenberg).   
 
Figure 1.  States with security breach laws map.  Adapted with permission from 
©National Conference of State Legislature (see Appendix A), “Right to Know,”  
by P. Greenberg, December 2008, p. 28, State Legislatures.  
 
Overall, these laws mandate notification to state residents of lost, stolen, or compromised 
PII through unauthorized access to computerized data, including access by an 
unauthorized employee (Heitzenrater, 2008; Romanosky, Telang, & Acquisti, 2008).  
There is an overall exemption in every state data security breach notification law except 
for the state of Wyoming where reporting a security breach is not necessary if the 
compromised PII was encrypted (Greenberg, 2008).  However, if the encryption key is 
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also compromised, this would then trigger the notification process.  Many of the states 
also have a provision wherein if it can be determined that no reasonable harm will come 
of the compromised PII, then notification is not required (Romanosky et al.).  A few 
states require that this determination be retained for three to five years. 
     Greenberg (2008) summarizes the 23 differences between the various state security 
breach notification laws.  The variations outlined in Table 1 created by the author of this 
dissertation investigation includes eight states requiring specific details of the breach be 
included in the notice based on Greenberg’s findings.  Three states included paper in the 
definition of what constitutes a breach, along with five other states adding biometrics to 
their definitions of a data security breach incident (Greenberg).  Health and medical 
information has been added to the PII definition of these states and Puerto Rico 
(Greenberg).  Eight states and Puerto Rico require that the security breach incident also 
be reported to the Attorney General (Greenberg). 
Table 1.  Differences Within the State Security Breach Notification Laws   
 
States 
Exempt 
from 
Reporting 
if PII 
Encrypted 
Includes 
Paper 
Breaches in 
Addition to 
Computerized 
Breaches 
Broader PII 
Definition 
Including 
Medical or 
Health 
Insurance 
Information 
Biometric 
Data if 
Released 
with 
Other PII 
Specific 
Information 
about the 
Breach 
Report 
to the 
Attorney 
General 
Every state 
except 
Wyoming  
X      
Alaska X X     
Arkansas X  X    
California X  X    
Hawaii X X   X X 
Iowa X   X   
Maine X     X 
Maryland X    X  
Massachusetts X X    X 
Michigan X  X  X  
Nebraska X   X   
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States 
Exempt 
from 
Reporting 
if PII 
Encrypted 
Includes 
Paper 
Breaches in 
Addition to 
Computerized 
Breaches 
Broader PII 
Definition 
Including 
Medical or 
Health 
Insurance 
Information 
Biometric 
Data if 
Released 
with 
Other PII 
Specific 
Information 
about the 
Breach 
Report 
to the 
Attorney 
General 
New 
Hampshire X    X X 
New Jersey X     X 
New York X     X 
North 
Carolina X   X X X 
Oregon X    X  
Puerto Rico X  X   X 
South 
Carolina X X     
Texas X   X   
Vermont X    X  
Wisconsin X   X   
Wyoming X    X  
Virginia X     X 
Created from the data in the ©National Conference of State Legislature article, “Right to 
Know,” by P. Greenberg, December 2008, p. 27, State Legislatures. 
 
 
     These laws are pertinent to any business, including law firms, or an individual who 
collects PII, with an exemption for those entities who must comply with HIPAA or 
GLBA in some states (Hildebrand & Savare, 2008; Romanosky et al., 2008).  Failure to 
notify those individuals whose PII are compromised carries a severe monetary penalty 
ranging from $250 - $500 per person to a maximum of $750,000 per incident in some 
states (Schwartz & Janger, 2007).  The critical distinction of these security breach 
notification laws is that notice is dependent upon where the consumer resides rather than 
where the business is located (Romanosky et al.).  Notices to over 1,000 residents are 
permissible through mass media in most instances or if the cost of notification is over a 
specific monetary amount, such as $5,000 in some states, up to more than $250,000 in 
others (Silverman, 2007).  Whenever the number of afflicted residents is more than 1,000 
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people, the majority of the state security breach notification laws require the company to 
notify the credit reporting agencies of the breach incident (Schwartz & Janger, 2007). 
     Romanosky et al. (2008) question whether the security breach notification laws 
actually affect the number of identity thefts.  In Romanosky et al.’s study, they found “no 
statistically significant effect the laws reduce identity theft” (p. 1).  However, Romanosky 
et al. also indicated that the data collected may be unreliable data gathered from Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the FTC.  Moreover, data bias may exist as a 
consequence of inactivity by those individuals who personally knew the alleged identity 
thief (Romanosky et al.).   
U.S. Identity Theft Regulations 
     Numerous risks are associated with unprotected PII.  An identity theft risk involves 
how a law firm collects, uses, disseminates, and disposes of PII (Rey, 2008).  News 
reports claim the exposure of numerous SSNs, credit card and debit card numbers, or 
medical information due to lost laptops, universal serial bus (USB) drives, or other 
portable media devices containing unencrypted PII (Bartlett & Smith, 2008;  Berg, 
Freeman, & Schneider, 2008; Greenberg, 2008; Radcliff, 2008; Schreft, 2007). The use 
of e-mail to transmit PII without the use of encryption also provides an avenue for 
identity theft if this information is intercepted or sent to the incorrect e-mail address.  
Hacking into an unprotected computer is a method identity thieves use to procure 
unauthorized access to PII (Comerford, 2006; Johnson, 2008).  Additionally, the physical 
thefts of credit card applications delivered through the mail or found in garbage by 
persons attempting to capture or steal someone’s identity also place information integrity 
at risk.  Improperly disposing of credit card applications, documents containing one’s 
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SSN, medical records or pharmacy receipts in the garbage without first cross-strip 
shredding them also result in identity theft (FTC Business Alert, 2005).   
     The prevention of identity theft as a result of compromised PII and sensitive 
information in an organization’s possession has been the focus of numerous laws in the 
U.S. as well as international laws. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) describes the 
risk of identity theft as the loss of one’s good credit that occurs when someone else steals 
an individual’s identity and through the use of PII procures credit cards typically for cash 
advances as well as to make purchases of jewelry, electronics, or other items that can 
easily be converted into cash (FTC, 2007; Rey, 2008).  Once the new credit card invoice 
is due, either one payment is made or no payments are made by identity thieves (FTC).  
As a consequence, the person whose identity has been stolen experiences deterioration in 
credit ratings and difficulties in procuring future credit (Rey).   
     FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act) of 2003 was signed into law in 
2003 to combat identity theft (Rey, 2008).  In 2005, a disposal rule was created by the 
FTC, National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and federal banking regulatory 
agencies requiring appropriate disposal of credit reporting information or information 
derived from credit reports (Federal Trade Commission, 2005; FTC Business Alert, 
2005). The FACTA disposal rule requires that PII be burned, pulverized, or shredded 
(FTC Business Alert).  This rule also describes the proper destruction of electronic media 
containing sensitive data to ensure that the information contained therein cannot be read, 
reconstructed, or used. The FTC Business Alert specifically indicated that attorneys must 
comply with the FACTA disposal rule.   
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     The American Bar Association (ABA) challenged whether the FTC could assert that 
lawyers were considered financial institutions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act if they 
provided financial services (Comerford, 2006; McMillion, 2006; Podgers, 2008).  Title V 
of the GLBA (1999) focuses specifically on privacy and the protections of financial 
customer data (Cassini et al., 2008).  Any non-public information in the possession of a 
financial institution must be protected from a security breach.  Typically, GLBA 
supersedes other laws regarding data breach notifications (Greenberg, 2008).  However, 
in the case of lawyers, they cannot be regulated by this financial institution law due to the 
2005 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruling in favor of the ABA that 
GLBA was not intended to regulate lawyers (Comerford, 2006; McMillion; Podgers).  
Thus, it is debatable whether the FTC can enforce the FACTA disposal rule with regard 
to law firms.  Nonetheless, Comerford stated that FTC rules should still be used in a 
guidance role by law firms as a basis for ensuring good security practices when handling 
confidential client information. 
Identity Theft Red Flags Rule 
     In 2005, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued 
guidelines for safeguarding high risk transactions, such as online money transfers 
(FFIEC, 2005; Foley, 2008; Greene, 2006).  According to the FFIEC, the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, and non-repudiation of credit card information must be protected.  
FFIEC guidelines mandate development by financial institutions of a security program 
based on findings from  a risk assessment (Foley; Greene; Nickell & Denyer, 2007); then 
implement the use of authentication appropriate for the level of risk (Cocheo, 2006; 
Hiltgen, Kramp, & Weigold, 2006).  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
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issued guidelines to mitigate account-hijacking identity theft (FDIC, 2004) and defined 
additional multi-factor authentication procedures.  These procedures include “something 
a person knows” such as shared secrets, out-of-band authentication (authenticated 
through a second medium, such as a cell phone, telephone, fax, or e-mail message), and 
challenge questions verification techniques (FDIC).  Other options include the use of 
“something a person has” such as tokens and non-hardware based one-time password 
scratch cards (FDIC).  Moreover, additional items under this category include Internet 
Protocol (IP) address location (match a previously used IP address), device authentication 
(authenticates the computer), geo-location (calculates location), and mutual 
authentication (digital certificate) (FDIC). Biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and 
retinal scans that verify “something a person is” are also increasingly employed (Cocheo; 
FDIC, 2005; FFIEC; Greene).  According to Comerford (2006) these techniques would 
also be useful for attorneys safeguarding client data. 
     Stringent laws dealing with preparation of red flags to warn of identity theft were 
promulgated by the FTC in cooperation with five other U.S. regulatory agencies in 2008 
(Rey, 2008).  As an example, on January 1, 2008, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve System (Board), FTC, FFIEC, FDIC, and National 
Credit Union Association (NCUA) endorsed the Identity Theft Red Flags and Address 
Discrepancies under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 Final Rule 
which became effective (FTC, 2007; Wernick, 2009).  Federal Register Subpart J of the 
Red Flags Rule requires a risk assessment of identity theft protection plans and programs.  
Subpart J further outlines 26 practices and patterns that should raise red flags that identity 
theft may occur (FTC; Rey). The Red Flags include identifying suspicious PII, such as 
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address discrepancies, forged documents, improper use of SSNs from deceased persons, 
or unusual activity (FTC; Rey). 
     A mandatory Red Flags Rule compliance date of November 1, 2008 for all financial 
institutions was endorsed as well (FTC, 2007).  However, many non-banking creditors, 
such as car dealerships and others who defer payment for goods or services did not 
realize that they too needed to comply with the Red Flags Rule. As a result, the FTC 
granted an extension to June 1, 2009 to these non-financial institution creditors and state-
chartered credit unions to develop and implement their written identity theft prevention 
programs (Moscaritolo, 2009; Podgers, 2009).  Despite the reprieve on the mandatory 
compliance date, the liabilities for failure to comply with the Red Flags Rule were 
activated.  The penalty for non-compliance includes civil monetary penalties and 
remediation costs, and may result in loss of customers (Rey, 2008).  The ABA filed a 
lawsuit opposing the FTC’s claim that attorneys have to comply with these rules. The 
ABA’s stance was that since attorneys ethically cannot bill for services until they have 
been rendered, this does not constitute a deferment of payment (Podgers).  The case was 
decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia judge in favor of the ABA 
(Honorable R.B. Walton, 2009).  However, the FTC has 30 days to appeal this ruling. 
     Currently, guidelines that specifically address law firm security like those for the 
financial industry are not yet available (M. Thorogood, personal communication, 
December 18, 2008).  Nonetheless, law firms with financial institution clients are 
required by these clients to produce evidence of security safeguards for banking 
information entrusted to the law firm during litigation (Comerford, 2006). 
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PCI DSS (PCI Data Security Standards) 
     The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS) outline the security 
measures that must be implemented with regard to credit card information.  These 
standards are required for safeguarding all credit card purchases (PCI Security Standards 
Council, 2008).  Pursuant to PCI DSS, it is required that law firms not store any more 
cardholder data than is necessary, not store sensitive authentication data subsequent to 
authorization (even if encrypted), and mask the PAN (primary account number) when 
displayed (Berg et al, 2008). The first six and last four digits are the maximum number of 
digits to be displayed (Berg et al.).  Law firms generally accept credit card payments for 
their services and must comply with the PCI DSS. 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996  
     The enactment of the HIPAA of 1996 imposes restrictions on healthcare providers to 
ensure that patient medical records remain confidential, private, and secure (Greene, 
2006; Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008; Li & Shaw, 2008; Wiant, 2005).  HIPAA requires that 
remote access to any medical records have proper security safeguards in place (Baker & 
Wallace, 2007; Kahn & Sheshadri; Wiant).  The HIPAA Security Rule dated February 
20, 2003 requires that all ePHI whether at rest or transferred electronically, be encrypted 
and protected from interception by unauthorized parties (CMS, 2003; Li & Shaw).  
Covered entities include health care providers, healthcare plans, and clearinghouses 
(Holloway & Fensholt, 2009). 
     HIPAA imposes restrictions on healthcare providers to ensure that patient medical 
records remain confidential, private, and secure through the use of administrative, 
physical, and technical safeguards (CMS, 2003; Johnston & Warkentin, 2008).  Protected 
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health information (PHI) can include paper documents, verbal communications, and 
electronic communications, such as electronic health records (EHRs), with only the 
electronic format of ePHI requiring administrative, physical, and technical safeguards 
(Cassini et al., 2008; Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008; Medlin et al., 2008).  Patient name with 
medical diagnosis, laboratory results, medical history, SSNs, credit card numbers, names 
of doctors, and contact information are considered ePHI (Li & Shaw, 2008; Medlin et 
al.).   
     While the HIPAA Final Ruling does not require specific security measures 
(technology neutral), it provides guidelines with regard to what is reasonable and 
appropriate.  The HIPAA Security Rule consists of 18 standards, which include 42 
implementation specifications (CMS, 2003).  Of the 42 implementation specifications, 20 
are required specifications and 22 are addressable specifications. While a number of these 
requirements are listed as addressable, it does not mean they are optional.  Rather, 
addressable means that if the risk assessment indicates they are necessary then these 
specifications should be addressed (CMS, 2003). 
     Covered entities must comply with the HIPAA Security Standards with respect to 
ePHI (Nahra, 2008). Covered entities are required to review, modify, and/or develop 
security measures that will provide reasonable and appropriate protection of ePHI by 
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the ePHI that is captured, 
maintained, and/or transmitted (Li & Shaw, 2008).  Additionally, ePHI must be protected 
against reasonably anticipated threats, hazards, and unauthorized disclosures and security 
policies must be updated on an annual basis (Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008; Nahra).  Anyone 
associated with the primary healthcare provider as a third party provider of services is 
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considered a Business Associate and also must comply with the HIPAA security 
provisions (CMS, 2003; Li & Shaw).  For example, if the law firm receives patient 
identifiable information, such as ePHI from a healthcare client, the law firm would 
become a business associate under HIPAA and must share in providing protections to the 
ePHI while it is in their possession (Li & Shaw).   The penalties for disclosure to 
unauthorized parties are substantial and can ruin the reputation of the law firm (Bisel, 
2007). 
     The HITECH Act portion of the ARRA (Congress, 2009) requires that any 
unauthorized access to PHI must be reported to the affected individual within 60 days of 
the security breach discovery (Holloway & Fensholt, 2009). The 60 day time period 
begins upon the discovery of the unauthorized access by anyone in the organization 
(Congress).  The notice requirements include an explanation of what happened, date of 
breach, what PHI was accessed, and the security countermeasures taken to mitigate the 
breach (Holloway & Fensholt).  The HITECH Act also outlines new penalties depending 
on the circumstances of the breach as $100 per violation up to $1.5 million associated 
with HIPAA privacy and security breaches (Holloway & Fensholt).    
International Data Privacy Laws  
     Historically, privacy laws started with the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974.  The OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Privacy Principles were 
created in 1980 (Gunasekara, 2007).  The content was developed by 23 countries, 
including the U.S., and provided guidelines for protecting, limiting, and securing the 
collected PII of individuals (Swire & Bermann, 2007).  ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 are based on the OECD Privacy Principles (Humphreys, 2007). The 
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Principals are explicit data privacy 
laws (Swire & Bermann).  According to Wugmeister et al. (2007), the APEC Privacy 
Principals incorporate OECD privacy principles of “notice, choice, collection limitation, 
use of personal information, data integrity, security safeguards, access and correction, 
and accountability” (p. 483).  Wugmeister et al. further state that the APEC Privacy 
Principal expectations go above and beyond the OECD Privacy Principles by requiring 
the ethical handling of any and all PII when PII is being transferred even those items that 
are not necessarily required to be protected. 
     While the U.S. is an opt-out society, meaning personal data can be used until the 
person requests his/her data not be used, many other countries, including those in the EU 
are opt-in societies wherein the person’s consent is required prior to use of PII for any 
purpose (Swire & Bermann, 2007).   In the EU countries, Canada, Australia, and Japan, 
data privacy is taken quite seriously.  By way of example, the following is an overview of 
some key international privacy laws. 
European Union (EU) Privacy Laws 
     The EU has explicit data privacy laws that are all encompassing with regard to 
vigorously protecting sensitive personal data (Swire & Bermann, 2007). Pursuant to the 
European Commission’s Directive, the EU definition regarding personal data refers to 
anything that can identify an individual and harm their dignity (Cassini et al., 2008).  No 
sensitive data regarding any EU resident can be disseminated without written consent 
from the individual (Swire & Bermann).  Employee data are classified as the most 
sensitive data that must be protected pursuant to the EU Data Directive. Data include 
business address, business phone number, title, sexual orientation, date of birth, trade 
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union membership, political opinions, national identification or social security number, 
credit/debit/charge card number, PIN, and photograph (Swire & Bermann).  Employment 
applications, performance evaluations, drug tests, and terminations are also considered 
sensitive data.  No PII or other sensitive data about an EU resident can be transferred to 
the U.S. without express written consent (Wugmeister et al., 2007).  Law firms with 
global offices must be aware of the individual laws for each state belonging to the EU 
and how each EU state’s laws relate to a data security breach of the law firm satellite 
office or offices located in that EU state (Goldberg, 2008).  Raether (2008) further 
indicated if a breach of information from the European Economic Area of Iceland, 
Norway, and Liechtenstein occurs, that these laws would also pertain to law firms in 
these areas as well (Wugmeister et al.). 
Canadian Privacy Laws 
     Canada also takes the privacy of their citizens very seriously. The Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) of 1998 covers all 
industries and protects the collection, usage, and disclosure of personal information 
(Wugmeister et al., 2007).  Similar to the European Directive, this law mandates a 
person’s consent to allow his/her personal information to be used in any fashion, barring 
criminal investigations (Swire & Bermann, 2007).  PIPEDA is based on the OECD 
Privacy Principles of accountability, purpose, consent, collection limitations, usage, 
disclosure and retention limitations, accuracy, safeguards, openness, individual access, 
and challenging compliance (Wugmeister et al.).  The burden is on the collector to protect 
the PII collected and retained to ensure that the data is used only for the purpose it was 
collected (Gunasekara, 2007). 
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Safe Harbor 
     The EU and Canada have strict laws controlling third party transfers of data 
(Wugmeister et al., 2007).  Thus, data cannot be removed from European countries or 
Canada without complying with many stringent standards.  A law firm with satellite 
offices in European countries must obtain Safe Harbor certification prior to transferring 
any private data to their offices in any other country, including the U.S. (Wugmeister et 
al.).  Safe Harbor certification is a laborious and expensive process (U. S. Department of 
Commerce, 2000).  However, it aids with being able to send law firm paycheck 
information as well as transmittal of other sensitive information back to the U.S.  
Supplier contact databases,  contract information and third party access to sensitive data, 
as well as customer databases and contract information, are all forms of personal 
information in Europe and must be protected (Swire & Bermann, 2007).  Consequently, if 
the law firm’s EU satellite office wants to exchange this type of information with their 
U.S. office, they must become Safe Harbor certified (Wugmeister et al.). 
Data Leakage Threats  
     Whitman and Mattord (2008) classify threats as accidental, deliberate acts, physical 
attacks, remote penetration attacks, human errors, acts of God, technical control failures, 
operational issues, or social engineering wherein someone is tricked into divulging 
his/her username and password.   Environmental, natural, and human threats (Bowen et 
al., 2006) to law firm data adversely impact a law firm’s operations.  Environmental 
threats include inadequate temperatures in law firm server closets, fires, and power 
outages (Bowen et al.; Nelson et al., 2006).  Natural threats to law firms include 
hurricanes, floods, high winds, blizzards, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcanic explosions, 
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and wild fires (Myler & Broadbent, 2006).  Environmental and natural threats also 
adversely impact the availability of law firm data.  By contrast, a security breach results 
from lost, stolen, or compromised PII or confidential data through unauthorized access to 
computerized data (Cassini et al., 2008). Human threats, however, whether accidental or 
intentional (Whitman & Mattord, 2008) can directly compromise PII by facilitating 
unauthorized access to computerized data (Cassini, et al.).   
Insider Threats  
     According to Comerford (2006) data at rest are even more at risk than e-mail 
messages in transit.  Unencrypted data on servers and hard drives are at risk to 
unauthorized retrieval by employees and/or hackers (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Wiant, 
2005).  The weakest factor in protecting PII and sensitive data from unauthorized 
disclosure is the insider (Bowen et al., 2006; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009) who works for the 
law firm as an employee, attorney, or contractor.  The consequences of losing a laptop or 
PDA containing sensitive law firm data or PII could lead to financial ruin in the form of a 
malpractice case resulting in bankruptcy and/or damage to a law firm’s reputation 
(Comerford; Desouza, 2008).  Additionally, removable media devices used by law firm 
employees may introduce a virus and/or malicious code into the network or individual 
computer while by-passing the IDSs and/or virus protection safeguards (Heikkila, 2007; 
Radcliff, 2008).  These removable media devices also provide the capability to download 
gigabits of attorney-client privileged documents, work product information, and/or client 
data.  Exposing law firm sensitive information and/or PII to unauthorized people poses a 
serious liability to the law firm (Goldberg, 2008).   
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     Downloading and/or uploading pictures and software programs onto law firm 
networks without regard to the acceptable use security policy requiring an anti-virus scan 
of pictures and software prior to installation could result in a security breach or incident 
(Greene, 2006).  In the absence of distributed written security policies outlining what can 
or cannot be downloaded, in conjunction with a lack of appropriate controls in place to 
prohibit unauthorized downloads from the Internet, there is a higher probability of  law 
firm employees unknowingly compromising law firm computers (Metzler, 2007; Verdon, 
2006).  West (2008) states that users are unmotivated to download security software 
while in the middle of a project or they feel incapable of making an appropriate decision 
with regard to whether or not they should install security software.  LaRose et al. (2008) 
found that fear inhibits user’s self-efficacy regarding using security measures such as 
anti-spyware and the downloading of security patches.  LaRose et al. further found that 
those who believed they were personally responsible for their computer’s security were 
more inclined to take appropriate security actions as necessary. 
     Many of the security techniques for law firm users rely upon passwords to 
authenticate the user prior to gaining access to protected sensitive data on the law firm 
computers/networks (Basta & Halton, 2008).  Employee usernames and passwords are 
utilized to access the network and files (Fordham, 2008) on the law firm servers.  
Although password files are often encrypted in ciphertext when stored on the server, the 
individual is the weakest link with regard to protecting the identity of the password 
(Bowen et al., 2006; Goldberg, 2008; Stream & Fletcher, 2008).  According to Garrison 
(2008), passwords are quickly divulged to others within the corporation and sometimes to 
complete strangers outside of the organization, or they are taped to computer screens for 
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anyone with physical access to the computer to discover (Basta & Halton; Fordham; 
Goldberg; Metzler, 2007; Stream & Fletcher).  Medlin et al. (2008) found that hospital 
employees who changed their passwords more often or had longer passwords were more 
willing to share those passwords through social engineering techniques such as entering a 
drawing to win a prize for giving up their password.  Medlin et al. further stated that 
those hospital employees who had training were more likely to have strong passwords 
than their peers but still were willing to share them with internal hospital employees.   
     Passwords that are common words found in the dictionary make them susceptible to a 
dictionary attack or easily guessed because they relate to the immediate life of the 
password holder (Basta & Halton, 2008; Beaver, 2007; Fordham, 2008; Garrison, 2008).  
Fordham suggests using the first or second letters of the words in sentences that are easy 
to remember. For example, the sentence “Nova Southeastern University is a great 
institution to get your PhD” would translate to the strong password NSUi@gi2gyP. 
     Password mismanagement is another insider threat.  The use of a default password is a 
high level threat since default password schemes are widely know by law firm employees 
and therefore trivial to guess (Beaver, 2007). Software default passwords may also 
readily be available on the Internet or through the software company Website (Beaver).  
Furthermore, if law firm employees are unaware of approaches for password protection, 
the likelihood of using default passwords increases (Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Metzler, 
2007).  In the event the default password naming scheme is widely known, curious and/or 
malicious individuals can readily access documents and e-mail accounts.   
     Additionally, the threat of compromised passwords increases with the hiring of 
contract attorneys (Gorga & Halberstam, 2007).  With contract attorneys working on a 
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temporary basis, a large turnover of employees coupled with the ability to download large 
amounts of sensitive information onto USB flash drives (Heikkila, 2007) would provide 
the motive and resources to carry out a threat action (Radcliff, 2008). Temporary 
employees, who may not be invested in the law firm, may be able to access highly 
confidential information (Gorga & Halberstam), thereby placing the law firm PII and 
confidential information at risk.  By surreptitiously logging in as an authorized user or 
contract attorney, these actions may disrupt network operations and his/her actions may 
not be traced (Heikkila, 2006).  This is a high risk threat that must be addressed and 
controls put into place to protect against it.  In the event that an intruder physically broke 
into the building, having data available without any type of password protection or 
encryption is an additional liability the law firm must also protect against (Comerford, 
2006).   
     Another insider threat can originate within the IT Department.  The sharing of one 
administrator username and password by the entire IT Department for accessing every 
network server is categorized as a high threat level practice (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint 
Technical Committee, 2005).  An audit trail using automated monitoring software should 
be enforced (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee).   However, when everyone 
shares the same administrative username and password, there is no audit trail to discover 
who made specific changes (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee; Kent & 
Souppaya, 2006).  Aside from the login username and password for logging into the 
network, each member of a law firm IT Department should be assigned a unique 
username and password for the domain controller accounts (Kent & Souppaya).  Use of 
the null default passwords poses a high threat level practice that can result in the 
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compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the network should a 
disgruntled employee or other unauthorized users initiate changes to the network servers 
(Wiant, 2005).  Thus, individual administrator passwords for each IT Department 
employee should be changed on a regular basis, as should law firm employee passwords 
(Fordham, 2008).   
Data Breach Incidents 
     How the law firm collects, uses, distributes, and disposes of both client and employee 
PII is impacted by identity theft risks associated with unsecured PII on law firm computer 
equipment or networks.  There are a number of Websites that report data breaches with 
different sets of data security breach incidents reported to each.  These Websites include 
government, medical, education and business in their sector categories with a few 
segregating banking/financial from the business category.  The following are a composite 
of the 2008 breaches. 
     Pursuant to data compiled by Attrition.org, Etiolated.org, and the Open Security 
Foundation, as of December 31, 2008, there were 386 data breach incidents (Open 
Security Foundation, 2008).    Figure 2 depicts these 386 data breach incidents by sector. 
 
Figure 2.  Incidents by sector.  Adapted with permission courtesy 
DataLossDB.org, ©2008, Open Security Foundation (see Appendix A). 
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As depicted in Figure 2, Biz (business) lead all sectors in 2008 with 148 reported data 
security breaches.  Edu (education) had 103 incidents, while Gov (government) reported 
79 and Med (medical) 56 incidents.  These reported security breaches comprised a 
number of different data types.  Figure 3 shows the December 31, 2008 breakdown of 
these incidents by data type.      
 
Figure 3.  Incidents by data type.  Adapted with permission courtesy 
DataLossDB.org, ©2008, Open Security Foundation (see Appendix A).  
 
As depicted in Figure 3, NAA (names and addresses) were the data type most 
compromised with 289 incidents reported followed by 273 incidents of SSN breaches.   
The rest of the data types were substantially less in total numbers of incidents with 60 
DOB (date of birth), 45 CCN (credit card numbers), 41 MED, 40 FIN (financial), 29 
ACC (account information – financial), 27 MISC (miscellaneous), and 7 EMA (e-mail 
address) for 2008 (Open Security Foundation).  Each data breach incident included a 
combination of data types that were compromised.  SSNs are typically more valuable PII 
to identity thieves than names and addresses (Greene, 2006).   However, in order to 
commit identity theft, the SSN in combination of the person’s name is necessary 
(Greene). 
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     Open Security Foundation (2008) has been collecting security breach information 
since 2000.  There were only a handful of security breaches reported during the early 
2000’s (Open Security Foundation).  Once the ChoicePoint data breach occurred in 2005, 
there were 22 states that enacted security breach notification laws (Greenberg, 2008) and 
consequently there were significantly more security breach incidents reported (Otto et al., 
2007). In 2005, 128 data breaches were reported (Open Security Foundation).  Figure 4 
shows the breakdown of types of breaches from 2000 through 2008 with laptops (21%) 
and hacking (20%) leading the types of all time breaches reported. 
 
Figure 4:  Incidents by Breach Type – All Time.  Adapted with permission 
courtesy DataLossDB.org, ©2008, Open Security Foundation (see Appendix A). 
 
     On a yearly basis, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) also compiles a list of 
security breaches. ITRC has been collecting information for the past four years (Curtin & 
Ayres, 2009).  Bartlett and Smith (2008) report exposure of PII as a risk management 
threat has been growing exponentially since 2006, up 140% from 2006 to 2007 with 448 
data breaches.   However, by August 2008, a record number of data breaches (449 
compared to a total of 448 for all of 2007) had already been reported on the ITRC (ITRC, 
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2008a) breach list.  As of December 31, 2008 for the year 2008, 656 data breaches and 
35.6 million record exposures were reported to ITRC (2008b).  This large increase of 
47% over 2007 is attributed to underreporting in previous years and more than one 
organization reporting the same breach (ITRC, 2009).    
     For the year 2008, businesses lead the way on the ITRC list with 36.6% of the 
breaches followed by education, government/military, medical/healthcare, and banking 
(ITRC, 2008b).  The banking industry, however, has more than half of the records that 
were compromised at 52.5% (ITRC, 2008b).  A summary of the breakdown of the 2008 
breaches outlined in the ITRC (2008b) data breach stats as of December 31, 2008 created 
by the author of this dissertation investigation depicted in Table 2 shows business as the 
leader in number of breaches with 240 breaches.  However, banking exposed three times 
as many records than business in 2008 with 18.7 million records compromised.  
Table 2. Summary of 656 Data Breaches   
 
CATEGORY # OF 
BREACHES 
% OF 
BREACHES 
# OF 
RECORDS 
PERCENTAGE 
OF RECORDS 
Banking 78 11.9% 18.7 M 52.5% 
Business 240 36.6% 5.8 M 16.5% 
Educational 131 20.0% .80 M 2.3% 
Government/Military 110 16.8% 2.9 M 8.3% 
Medical/Healthcare 97 14.8% 7.3 M 20.5% 
Created from the data in the ITRC 2008 Data Breach Stats (ITRC, 2008b). 
 
The ITRC (2009) points out that government previously had the highest number of 
breaches in 2006 with 30% of the breaches but had substantially reduced that number to 
only 16.8% in 2008.  According to ITRC (2009), “only 2.4% of all breaches had 
encryption or other strong protection methods in use.  Only 8.5% of reported breaches 
had password protection” (p. 1).  The ITRC 2008 data breach list shows only two Texas 
law firms and one Florida law firm as having reported a data breach (ITRC, 2008b).    
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One of the Texas law firms reporting a breach listed 672 records as being compromised.  
The other two law firms did not disclose the number of records breached (ITRC, 2008b).  
According to Curtin and Ayres (2009) in their analysis of the ITRC 2005, 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 reported data breaches, lost or stolen computing hardware were the largest 
contributors to breaches (29.14%), while insiders of an organization were responsible for 
35% of the ITRC reported data breaches. 
     The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse collects security breach incident information from a 
number of sources, but their primary source is the Open Security Foundation Data Loss 
Database (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2008).   Their chronology of data breaches 
indicates there have been over 246 million breaches since 2005 (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse).  Greenberg (2008) depicts in Figure 5 a 2008 breakdown of the 880 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reported data breach notifications.  
 
Figure 5.  How data are breached. Adapted with permission from ©National 
Conference of State Legislature (see Appendix A), “Right to Know,” by P. 
Greenberg, December 2008, p. 27, State Legislatures. 
 
The majority of the breaches (45%) were attributed to lost or stolen equipment, while 
hacking only contributed to 18% of these incidents.  Inadvertent Web exposure (14%), 
lost mail (12%), improper disposal (6%), and insider fraud (5%) were the other reasons 
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provided for the incidents reported to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (Greenberg).  
Schwartz and Janger (2007) believe insider fraud reporting has historically been 
extremely low due to the fact that companies do not typically report insider abuse. 
     Romanosky et al. (2008) state there may be reporting biases with regard to who 
reports a data breach. According to Sveen, Sarriegi, Rich, and Gonzalez (2007) data 
breaches are typically under reported by employees due to disincentives such as 
embarrassment, lack of positive gains, fear of punitive measures or reprimands, and time 
allotment being too high for completion of reporting forms.  In law firms, the lack of 
commitment and/or incentives to report a security breach incident can have serious 
consequences, such as malpractice and regulatory compliance penalties (Goldberg, 2008).  
     In 2007, TJX Companies, Inc., the parent company of a number of discount retailers, 
reported a large security breach involving 94 million Visa and Master Card records due to 
the inappropriate use of WEP (wired equivalent privacy) wireless security, inadequate 
storage of these records, and a failure to encrypt data at rest (Bartlett & Smith, 2008; 
Berg et al., 2008; Chandler, 2007; Heitzenrater, 2008).  Due to the inadequate security 
solutions in place, hackers were able to break into the TJX Companies network and 
compromise these 94 million records for 18 months before being discovered.  This data 
security breach crossed many jurisdictions (Chandler) and cost approximately $4.5 
billion (Berg et al.).   
     Another security breach incident reported in 2008 involved the Hannaford Brothers 
Supermarket chain (Bartlett & Smith, 2008). Approximately 4.2 million records were 
compromised by hackers (Bartlett & Smith).  As noted by Swartz (2008) the numbers of 
records compromised typically are grossly understated.  According to Bartlett and Smith 
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only a small percentage of compromised records are used in an illegal way.  Despite the 
lack of criminal activity involved with compromised data, the trust of the client in the law 
firm that has reported a security breach incident may be damaged (Bartlett & Smith).  
However, Chandler (2007) stated that as large numbers of security breach notices are 
distributed, affected individuals become increasingly desensitized to these notifications. 
Information Security Assessment 
     An information security assessment is a critical exercise for protecting the confidential 
and sensitive data (Humphreys, 2007; Salmela, 2008) that resides on a law firm’s 
network and portable media devices (Batista, 2006; Heikkila, 2006).   A security 
assessment based on a combination of a risk assessment that identifies the potential 
threats to mission critical assets of a law firm, along with vulnerability scans of 
applications, ports, and operating systems, including mission critical databases, assist in 
the mitigation and remediation of potential threats (Batista).  Based on the identification 
of the mission critical assets that need the utmost protection and the level of risk accepted 
by law firm management, the scope of the vulnerability assessment is defined 
(Humphreys; Salmela).   Natural, human, and environmental threats that are identified 
can aid in determining the management, operational, and technical controls implemented 
to remediate these threats (Bowen et al., 2006; Heikkila). 
     IT risk assessments are performed to protect vital business processes and key assets of 
a law firm (Batista, 2006; Salmela, 2008).  According to Humphreys (2007), the goal of a 
risk assessment is to evaluate the impact of a threat based upon the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) approach in law firm environments (Batista).  If a 
database becomes unavailable, the lawyers sit idle unable to bill time and as a 
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consequence thousands of dollars in revenue can be lost (Bisel, 2007).  In the event that a 
database becomes corrupt or sensitive information is inadvertently disclosed, the cost can 
range from losing the case to losing the confidence of the client (Comerford, 2006; 
Desouza, 2008).  The firm’s reputation is at stake should the trust the client places in the 
law firm suddenly be destroyed due to the inadvertent or deliberate disclosure of the 
client’s information to unauthorized parties due to a security breach incident (Alagna et 
al., 2005; Desouza; Salmela, 2008).  The exposure of the firm to lawsuits can range in the 
millions of dollars. 
     Accordingly, an initial risk assessment should be performed by the law firm’s IT 
Department in order to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities to unauthorized 
access to PII and confidential data (Ross, 2007; Batista, 2006).  An independent third 
party security firm may also be contracted to perform vulnerability assessments and, 
thereby, discover the potential risks (Foley, 2008; Heikkila, 2006).  If the decision is to 
hire an IT consulting firm to conduct a security assessment, this typically includes the 
scheduling of interviews with lead department personnel and/or individual users in all 
satellite offices as well as the primary location.  These interviews provide verification as 
to whether employees are abiding by the law firm’s written security policies and 
procedures (Humphreys, 2007; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).   The 
employees respond to specific questions taken directly from the security policies to assist 
with ascertaining whether or not these policies are understood and applied correctly 
(Humphreys) by law firm employees.  
     Risk assessment results can be categorized by likelihood of occurrence, impact on the 
firm’s tangible and intangible assets, acceptance of risk with remediation, and acceptance 
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of risk without corrective actions (Humphreys, 2007).   Whether the law firm or an 
independent third party security firm performs the security assessment, the results of this 
assessment are usually presented to the law firm’s managing partners and the IT 
Department supervisor (Batista, 2006).  Managing partners are not typically trained in 
information security and, therefore, the final risk assessment results must also be 
presented in a format that is easily understood by the lay-person (Batista; Heikkila, 
2006).  As noted by Bowen et al. (2006), this report should not consist of accusations 
about the risks, but rather documentation on actual and projected threats and risks for 
enabling informed business decisions regarding appropriate corrective controls necessary.  
The risk assessment should include the review and analysis of compliance with 
information security policies and procedures by law firm employees. 
     Participants in the risk assessment process can include those users that remotely 
access law firm content and information.  The various assets of a law firm must be 
evaluated to determine what the critical assets are and whether or not they are adequately 
protected (Humphreys, 2007).   NIST outlines the various levels of management controls, 
operational controls, and technical controls that an organization should strive for with its 
security plan (Bowen et al., 2006).  It is important to begin with the mission critical 
components and develop policies to mitigate any gaps between security risks and 
corrective actions (Humphreys).   
     Threat identification includes reviewing the physical or hardware and software 
components that support access to the law firm’s computer systems and network and any 
vulnerable applications which may perpetuate a security breach incident.  Each threat is 
ranked by the probability of occurrence and whether or not a law firm is willing to accept 
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the risk, avoid the risk by prohibiting a certain action from being taken, or transfer the 
risk to an insurance carrier or other third party (Hadfield, 2008; Humphreys, 2007; 
ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).  Threat probability levels assist with 
the control analysis, likelihood of occurrences, and impact analysis determination that 
must be made for each asset (Bowen et al, 2006; Humphreys).   
     Vulnerability assessments can be conducted with scanning tools that identify the 
potential risks to the applications, servers, and routers (Batista, 2006; Hadfield, 2008).  A 
penetration test can also assist in identifying how unauthorized users could potentially 
compromise a law firm’s business assets (Bowen et al., 2006).  Based on the risks that are 
identified, the law firm should consider implementing controls to mitigate the threats and 
vulnerabilities (ISO/IEC 27001 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).  
     Due care must be exercised when performing vulnerability scans of law firm 
networks.  The potential for exposing a firm’s assets during the vulnerability assessment 
should be determined and guarded against unintended intrusions (Bowen et al., 2006).  
The tools selected for vulnerability scans may target Microsoft products as well as 
Cisco and Citrix products that are commonly used in law firm networks (Gibney & 
Corham, 2008).  For example, common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) are found 
in the Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) and Apache Web servers (Whitman 
& Mattord, 2008).  The United States Computer Emergency Response Team (U.S. – 
CERT) numbers are typically included in vulnerability scan reports.  CERT publicly 
announces vulnerabilities found, as well as the mitigation in the form of patches to 
remediate these vulnerabilities (Arora, Nandkumar, & Telang, 2006).  The published 
vulnerabilities are assigned numbers for reference purposes. These numbers are divided 
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into candidate numbers (CAN) and CVE numbers (Carnegie Mellon University, 2008; 
Pfleeger & Rue, 2008).  A CAN is a potential vulnerability, while a CVE is a confirmed 
vulnerability (Pfleeger & Rue).   Thus, the vulnerabilities identified by the vulnerability 
scan need to be remediated with the appropriate patch to safeguard the law firm network 
from data leakage and unauthorized access to PII. 
     Management controls, operational controls, and technical controls safeguard tangible 
and intangible assets (Bowen et al, 2006).  A law firm’s reputation and client perceptions 
are intangible assets (Desouza, 2008).  Tangible assets include the law firm’s hardware, 
software, electronic documents, paper documents, and employees (Humphreys, 2007).   
Management Controls 
 
     Management controls include vulnerability assessments, security policies, and security 
plans, implemented to manage the security of the law firm’s computer systems and 
network (Bowen et al., 2006).  Law firm networks contain financial data, trade secrets, 
personnel information, client records, including PII and other sensitive data (Comerford, 
2006).   Protecting this data from disclosure to unauthorized individuals is critical to law 
firm operations (Ries, 2007). Typically, physical security is the first line of defense that is 
commonly addressed by law firms (Keller et al., 2005).  Critically important is the 
implementation of security policies and procedures enforced by management to safeguard 
the integrity of law firm computer information systems (Metzler, 2007).     Once a 
vulnerability assessment is performed and security policies are drafted, a yearly review of 
the enforcement of security controls is recommended to ensure the adequacy of security 
controls in mitigating emerging security threats (Humphreys, 2007).  Any time a data 
security breach of a law firm’s network has occurred, an assessment should be performed 
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and the security incident documented and mitigated (Alagna et al., 2005; Humphreys; 
ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).  According to Humphreys, whenever 
a new technology is employed by the law firm, an assessment should be conducted to 
ensure that threats and/or risks associated with the new technology are reduced.   
     The designation of an individual responsible for security is recommended by ISO/IEC 
27002:2005 (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).  Thus, law firms should 
consider hiring a Chief Security Officer (CSO) or Information Systems Security Officer 
(ISSO) to oversee the overall information security of the law firm (Alagna et al., 2005; 
Bowen et al., 2006).  According to Alagna et al., this person should have information 
security qualifications relative to network access controls, IDSs, as well as information 
security policies and procedures and be able to communicate IS issues with the lead IT 
person such as the IT Director or Chief Information Officer (CIO).  If a law firm has not 
developed a security plan or drafted security policies, this may be the first order of 
business (Keller et al., 2005; Metzler, 2007).  A CSO/ISSO oversees the development of 
security policies and the enforcement of security policies and procedures (Alagna et al.; 
Bowen et al.; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  At a minimum, one of the current IT 
Department employees may be designated to assist with vulnerability assessments.  
Attendance at security training sessions on a regular basis to gain insight on the security 
risk assessment process and maintain an understanding of the current threats and 
technical controls available is recommended for the CSO/ISSO (Bowen et al.; ISO/IEC 
27001 Joint Technical Committee, 2005; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee; 
Humphreys, 2007).  
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Operational Controls 
 
     Operational controls include physical security, personnel security, business continuity 
planning, incident response, hardware and software maintenance, confidential 
information protection, and security awareness training (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical 
Committee, 2005) that are implemented by law firm personnel rather than automatically 
by computer software (Bowen, et al., 2006).  The law firm may consider including an 
audit log requirement in the written security policies with an established protocol for 
setting up user accounts, including administrative user accounts and passwords (ISO/IEC 
27002 Joint Technical Committee; Lin, 2006; Metzler, 2007).  Also, written procedures 
for disabling a user account could be included in the security policies so that a standard 
process is in place for terminated employee accounts (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical 
Committee). 
     With regard to physical security, data centers consisting of network devices and 
servers should be in a secured area to protect confidential information and PII (ISO/IEC 
27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  For example, 
highly confidential compact discs (CDs) stored in hallways in plain view pose a threat for 
theft. Additionally, retired servers must be properly wiped of their contents prior to 
disposal (FTC Business Alert, 2005; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee).  The 
proper disposal of retired equipment and the locking of server rooms, as well as the safe 
storage of CDs should be included in the security policies to provide appropriate 
procedures for protecting law firm PII and confidential information (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint 
Technical Committee). 
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     Enforcing an encryption policy to ensure the encryption of data at rest and on laptops, 
as well as USB devices (Radcliff, 2008; Myler & Broadbent, 2006) is another operational 
control for law firms.  Access to confidential information residing on the law firm 
network and removable media devices can be mitigated by installing encryption software 
on hard drives as well as USB devices (Radcliff; Heikkila, 2007). The benefit of 
encrypting PII and sensitive data is that the state security breach notification laws, with 
the exception of Wyoming, specifically exempt notices to clients if the compromised PII 
is encrypted and the encryption key is not attached (Greenberg, 2008).   
     In the absence of training or educational sessions regarding security issues, law firm 
employees may lack procedures or policies covering the basic functions, such as 
changing the default passwords issued to each user (Gupta & Hammond, 2005).  This 
absence results in a large numbers of users who never change default passwords (Gupta 
& Hammond; Metzler, 2007).  One corrective action could be implementing the 
requirement that the login password be changed upon the first login session (ISO/IEC 
27002 Joint Technical Committee, 2005).  The operational control of changing passwords 
has met with some resistance (Keller et al., 2005) from law firm users (M. Thorogood, 
personal communication, December 18, 2008).  However, law firm IT departments must 
develop, implement, and enforce password policies that will assist with mitigating this 
risk (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).   
     Further consideration as to the number of times a password must be changed should 
coincide with the sensitivity of the data being protected and the feasibility of users 
changing, as well as protecting, their passwords (ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical 
Committee, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2008).  From time to time, a law firm may 
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employ many contract attorneys to work on litigation support databases (Gorga & 
Halberstam, 2007) who have access to sensitive data.  In these types of situations it is 
important that the passwords change more often.  It is difficult for people to remember 
their passwords due to the number of passwords required on various Websites 
(Richardson, 2006), as well as at the law firm.  According to Harrison (2006) a 2006 
Sophos survey found that “41 percent of the respondents said they always use the same 
password, 45 percent said they have a few different passwords, and 14 percent said they 
never use the same password on multiple Web sites” (p. 5).  Strong passwords require a 
combination of lower case letters, upper case letters, as well as a mix of numbers and/or 
other characters found on a keyboard (Basta & Halton, 2008; Harrison; Keller et al., 
2005; Richardson).  Training on how to choose and maintain a strong password is 
advisable for all law firm employees and mandatory particularly for all temporary 
contract attorneys (Gorga & Halberstam; Heikkila, 2006), especially those with access to 
PII and sensitive data. 
Technical Controls  
 
     Technical controls are those security controls, such as access controls, audit logs, and 
user authentication that assist with the detection of security violations by automated 
software programs (Bowen et al., 2006; ISO/IEC 27002 Joint Technical Committee, 
2005).  Technical controls, such as anti-virus software, IDSs, and data leakage content 
filtering, assist with enforcement of law firm security policies (Whitman & Mattford, 
2008).   
     Audit logs are incorporated within software packages and merely need to be enabled 
in order to log the events that have occurred within a computer program (ISO/IEC 27002 
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Joint Technical Committee, 2005; Kent & Souppaya, 2006).  For example, data leakage 
software can identify whether SSNs or credit card numbers are being sent within the 
contents of an unencrypted e-mail message (Hook, 2009).  This data leakage software 
will prohibit and/or stop the e-mail from being successfully sent out.  It will also send an 
automated e-mail to the sender stating that the inclusion of SSNs, credit card numbers or 
other PII is a violation of law firm policies as well as certain laws (Hook). Event logs are 
reviewed to determine if a security breach has occurred and to assist with the 
investigation of an incident (Kent & Souppaya).  Additionally, audit logs may act as a 
preventative tool if law firm employees are aware that their actions are being logged.   
Summary of What is Known and Unknown about the Topic 
     Security policies allegedly help with preventing security breach incidents (Baker & 
Wallace, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Hong et al., 2006; 
Keller et al., 2005; Metzler, 2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006). Doherty 
and Fulford found no statistical relationship between security policies and security breach 
incidents.  However, they did not examine whether or not the security policies were 
initiated by the security breach or were already in place when the security breach incident 
occurred.   
     Wiant (2005) investigated the existence of information security policies in hospitals 
and their value in prompting hospital employees to report security incidents.  This survey 
had a 5.6% completed response rate to their mail surveys.  Wiant found that those 
hospitals with information security policies did not have fewer incidents or less serious 
incidents of computer abuse than those hospitals that had no information security policies 
at all.  Wiant suggests that the legal industry is behind in security initiatives and 
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recommends further research with regard to the effectiveness of information security 
policies in abating security incidents. 
     Regulatory compliance requires sensitive data be adequately safeguarded from 
inadvertent disclosure and supports the availability of audit trails to monitor who has 
access to data (Bowen et al., 2006; Greene, 2006).  Laws requiring administrative, 
physical, and technical safeguards for compliance include 45 state security breach 
notification laws as of October 2009 requiring notification of unauthorized access to 
computerized PII (Greenberg, 2009).  These security breach notification laws are similar 
to SB 1386 (2002), GLBA (1999), HIPAA (CMS, 2003), and SOX (2002).  Law firms 
have clients who must comply with these regulations.  When protected data are 
transferred to the law firm by the client, the law firm must also comply with the 
regulations and provide adequate safeguards (Comerford, 2006).  Law firms must abide 
by applicable state security breach notification laws with regard to their employee records 
in the event employees’ SSNs, bank accounts, or other financial information is breached 
(Johnson, 2008; Kugele & Placer, 2007; Schwartz & Janger, 2007). 
The Contribution This Study Will Make to the Field  
     There is little empirical research on information security policies and their effect on 
computer security breach incidents (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Hagen et al., 2008; Hong 
et al., 2006; Kemp, M., 2005;  Romanosky et al., 2008; Thomson, K-L & von Solms, R., 
2006; Wiant, 2005).  The contribution of this dissertation investigation is the furtherance 
of the research of Doherty and Fulford, as well as Wiant with a different population and 
discovery of whether information security policies created proactively aided in 
preventing security breach incidents.   
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     Surveys of different populations have produced varied results concerning security 
(Pfleeger & Rue, 2008). Hong et al. (2006) determined in a study of companies in Taiwan 
that “Organizational type will have an impact on the time of building an ISP [information 
security policy]” (p. 111) and “The larger size of MIS department of an organization, the 
earlier will this organization build an ISP” (p. 11).  According to Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen (2007), research has historically concentrated on the technological 
perspective; and additional research is needed with regard to practical observations of 
security management.   In a study of companies in Norway, Hagen et al.(2008) 
determined security measures are interdependent.  According to Albrechtsen et al., the 
implementation and effectiveness of security measures result in an inverse relationship 
and “This inverse relationship is interpreted as a metaphorical staircase of four steps: 
security policy; procedures and control; tools and methods; and awareness creation” (p. 
393).   The author’s findings regarding the effectiveness of information security policies 
in reducing the number of computer security breach incidents will contribute to the body 
of knowledge and provide data concerning the perception of law firms, an under 
represented population, in the information assurance field. 
     The author also added to the body of knowledge with regard to security breach 
notification laws.  Although information assurance is evolving with regard to computer 
security breach incidences (Pfleeger & Rue, 2008; Romanosky et al., 2008; Wiant, 2005), 
this research is valuable because it provides insight concerning the effect that information 
security policies have on computer security breaches in law firms.  The proliferation of 
security breach incidents has substantially and rapidly risen over the past five years 
(ITRC, 2009; Open Security Foundation, 2008; Romanosky et al.).  In the U.S., 
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individual State data breach notification laws protect the PII of individuals and 
subsequently require notification to state residents of possible compromises that may lead 
to identity theft. Unlike other data privacy laws that are industry-specific, such as GLBA 
(for financial services) or HIPAA (for healthcare), these individual state laws are 
applicable to any industry, including the legal industry.  The one significant finding of 
this dissertation investigation in regard to the state security breach notification laws is 
that law firms demonstrated a need to become more immersed in security breach 
notification law requirements with regard to the requirement that notification of a security 
breach of computerized data is based on where the resident resides rather than where the 
data reside (Romanosky et al.) in order to respond appropriately to any unauthorized 
access to client data or employee PII.  The results also demonstrated a significant 
difference between the small and medium, small and large, small and very large law 
firms with regard to who encrypts e-mail messages with the small law firms reporting 
less usage of encryption of e-mail messages and hard drive data.  While this is not a 
surprising finding given the financial constraints of small law firms, it does provide 
insight for legislators to apply when they consider passing laws mandating that all PII 
data inserted into e-mail messages or stored on hard drives be encrypted (Worthen, 
2008).   
    In this dissertation investigation, the author contributed to the body of knowledge with 
regard to an affirmation of literature regarding self-efficacy (LaRose et al., 2008).  This 
dissertation confirmed that users are unmotivated to download security software while in 
the middle of a project or they feel incapable of making an appropriate decision with 
regard to whether or not they should install security software (West, 2008).   
67 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
Research Methods Employed  
 
     This dissertation investigation utilized a Web-based survey to document and analyze 
the responses of law firm IT personnel with regard to their perceptions of how 
information security policies affect computer security breach incidents.  The author 
investigated the exploratory analysis study of Doherty and Fulford (2005), who surveyed 
IT directors from large U.K.-based organizations (employing more than 250 people) 
regarding the role of information security policies in relation to the number and severity 
of security breaches.  The author incorporated the Doherty and Fulford original survey 
instrument and compared those results to the data collected in this research. The 
relationship between information security policies and information security breach 
incidents was also examined.  Validated questions from the Doherty and Fulford survey 
were adapted into this dissertation study.   Survey questions regarding security threats, 
security policies, and successful implementation of information security policies were 
adopted from the original survey instrument received from Doherty and Fulford. 
Additional questions posited by the author included self-efficacy issues, applicable 
privacy laws, management approval and communication of security policies, and 
utilization of risk assessments and other security measures in law firms (Post & Kagan, 
2007; Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006).  Furthermore, the author investigated 
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the role of IT security assessments utilized by law firms in assuring that their networks 
are protected from possible information security breaches.   
Specific Procedures Employed  
Online Survey Development and Distribution 
 
     The author developed and distributed a Web-based survey by utilizing Zoomerang 
(www.zoomerang.com), a Web survey tool. Global law firm IT members of ILTA were 
surveyed.  Data were collected from the Web-based questionnaire with multi-choice 
questions, demographic questions, and Likert-scale questions.   As required whenever 
using human subjects, the author completed the institutional review board (IRB) process 
(Patton, 2002) with the Nova Southeastern University (NSU) IRB.  The author’s survey 
received initial NSU IRB approval on April 15, 2008 and on January 7, 2009 an 
Amendment of IRB Approved Studies (NSU IRB Protocol, 2008) was approved (see 
Appendix C). 
     The author developed a set of questions based on current information security policies 
and security breach notification laws (Gibney & Corham, 2008; Greenberg, 2009; Myler 
& Broadbent, 2006; Post & Kagan, 2007; Verdon, 2006; Wiant, 2005).  The original 
questions from the Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) study were validated in a pre-test and a 
post-test conducted by Doherty and Fulford.  This set of questions was included in the 
author’s Web-based survey on Zoomerang.    Five-point Likert-scale questions for the 
questionnaire contained five responses including a neutral response available in-between 
the strongly agree on one end and strongly disagree on the other end (Sekaran, 2003).   
     The variables in this dissertation investigation were information security policies, 
information security breach incidents, updating information security policies, revising 
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information security policies, adoption of best practices, self-efficacy, security measures, 
and law firm size.  According to Creswell (2009), relating the variables to research 
questions and specifically to survey instrument items aids the author in expressing how 
the research question answers were calculated.  This investigation’s variables, research 
questions, including the corresponding survey questions, are outlined in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Variables, Research Questions, and Items on Author’s Survey  
 
Variable Name Research Question Item on Survey 
Information 
Security Policies 
and Security 
Breach Incidents 
1. Do law firms that have written information 
security policies have fewer security breach 
incidents in terms of frequency and severity than 
those that do not have information security 
policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?  
See Questions  
3, 11, 12 
Information 
Security Policies 
and Security 
Breach Incidents 
2. Are law firms that have had information security 
policies in place for numerous years likely to have 
fewer computer security breach incidents in terms 
of both frequency and severity than those that do 
not have information security policies in place 
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)? 
See Questions  
3, 11, 12, 16 
Updated 
Information 
Security Policies 
and Security 
Breach Incidents 
3. Do law firms that have updated their information 
security policies on a regular basis have fewer 
security breach incidents in terms of frequency 
and severity than those that have not updated their 
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 
2005, p. 26)? 
See Questions  
3, 11, 12, 17 
Information 
Security Policies 
and Security 
Breach Incidents 
4. Are law firms that have an information security 
policy with a broad scope likely to have fewer 
security breaches in terms of both frequency and 
severity than those organizations that do not 
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
See Questions  
3, 11, 12, 21, 22 
Adoption of Best 
Practices and 
Security Breach 
Incidents 
5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of 
best practices likely to have fewer security 
breaches in terms of both frequency and severity 
than those organizations that have not (Doherty & 
Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
See Questions  
3, 11, 12, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 27 
Self-efficacy 6. When under a time deadline to finish an 
assignment, are law firm employees more likely to 
by-pass security measures in order to complete the 
task (Post & Kagan, 2007)? 
 
See Questions  
3, 28 
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Variable Name Research Question Item on Survey 
Information 
Security Policies 
and Security 
Breach Incidents 
7. Are law firm security policies created in response 
to an information security breach incident 
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)? 
See Questions  
3, 13, 14, 15, 29 
Security Measures 
and Information 
Security Policies  
8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, 
and/or penetration tests a part of law firms’ 
validation of the intended security policies (Myler 
& Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006)? 
See Questions  
3, 18, 19, 20, 30 
Information 
Security Policies 
and Law Firm Size 
9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and 
smaller law firms (less than 250 users) differ in 
whether they have written information security 
policies (Gibney & Corham, 2008)? 
See Questions    
3, 14 
Information 
Security Policies, 
Security Breach 
Incidents, and Law 
Firm Size 
10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) 
and larger law firms (more than 251 users) differ 
in whether written information security policies 
were due to information security breach incidents 
(Gibney & Corham, 2008)? 
See Questions  
3, 14, 15 
 
 
The remaining questions posed in the author’s online survey included demographic 
questions as to size of the IT department, location(s) of the firm offices, functions of law 
firm technology related departments, designation of security responsibility, education, 
gender, age, job level, length of experience, position at the law firm, and privacy and/or 
security law compliance requirements.  
     The author’s online survey was distributed through an e-mail message from the 
ILTA’s Executive Director, Randi Mayes, to its members via its membership database of 
law firm technology professionals that included a link to the author’s Zoomerang survey.  
By having the cooperation of ILTA (see Appendix D), the survey was more credible and 
well received by its members (Baker & Wallace, 2007), instead of coming directly from a 
lesser known sender.  In an effort to encourage responses, Ms Mayes provided a link to 
the ILTA Website where a PDF of the survey questions was available for ILTA members 
to preview prior to participating in this dissertation study.  As of April 2009, 1,123 law 
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firms globally held ILTA memberships.  The author utilized Zoomerang.com to host this 
survey since ILTA members are familiar with completing the annual ILTA technology 
surveys using the Zoomerang interface. The questionnaire was formatted in hypertext 
markup language (HTML) and uploaded to the Zoomerang.com Website. The 35 
question survey distributed to ILTA members is attached as Appendix E. 
     According to Roster et al. (2007), online surveys are more cost efficient and provide 
more design features than paper surveys.  Evans and Mathur (2005) and Punter, 
Ciolkowski, Freimut, and John (2003) point out the advantage of the simplicity with 
which the respondents are able to complete the online survey as well as how quickly the 
researcher can analyze the results since they are already in an electronic format.    With 
the results already provided in electronic format, the reliability of the data collected from 
the online survey is improved since the results are not hand coded (Punter et al.). The 
simplification of responding to the author’s Zoomerang.com link provided by ILTA, 
where the respondents merely click on their answers, improves the response rate as 
compared to mailed paper surveys (Punter et al.). Evans and Mathur further found that 
online surveys are more convenient than mail surveys or interviews because they can be 
completed at the respondent’s leisure and thus are more likely to be completed.  
Sampling and Participants 
     The population for this online survey consisted of law firm IT personnel and others 
familiar with legal technology in law firms. Fulford and Doherty (2003) found that 
surveys targeting IT personnel “yield a more realistic assessment of the information 
security situations in an organization” (p. 107).  In this online survey, the author 
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continued to use firm size defined in ILTA’s 2008 Technology Survey (Gibney & 
Corham, 2008, p.3.) as:       
Firm size Number of users 
Small <151 
Medium 151-250 
Large 251-500 
Very Large >500 
 
Participants were provided a letter describing the research and an Informed Consent Form 
as the first page of the survey.    Subjects were recruited from the global ILTA 
membership.  By including law firms outside of the U.S., the author was provided an 
opportunity to gather and analyze data on an international level. Attorneys, paralegals, 
and law firm IT staff who consented to participate in the dissertation investigation 
constituted the research subjects. Thus, a site selection purposeful sampling was utilized 
by targeting ILTA legal technology members who were knowledgeable and skilled in 
using their law firm’s IT (Sekaran, 2003).   
     ILTA agreed to assist with ensuring that only one e-mail invitation to take this 
questionnaire was sent to each law firm, despite multiple offices across the globe (see 
Appendix D).    The information obtained in this dissertation investigation was treated as 
strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by law.  The participant’s name was not 
linked to his/her responses and was not used in the reporting of information in 
publications or conference presentations. The names of subjects or e-mail addresses of 
the respondents were not known to the researcher since ILTA sent out the invitation.  
However, there was an opportunity for the respondents on the questionnaire to provide 
the author with their e-mail addresses for possible follow-up questions.  Nevertheless, 
their names and any other identifying information provided were not used in the reporting 
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of information in this dissertation, in any publications, or conference presentations. Only 
cumulative results were analyzed and placed into this dissertation.   
     Participation in this dissertation investigation by members of this legal technology 
group was on a random, volunteer basis, inasmuch as not every member who received the 
e-mailed link to the questionnaire completed it (Patton, 2002).  The author offered a copy 
of the results to participants as an enticement to participate (Baker & Wallace, 2007).  
Data Collection  
     Online survey questions elicited responses to direct questions concerning whether or 
not information security policies developed for law firm personnel affect security breach 
incidents.  Questions dealing with how security is handled, what security measures are in 
place, types of security breaches the law firm has encountered, and security policies 
utilization in law firms were posed to all participants.   
     Survey results were placed in the Zoomerang database on www.zoomerang.com, and 
were only available online to the author via an ID and a password.  The raw data results 
were then exported from the Zoomerang database into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  
Confidentiality was maintained by the anonymity of the results provided on this 
Zoomerang account and no identifying information of the respondents was transferred to 
NSU.    
Data Analysis 
     The survey results were tabulated using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS™)12.0 for the advanced statistics, as well as SPSS™ PASW Statistics 17.0 for 
Microsoft Windows, and Microsoft Excel 2007 software’s statistical functions to 
create tables representing the respondents’ responses. An interpretation of these results in 
74 
 
the form of a narrative addresses responses to the research questions and include tables 
(Creswell, 2009) created using both SPSS™ and the statistical functions of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. Data analyses are provided in a narrative form that included an 
interpretation of the findings (Creswell).     
     Assistance with the analysis of the advanced statistics of this study’s results was 
provided by Dr. Phyllis Curtiss, Director of the Grand Valley State University (GVSU) 
Statistical Consulting Center (SCC).  Dr. Curtiss had access to the raw data Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet containing the individualized responses of the respondents, which 
was loaded onto a GVSU secure server that requires userid and password to access the 
data. This spreadsheet was utilized to calculate the advanced statistics and was 
safeguarded by limiting access to the file at the SCC to only Dr. Curtiss and those 
students generating the statistics under the direction of Dr. Curtiss.  Upon completion of 
the advanced statistical calculations, this file was securely deleted from the GVSU SCC 
computers and network. 
The Role of the Researcher 
 
      According to Creswell (2009), the background of the researcher in qualitative studies 
should be included in the study to provide an understanding of how past experiences may 
influence the interpretation of the dissertation investigation. The author has firsthand 
knowledge of the evolution from paper documents exchanged during litigation to the 
current trend of electronic document production with 18 years of experience as a 
paralegal in two law firms in Michigan.  Most recently achieving her Certified 
Information Security Manager (CISM), Certified Information Privacy Professional 
(CIPP) certification, as well as experience  as a law firm Information Technology (IT) 
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Project Manager, and Information Security Consultant, the author has been exposed to 
the numerous information security policies, security breach incidents, data privacy laws, 
and security breach notification laws.  The issue of security and confidentiality of 
sensitive client information and PII is of primary concern to a law firm.   
Reliability and Validity 
 
     According to Sinkovics, Penz, and Ghauri (2008), reliability is more objective than 
subjective in qualitative research.  Sinkovics et al. suggest building on a previous study as 
a way to remove method bias.  The author furthered the study of Doherty and Fulford 
(2005) in an attempt to remove this validity issue.  According to Creswell (2009), 
member checking of themes discovered from the investigation should be presented to 
someone involved with the group taking the survey.  To further enhance the validity of 
the Web-based survey, the author used member checking with the 2007-2009 ILTA 
President and Sidley Austin LLP’s Enterprise End User Services Director, Joy Heath 
Rush, to ensure the accuracy of the findings (Creswell).  Additionally, through peer 
debriefing and peer review, the author ensured the validity of the findings of the study 
with Meg Hackett, J.D., a lawyer in a law firm who did not participate in the online 
survey (Creswell).  By surveying a diverse population of IT law firm personnel across the 
U.S. the author further ensured the corroboration of the Web-based study (Creswell & 
Clark, 2007; Patton, 2002).   
     Importantly by incorporating the Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) original survey 
instrument into this dissertation investigation, the author also validated the findings 
obtained by Doherty and Fulford within the legal sector (Patton) and also demonstrated 
the reliability of this earlier survey (Creswell, 2009). Doherty and Fulford validated their 
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survey instrument through two pre-tests and a pilot study exercise distributed to 
experienced IS researchers and senior IT professionals with IS duties.  A panel of subject 
matter experts provided input as to the validity and reliability of the author’s survey 
questions as well.  The subject matter expert panel included: 
1. Anne K. Abatte – Ph.D., Executive Director Greater Cincinnati Library 
Consortium, Cincinnati, Ohio 
 
2. Ruth S. Stevens, M.L.S, J.D., Associate Professor, Grand Valley State University, 
Grand Rapids, Michigan  
 
3. Mark Thorogood, M.S. – Manager, Application Services at McDermott Will & 
Emery LLP, Chicago, Illinois 
 
The subject matter experts’ comments (see Table 4) formed the foundation for the 
revision of the original survey.  The author’s survey (see Appendix E) primarily 
incorporated the questions from the original survey instrument (see Appendix F) 
developed by Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) to support their empirical study regarding 
security breaches and security policies.  Appendix G shows the redline revisions made to 
the Doherty and Fulford original survey instrument.  These changes enabled the author to 
customize the original survey to match the research questions for this dissertation 
research. 
Table 4.  Feedback from the Subject Matter Experts That Served as Panel Members 
 
Question Comment Resolution 
1 
How many lawyers are 
employed by your law 
firm?   
"Small" should be smaller--you 
may insult someone with 
numbers that large. 
 
Why are these law firm size 
numbers significant?  Why have 
break between 150 and 151 vs. 
100 and 101, etc.  Are these 
categories used by another survey 
or group?   
ILTA audience uses 
these terms on a regular 
basis.  No action taken. 
 
The target audience is 
familiar with these law 
firm sizes since ILTA 
uses these sizes on all of 
their surveys. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
 
The term “employed” in the 
question may be confusing. By 
definition, partners are not 
employed, they are self-
employed. In a typical law firm, 
only counsels, non-attorney 
professionals, and associates are 
employees of the firm. Partners 
are business owners, not 
employees. 
 
Wouldn’t the size of the IT 
department be important as well? 
 
Change the sentence “How many 
lawyers are employed by your 
law firm?” to “Indicate the size 
of your law firm?” 
 
Inside the table, change “Number 
of Users” to either “Number of 
End-users” or “Number of 
Lawyers.” Note that the term 
“attorneys” should not be used 
because it means different things 
depending upon the nationality of 
the reader. For example, there are 
attorneys, barristers, and 
solicitors in the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, the term 
“employed” should not be used 
because technically partners are 
business owners, not employees. 
Lastly, the term used in the table 
should agree with the term used 
in the question. The terms 
presently do not agree. 
 
Is the size breakdown consistent 
with other surveys? 
 
Revised the question to:  
“Please indicate the size 
of your law firm.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, added this question. 
 
 
Revised the question to:  
“Please indicate the size 
of your law firm.” 
 
 
ILTA’s Executive 
Director indicated via e-
mail that she believes 
number of users is a 
more accurate depiction 
of firm size.   
 
Revised attorneys to law 
firm employees/lawyers 
or other members of the 
firm throughout the 
survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
The target audience is 
familiar with these law 
firm sizes since ILTA 
uses these sizes on all of 
their surveys. 
 
 
 
78 
 
Question Comment Resolution 
2 
Which of the following 
most accurately describes 
the location(s) of your 
firm’s offices?    
 
Why do you switch from "global" 
to "international" in the 
responses?  This could be 
confusing. 
 
 
Does this mean an office outside 
of the U.S.? Global typically 
means comprehensive. The terms 
global and international may be 
confusing. The term “global” 
appears to mean non-U.S. office; 
however, the term could also 
mean servicing clients from 
multiple nations, which is 
sometimes done, especially when 
dealing with intellectual property 
matters before the Europe court. 
 
The question seems to be tapping 
two dimensions (i.e., office count 
and office locations). The 
question could be severed into 
two questions, thereby making it 
clearer. 
 
 
Changed all responses to 
“international.” 
 
 
 
 
Changed all responses to 
“international.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised question to: 
Please indicate the size 
of your law firm 
information technology 
department.   
Added a new Question 
3:  Which of the 
following most 
accurately describes the 
location(s) of your 
firm’s offices?  
 
Added a new Question 
3:  Which of the 
following most accurately 
describes the location(s) 
of your firm’s offices?    
 
  
4 
Which of the following 
best describes your law 
firm?   
 
 
None. 
 
5 
Which of the following 
technology-related 
department(s) does your 
law firm have?   
Get rid of "but" in the last choice-
-Seems confusing, and perhaps 
says that a different name is 
wrong. 
 
Revised question to list 
functions rather than 
department titles. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
I am concerned about the 
wording of this question.  Should 
this be a list of functions, not 
department titles?  I see a 
situation in which departments at 
two different firms have the same 
titles, but they do different things.  
 
What is the difference between 
information technology and 
information systems? Moreover, 
many firms call their IT 
department Information Services. 
This raises the concern of 
synonyms and the need to clarify 
terms and concepts that are 
potentially ambiguous. 
 
What about a large office that 
does not have departments? 
 
The list of departments appears to 
contain synonyms, which may 
cause confusion. 
 
Are you only interested in 
services that relate to information 
security? If so, you should state 
that.  If you want all services, you 
might get a lot of responses in 
your "Other" category, like 
training, hardware installation, 
upgrade, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changed “information 
systems” to 
“information services.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changed to a list of 
functions. 
 
Revised. 
 
 
 
 
Added information 
security to question: 
“Which of the following 
information security 
functions does your law 
firm technology-related 
department(s) provide?” 
6 
Does your law firm have 
a designated person or a 
group of people who 
handle security issues?   
 
 
Are you only interested if they 
have one person?  What if they 
had two people or a whole 
department?  How should they 
answer the question? 
 
 
 
Changed to have two 
“yes” answers – one for 
a single person and the 
other for a group. 
7 
If yes, what is their title?   
 
 
None. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
8 
Which of the following 
privacy and/or security 
laws is your law firm 
required to comply with?   
 
 
I think there should be a "Don’t 
Know" option next to each 
option.  They might know about 
one law they have to comply with 
but not about another. 
 
 
Added a “Do not know” 
selection. 
9 
Please record in the table 
below the approximate 
number of IT security 
breaches that your law 
firm has experienced in 
the past two years. 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
10 
Please indicate the 
severity of the worst 
breach of each type that 
your law firm has 
experienced in the past 
two years, using the scale 
provided. 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
11 
Please indicate your level 
of agreement with the 
following statements. 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
12 
Does your law firm have 
written information 
technology (IT) security 
policies? 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
 
13 
Were your law firm 
written IT security 
policies and procedures 
created due to a security 
incident/breach? 
 
None. 
 
14 
How long has your law 
firm been actively using a 
documented IT security 
policy? 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument 
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Question Comment Resolution 
15 
Approximately how often 
is the IT security policy 
updated?   
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
16 
Does your law firm audit 
and enforce the 
documented IT security 
policy? 
 
 
None. 
 
 
17 
Approximately how often 
is the IT security policy 
audited by an independent 
third party?   
 
 
I don't like the sequencing of the 
responses.  They should be in 
order of frequency from least to 
highest.  Every two years should 
be before less than every two 
years.  I also don't like your 
intervals.  I think there are gaps 
and combining "more" and "less" 
could create confusion.  How 
about specific ranges.  Every two 
years or more.  Between one year 
and 2 years, etc.  Whatever you 
want to know. 
 
Revised the sequencing 
of frequency from least 
to highest. 
18 
How is the IT security 
policy disseminated to 
law firm employees/ 
attorneys? 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
Revised “organization 
employees” to law firm 
employees/lawyers or 
other members of the 
firm. 
 
19 
Using the table below, 
please indicate the 
security issues covered in 
your IT security policy 
and/or through separate 
procedures or standards.  
If you do not explicitly 
cover an issue through 
your policy or a separate 
stand-alone standard, 
please leave blank. 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
20 
How important do you 
believe the following 
factors to be for the 
successful 
implementation of IT 
security in your law firm 
on a scale of 1-5 with 1 
being the least important 
and 5 being most 
important? 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
 
Revised “organization” 
to law firm. 
21 
How successful do you 
believe your law firm has 
been in adopting each of 
these factors on a scale of 
1-5 with 1 being the least 
important and 5 being 
most important? 
 
 
 
None – this question is from 
Doherty and Fulford’s original 
UK study on Info. Security 
Policies survey instrument. 
 
 
Revised “organization” 
to law firm. 
22 
Are IT security policy 
documents approved by 
management, published 
and communicated to all 
law firm employees and 
relevant third party 
service providers? 
 
Added a new Question 
22:  Are IT security 
policy documents 
approved by 
management? 
 
 
 
I think this combines too many 
things in one question.  How 
separating it into three questions 
  
1  approved 
2  published 
3 communicated 
 
 
Split old question 22 
into three questions as 
recommended. 
23 
Added a new Question 
23:  Are IT security 
policy documents 
published? 
 
 
  
Split old question 22 
into three questions as 
recommended. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
24 
Added a new Question 
24:  Are approved IT 
security policy documents 
communicated to all law 
firm employees and 
relevant third party 
service providers? 
 
  
Split old question 22 
into three questions as 
recommended 
25 
Are law firm computers 
shut down for inactivity 
after a defined period? 
 
 
None. 
 
26 
When under a time 
deadline to finish an 
assignment, how likely 
would it be to: 
 
 
In this question you don't say 
who you are referring to.  Is the 
person supposed to answer based 
on what they would do or what 
they think other people in their 
firm would do? 
 
 
Changed to add to: how 
likely would it be “for 
people in your law 
firm.” 
27 
Please indicate your level 
of agreement with the 
following statements: . . . 
 
 
Are you asking about both 
policies and procedures?  Is the 
question whether or not firms 
need written policies or whether 
they need procedures to protect 
information security or both?  
Could you just leave out the word 
“procedures”? 
 
 
Deleted procedures. 
 
28 
During the past 12 
months, how often did 
your law firm . . . ? 
 
I would highlight "past 12 
months" to make it easier to see. 
 
Do you need a “don’t know” 
option? 
 
Should this question include 
instructions such as select the 
answer that best applies because 
the potential responses are not 
collectively exhaustive? 
 
 
Highlighted on Word 
document and on 
Zoomerang. 
 
Added a “Do not know” 
column. 
 
Revised to, “During the 
past 12 months, how 
often did your law firm?  
Select the answer that 
best applies”. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
“A Few Times a Month” – 
Should this be “more than once 
per month”? 
 
Revised to “more than 
once per month”. 
29 
Which of the following 
statements is true for your 
law firm?   
 
I would switch the order on your 
last two choices.  This leads to 
sort of a natural progression. 
 
Switched order of last 
two choices. 
Section 4 header 
Demographic Questions 
These last few questions 
are to help me get to 
know you, the respondent 
better.  Like all of the 
questions in this 
questionnaire, your 
answers were held in 
strict confidence.  No 
answers were paired with 
an individual and only a 
cumulative set of results 
were presented in the 
dissertation. 
. . .  .get to know you, the 
respondent, better. . . 
 
Are these required or optional?  
Do you want to state that they are 
optional?  I might be put off by 
this type of question, but I 
understand why you are trying to 
get this information. 
 
Added comma after 
“respondent”. 
 
Added:  All of these 
responses are optional. 
30 
What is the highest level 
of education you have 
completed? 
 
"Highest level" could be difficult 
for someone.  What if they have a 
bachelors and a JD?  Does 
"highest level" assume that they 
also have a master degree? 
 
Are these categories (Ph.D.) 
necessary, particularly the A.B.D. 
category? 
 
Added:  “Prefer not to 
answer” to level of 
education. 
 
 
 
Removed A.B.D. 
31 
Please state your gender. 
 
 
None. 
 
32 
Please state your age. 
 
 
None. 
 
33 
Which title best describes 
your job level? 
 
Can you add "Law Firm 
Administrator" or even CEO as 
one of the options? 
 
Yes, added “Law Firm 
Administrator” and 
“Chief Executive 
Officer”. 
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Question Comment Resolution 
34 
Would you be willing to 
be contacted to answer 
follow-up questions via 
an e-mail message linking 
you to a second follow-up 
Zoomerang survey, if 
necessary?   
* Please note that your e-
mail address will only be 
used to send you the link 
to the additional survey.  
Any and all additional 
information obtained 
would be held in strict 
confidence and your 
name would not be used 
in the reporting of 
information. 
 
None. 
 
 
Final Paragraph 
 
Thank you for 
participating in this study!  
Is there anything 
additional that you would 
like to share with the 
researcher?  Please 
provide your comments in 
the space provided. 
 
When I started looking at the 
survey, one of my first thoughts 
(as a potential respondent) was 
whether my responses would be 
confidential.  I think there should 
be a reminder at the beginning of 
the survey (not just the cover 
letter) that responses are 
confidential and will not be 
linked to any particular firm or 
person.  If I were in law firm IT, I 
would be very hesitant to share 
details about my firm’s security 
procedures that could be leaked 
to others. 
 
 
Added confidentiality 
clause to first question 
and end of survey. 
 
Threats to Internal Validity 
     The primary internal validity threat to this dissertation investigation was maturation.   
Sekaran (2003) defines maturation as the tainting of the survey results due to an 
uncontrollable variable such as the passage of time.  Since technology is evolving at a 
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rapid pace, the threat of maturation effects through the passage of time as the dissertation 
investigation continues (Sekaran) coupled with technology changes is also a concern.  
The survey questions were posed to a panel of subject matter experts in an attempt to 
control this threat. The length the survey was open to the respondents was also limited to 
three weeks in an effort to combat maturation effects.  
Threat to External Validity 
     A threat to external validity for this dissertation investigation was selection threats of 
having more than one person from the same law firm complete the questionnaire.   In an 
attempt to control this threat, ILTA agreed to send the link to this Web-based study to 
only one e-mail address per law firm (see Appendix D).  Additionally, an external 
validity threat that could not be controlled by the author was whether or not the person 
who received the link to the questionnaire was the actual person who completed the 
questionnaire. 
Formats for Presenting Results 
 
     The data collections were represented in graphical format and tables.  SPSS™ 12.0 was 
utilized for the advanced statistics, as well as SPSS™ PASW® Statistics 17.0 for 
Microsoft Windows and the statistical functions of Microsoft Excel 2007 to analyze 
and calculate the results of the questionnaires.  The survey results were provided to the 
researcher from the Zoomerang software in a format that was easily converted into 
SPSS™ and Microsoft Excel 2007 for analysis and computation of results using the 
various statistical features of these software programs. 
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Resource Requirements 
 
     Randi Mayes, the ILTA Executive Director, assisted with the distribution of the 
surveys to the ILTA members by distributing an e-mail invitation with the link to the 
author’s Zoomerang Website (see Appendix D).  Reminder e-mails to complete the study 
were sent by Ms. Mayes.  Zoomerang sent the online results only to the author.  Access to 
the data collected on Zoomerang was password protected and limited to the author.   
     Dr. Phyllis Curtiss, Director of the GVSU SCC and those students generating the 
advanced statistics under her direction had access to the raw data Microsoft  Excel 
spreadsheet containing the individualized responses of the respondents.  This raw data 
spreadsheet was provided by the author and loaded onto a GVSU secure server that 
requires userid and password to access the data. This spreadsheet was utilized to calculate 
the advanced statistics using SPSS™ 12.0.  Participants were not identified in any of the 
results.  Additionally, SPSS™ PASW® Statistics 17.0 for Microsoft Windows and 
Microsoft Excel 2007 were used to analyze and calculate the results of the 
questionnaires.   
     Internet access to the Zoomerang Website account to set up the survey and review the 
results of the survey as well as e-mail to send out the Zoomerang link to Randi Mayes 
were necessary resources.  The NSU electronic library (e-library), the Internet, and 
articles in professional journals and magazines supported the author’s research in this 
topic area. 
Summary 
     In this chapter the author delineated the specific procedures employed for conducting 
the survey and analyzing the survey findings.  The author described the methodology 
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utilized for this investigation.  The approach consisted of the development and 
distribution of a Web-based survey that was based on the Doherty and Fulford (2005) 
survey and included additional new questions posited by the author. The use of 
Zoomerang as the online survey tool and the agreement with ILTA to send out e-mail 
invitations to their members was also described. 
     Furthermore in this chapter, the author discussed the data analysis conducted with 
regard to the results received from the Zoomerang survey.  The composition of the target 
population and sampling for this study was described. The reliability and validity of the 
research was reviewed, including the feedback received from the subject matter experts 
that served as panel members with regard to customizing the Doherty and Fulford (2005) 
questions for this dissertation investigation.  Resource requirements and IRB approval 
processes were also examined.    
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
Introduction 
     This chapter reviews the findings of this dissertation investigation which was designed 
using the original survey instrument from the Doherty and Fulford (2005) study along 
with some additional questions posited by the author.  The survey was converted to an 
online survey, hosted on Zoomerang.  The analysis of these responses includes an 
analysis of their relationship to the Doherty and Fulford responses. 
     On March 12, 2009, ILTA Executive Director, Randi Mayes, sent out an invitation to 
1,123 ILTA members to partake in the author’s Web-based study by providing the ILTA 
members with an introduction to the author and a link to the Zoomerang online survey.  
Ms. Mayes included a link to the ILTA Website where a copy of the survey could be 
previewed prior to taking the survey.  Ms. Mayes also sent out notices on March 20, 2009 
and April 1, 2009 reminding all 1,123 ILTA members to complete the author’s survey on 
Zoomerang.  This survey was open for three weeks.  Those who completed the survey 
and agreed to respond to additional follow-up questions were sent an additional 
Zoomerang link to these questions on April 2, 2009.  Follow-up questions were open for 
two weeks. Overall, data were collected over a five week timeframe ending April 15, 
2009. 
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     A total of 111 ILTA members initiated responding to the online Zoomerang survey.  
Of these, there were 19 people who completed only a portion of the survey.  These 
incomplete responses were not included in the response rate or percentage calculation for 
valid responses (Sekaran, 2003).  There were 92 completed responses to the survey 
received, of which four completed the survey by declining to participate after reading the 
informed consent resulting in 88 valid responses. The response rate for the survey was 
8.19% (92 completed responses) with 7.83% (88) of the respondents providing valid 
responses.   
     It is interesting to note that the Doherty and Fulford study response rate was 7.7%.  
Wiant’s (2005) investigation had a 5.6% completed response rate to mail surveys 
regarding the existence of information security policies in hospitals and their value in 
prompting hospital employees to report security incidents.  The Computer Security 
Institute (CSI) response rate for their 13th year of its CSI Computer Crime and Security 
Survey (2008) was 10%.  Similar to the Doherty and Fulford study, as well as the Wiant 
studies, when CSI first deployed their survey in 1996, their response rate also was low at 
8.6% (Power, 2002).  
     The author supplemented the dissertation investigation with follow-up questions sent 
to 45 of the respondents that had provided e-mail addresses for this purpose.  The author 
asked the open ended question: “Why do you think so few people respond to 
questionnaires dealing with security?”  A number of the respondents stated that it was 
due to fear of disclosing vulnerabilities, exposure, or liability concerns.  The table below 
created from data received from follow-up questions shows the actual responses: 
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Table 5.  Open Ended Follow-Up Question 
 
Why do you think so few people respond to questionnaires dealing with security? 
1 Because we don't know who will have access to identifying information from the survey and 
we don't want to advertise our vulnerabilities. 
2 Some people are reluctant to publicize threats because it shows weakness and vulnerability. 
3 Most people think that their security is adequate, but many may not want to admit that they 
don't understand security. 
4 Reluctance to make public security arrangements; difficulty of answering the questions with 
the options provided. 
5 Most do not pay attention to security until they are impacted by the loss of same. 
6 You never think about it until it happens. 
7 Lack of understanding and denial that there is a problem. Securing computerized data is not 
understood by many IT professionals. Law firms in the U.S. are historically conservative in 
changing systems that appear to work and fix something only when it has broken. 
8 They either do not want to admit that their own firm has poor security or they have some 
silly idea that expressing knowledge of security policies somehow infringes on the security 
of their firm. 
9 :-) They either don't know anything about it or they don't care. 
10 Too shy to show that their office might be at risk, we always think that we don’t do enough 
to protect our system. Also too afraid to be noticed. 
11 For security reasons. Most people wouldn't want to describe the security system they have at 
home for fear it could help people break in. 
12 Because they do not understand the issues 
13 Fear, exposure and liability. 
14 They don't want to show their ignorance of the issue 
15 I don't think it's limited to security issues. But I do think that I hide the most ridiculous 
things from vendors (the name of my backup vendor; when the tapes go offsite; stuff that 
doesn't matter) in the name of security. Maybe people don't want to share something that, 
put together with all the other things, could cause a security breach? 
16 People get asked to fill out surveys every day. 
17 Fear of disclosure 
18 Not enough time to respond to surveys 
19 They are hiding from the fact that they are vulnerable. 
20 So few people know about it! And it's an emotionally difficult area to talk about when your 
firm isn't up to standards. 
21 It reminds them how their security is lacking in every area and how they are not following 
proper legal procedures 
22 Because they are afraid of the unknown and are embarrassed of their answers. 
23 Fear that the information will be used against them. Embarrassment. Ignorance on the 
subject. Many do not understand security and assume someone is taking care of it. 
24 Exposure to media. 
25 Because we are all concerned about our security and would not like others to know any 
vulnerabilities 
26 Afraid of public knowledge that will damage the chances for future business and cause loss 
of current customers. 
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Why do you think so few people respond to questionnaires dealing with security? 
27 Probably don't want to take the time to respond. 
28 Besides the fact it's a difficult (as in intellectually challenging) area, it may be an area no 
one really believes requires concern -- or expenditures -- until a problem actually surfaces 
(when the horse is on the way out of the barn). I know I am often accused of being 
"alarmist" and "going overboard on this stuff" and that likely won't change until (and if) an 
incident occurs (and if that incident costs money, it will immediately become "why haven't 
we?"). 
29 Out of sight, out of mind. 
30 Don't want to admit to not having adequate security procedures in place. 
 
 
Findings 
Demographics Analysis 
     Demographic questions such as level of education, gender, age, and job level were 
included in the survey instrument.  The basic demographic analysis was performed using 
Microsoft Excel.  Table 6 presents this demographic analysis.  The gender distribution 
demonstrated that about two- thirds (66%) of the survey respondents were male and 
approximately one-third (34%) were female.  Most of the respondents (42%) were 
between the ages of 36 and 45.  Over one-half of the respondents (55%) held the title of 
CIO/Director.  More than one-half of the respondents (52%) hold Bachelor degrees, 
while an additional number of respondents (19%) possess advanced degrees of Master 
degrees and one holds a law degree (1%). 
 
Table 6.  Demographic Data of the Study Respondents  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
   
High School Graduate 7 8% 
Paralegal Certificate 0 0% 
Bachelor Degree 46 52% 
Master Degree 17 19% 
Juris Doctorate 1 1% 
Ph.D. 0 0% 
Prefer not to answer 6 7% 
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Item Frequency Percentage 
Other, Please Specify 
  1   Some college 
  2  AA 
  3  Bachelor with 45 hours towards Master 
  4  Community College 
  5  Military Technical Academy Graduate 
  6  Some college 
  7  Associate Degree, Microsoft Certs. 
  8  Some college credits, but no degree 
  9  Technical College 
10  Network Admin Certificate, MS & Novel Cert 
11 12% 
   
Female 30 34% 
Male 57 66% 
   
Age   
18-25 1 1% 
26-35 6 7% 
36-45 37 42% 
46-55 29 33% 
56-65 12 14% 
65+ 0 0% 
Prefer not to answer 3 3% 
   
Associate 0 0% 
Partner 1 1% 
Chief Information Officer/Director 48 55% 
Chief Security Officer/Information Security Officer 1 1% 
Privacy/Compliance Officer 0 0% 
Project Manager 0 0% 
Legal Technology Manager 15 17% 
Paralegal/Legal Assistant 0 0% 
Legal Secretary 0 0% 
Technician 0 0% 
Database Programmer 0 0% 
Database Coder 0 0% 
Network Administrator 11 12% 
Other, Please Specify 
  1   Director of Information Technology 
  2  IT Director 
  3  Systems Administrator 
  4  Executive Director 
  5  Director 
  6  Technology Courseware Developer & Trainer 
  7  Staff Development & Training Manager 
  8  Information Systems Director 
  9  Office Manager/Administrator 
10  Director and Network Manager 
11  Director, Technology 
12  engineer 
12 14% 
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Law Firm Demographics 
     The survey instrument collected law firm demographics such as size of law firm in 
number of users, size of information technology department, location of law firm offices, 
country where the law firm was based, functions of the law firm technology-related 
department, whether the law firm had a designated IT security person or group, and title 
of the IT security person. This demographic data are presented in Tables 7 through12.   
     Table 7 reports on the sizes of the respondents’ law firms and the percentages of their 
law firm users. Close to one-half of the respondents (40%) were from small-sized law 
firms with fewer than 150 users. One-fourth of the respondents were from large-sized law 
firms with 251-500 users. Almost one-fifth of the respondents (19%) were from medium-
sized law firms with 150-250 users.  The remaining 16% of the respondents were from 
very large-sized law firms with less than 150 users. 
Table 7.  Size of Law Firm in Number of Users of the Study Respondents  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Small <150 Users 35 40% 
Medium 151-250  Users 17 19% 
Large 251-500  Users 22 25% 
Very Large >500  Users 14 16% 
 
 
 
     Table 8 presents data on the sizes of the respondents’ law firm information technology 
departments. The majority of the respondents (52%) had IT departments with 2 to 10 
people.  
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Table 8.  Size of Law Firm Information Technology Department of the Study 
Respondents  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
1 16 18% 
2-10 46 52% 
11-24 13 15% 
>25 13 15% 
 
 
     Tables 9 and 10 report on the location of the respondent law firm offices and the 
countries where they are based. The majority of the respondents (88%) were based in the 
U.S., with 10 percent of the respondents based in Canada, and the balance based in 
Australian (1%) and Asia (1%). Approximately one-half of the respondents had multiple 
offices in the U.S. (49%) or one office in the U.S. (32%) as their primary office. 
 
Table 9.  Location of Law Firm Offices of the Study Respondents  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
One office in the United States 28 32% 
One office in the United States as well as 
international office(s) 1 1% 
Multiple offices in the United States 43 49% 
Multiple offices in the United States as well as 
international offices 2 2% 
Multiple offices in the United States and one 
international office 4 5% 
One international office in Europe 0 0% 
Other, please specify 
One office in Canada 5 7% 
Other, please specify 
Multiple offices in Canada 1 1% 
Other, please specify:  Multiple of offices in 
Canada, one in US,UK & Australia 1 1% 
Other, please specify:  Australia 2 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Table 10.  Region Where Law Firm Offices of the Study Respondents Were Based 
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
United States based law firm 77 88% 
European Union based law firm 0 0% 
Canadian based law firm 9 10% 
Asia Pacific based law firm 1 1% 
Latin American based law firm 0 0% 
Prefer not to answer 0 0% 
Other, please specify:  Australia 1 1% 
 
     Tables 11 and 12 present data regarding the functions of the law firm technology-
related departments and report whether the law firm designated a person or group to 
handle IT security issues.  The majority of the respondents’ technology-related 
departments provided information security services (90%), disaster recovery (89%), 
information security appliance/software implementation (83%), incident response (80%), 
and information security policy development (78%).  Less than one-half of the 
respondents’ technology-related departments provided Web page design/development 
(49%) and privacy policy development (44%).   Very few law firms (2%) outsource all of 
these functions.  Less than three quarters of the law firm respondents (69%) had one 
person or a group of people designated to handle security issues. 
Table 11.  Functions of the Law Firm Technology-related Departments of the Study 
Respondents  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Information security services 80 91% 
Information security policy development 69 78% 
Privacy policy development 39 44% 
Web page design/development 43 49% 
Incident response 71 81% 
Disaster recovery 78 89% 
Information security appliance/software 
implementation 73 83% 
We outsource all of these functions 2 2% 
Do not know 2 2% 
Other, please specify:  
Outsource some of these functions 2 2% 
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Table 12.  Law Firm Designation of Security Personnel of the Study Respondents  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Yes, one person 23 26% 
Yes, a group of people 38 43% 
No 27 31% 
Do not know 0 0% 
 
     Table 13 presents data regarding statements the respondents indicated were true for 
their firm. Over one-half (56%) of the respondents indicated that security falls upon 
everyone in the IT department in their law firm.  Close to one-half (48%) of the 
respondents stated that an individual is designated to be responsible for information 
security in their law firm.  Almost one-quarter (22%) of the respondents did not have any 
individual designated as responsible for information security in their law firm. Only 
seven percent of the respondents indicated their law firm had a separate department 
responsible for information security. 
Table 13.  Law Firm Respondents’ Designation of Responsibility for Information 
Security  
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
There is an individual designated as being responsible for 
information security in my law firm. 42 48% 
There is a separate department in my law firm responsible for 
information security. 6 7% 
Information security falls upon everyone in the information 
technology department in my law firm. 49 56% 
No individual is designated as being responsible for 
information security in my law firm. 19 22% 
 
 
     Table 14 presents data regarding the privacy and security laws applicable to the law 
firm respondents, including U.S. laws and international laws. Almost one-half of the 
respondents did not know whether their law firms were required to comply with these 
laws, or claimed that their law firms did not have to comply with any of these laws.  
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Table 14.  Privacy and Security Laws Identified by Law Firm Respondents for 
Compliance 
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
PIPEDA (The Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Document Act) 9 11% 
State Data Breach Notification Laws 12 15% 
European Union Directive on Data Protection 2 2% 
GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) 3 4% 
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act) 31 38% 
FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act) 1 1% 
FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) 2 2% 
USA P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act 12 15% 
APEC Privacy Principals (Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) 3 4% 
Australia's Federal Privacy Act 3 4% 
Japan's Law Concerning the Protection of Personal 
Information 0 0% 
Do not know 32 39% 
Other, Please Specify: 
1   None 
2  Canadian Bar Assoc, Law Societies of BC, AB 
& YT 
3  None 
4  Not sure of the rest 
5  PIPA - Personal Information Protection Act 
6  None of these apply to us. 
7  Massachusetts Regulation 17 
7 9% 
 
 
Follow-up Questions 
 
     This dissertation investigation requested that respondents interested and willing to be 
contacted to answer follow-up questions via an e-mail message linking to a second 
Zoomerang survey provide their e-mail addresses.  Forty-five respondents agreed to 
respond to follow-up questions and provided their e-mail addresses.  Ten questions were 
posed to this group in a separate Zoomerang survey from April 2, 2009 through April 15, 
2009.   
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     According to Romanosky et al. (2008), the critical characteristic of the U.S. data 
security breach notification laws are that notice is dependent upon where the consumer 
resides rather than where the business is located.  Table 14 shows that only 15% of the 
respondents indicated that their law firms were required to comply with U.S. data 
security breach notification laws.  However, because at the time of the survey there were 
44 states (excluding Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and South 
Dakota) and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands with security 
breach notification laws, the author speculated that it was likely that the U.S.-based law 
firms had one or more clients who resided in a state requiring data security breach 
notifications.  In order to test this speculation, the author asked the 45 respondents who 
had agreed to a follow-up Zoomerang survey whether they had clients who resided in any 
of these or territories with data security breach notifications.  Table 15 presents data 
regarding the location of where the respondents’ law firm offices were based. Thirty-
three of the 34 respondents to the follow-up Zoomerang survey responded that they had 
clients that resided in one or more states with data security breach notification laws, 
including four of the five Canadian law firms represented in Table 15.  Table 16 presents 
the mean and standard deviation (Std. D.) for the follow-up questions pertaining to the 
respondents’ understanding of U.S. data breach notification laws.  These descriptive 
statistics were calculated using SPSS™ and included a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly 
disagree to 5 =strongly agree). 
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Table 15.  Region Where Law Firm Offices of the Follow-up Respondents Were 
Based 
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
United States based law firm 29 85% 
European Union based law firm 0 0% 
Canadian based law firm 5 15% 
Asia Pacific based law firm 0 0% 
Australian based law firm 0 0% 
Prefer not to answer 0 0% 
Other, please specify 0 0% 
 
Table 16.  U.S. Security Breach Notification Laws 
 
Item Mean Std. D. 
Aware of notification laws in 44 states (excluding Alabama, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and South Dakota), the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands that require that in the event 
personal information (PI) and/or personally identifiable information (PII) is 
exposed to unauthorized parties, the affected clients be notified. 
3.74 1.082 
Aware that these U.S. security breach notification laws mandate notification 
to its state residents of lost, stolen, or compromised unencrypted PI and/or 
PII through unauthorized access to computerized data, including access by 
an unauthorized employee.  
3.65 1.203 
Notification of a security breach of computerized data pursuant to these 
U.S. security breach notification laws is based on where the resident resides 
rather than where the data resides.  
3.29 .906 
 
Survey Data Analysis 
 
     The author collected data to measure the incidence (0 occurrences, 1-5 occurrences, 6-
10 occurrences, and >10 occurrences) of breaches (computer virus, hacking incident, 
unauthorized access, theft of hardware/ software, computer-based fraud, human error, 
natural disaster, and damage by employees) within the two years preceding the survey 
along with the severity of the breaches using a five-point Likert scale (1=fairly 
insignificant to 5 =highly significant).   Data were collected using the same questions that 
Doherty and Fulford (2005) used in their study.  Table 17 presents the published results 
from the Doherty and Fulford study.  Table 18 presents the descriptive results of the 
101 
 
author’s dissertation survey with regard to incidence of breaches and severity of worst 
breach.  The not applicable (N/A) responses were treated as missing values and not 
included in the calculation of the mean. 
Table 17.  Doherty & Fulford Table 2. The Incidence and Severity of Security 
Breaches  
 
 
Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from  
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security 
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 29  
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford. 
 
 
Table 18.  Law Firms – Incidence and Severity of Security Breaches  
 
Incidence of Breaches Severity of Worst Breach Type of Breach 
Approximate Number of 
Breaches in Last Two Years 
Fairly 
Insignificant 
                  Highly  
Significant 
 Mean 
Value 
 0 1-5 6-10 >10 1 2 3 4 5 N/A  
Computer virus 26 34 11 15 29 13 11 11 5 18 2.28 
Hacking Incident 81 3 0 0 19 1 3 0 0 61 1.30 
Unauthorized 
access 
55 24 2 2 23 8 5 6 0 43 1.86 
Theft of hardware/ 
software 
40 35 7 1 23 9 8 14 1 30 2.29 
Computer-based 
fraud 
79 4 0 0 20 3 3 0 0 59 1.35 
Human Error 21 46 6 11 34 15 9 11 1 15 2.00 
Natural Disaster 73 9 0 0 18 3 2 2 2 57 1.78 
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Incidence of Breaches Severity of Worst Breach Type of Breach 
Approximate Number of 
Breaches in Last Two Years 
Fairly 
Insignificant 
                  Highly  
Significant 
 Mean 
Value 
Damage by 
Employees 
78 4 0 0 17 2 3 1 0 61 1.48 
 
 
Research Questions Answered 
 
     This Web-based study consisted of 10 primary research questions.  The first five 
questions were derived from Doherty and Fulford’s (2005) research on the relationship 
between written information security policies and security breaches in an exploratory 
analysis of U.K. organizations employing more than 250 people.  The author converted 
their hypotheses into research questions for this dissertation investigation in order to 
discover how law firms compare to the subjects in the Doherty and Fulford study.  The 
additional five research questions in the Web-based survey were designed to investigate 
whether information security policies impact law firms.  The 10 primary research 
questions investigated in this dissertation investigation included: 
1. Do law firms that have written information security policies have fewer security 
breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those that do not have 
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?  
     Table 19 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study.  Doherty 
and Fulford found “no statistically significant associations between the existence of an 
information security policy and either the incidence or the severity of any of the eight 
types of security breach.” (p. 30).   While Doherty and Fulford used a chi-square test to 
display their results, the author’s survey responses for the incidence of breaches did not 
meet the chi-squared test conditions consisting of all expected counts must be >1 and no 
more than 20% of expected counts could be <5 (Field, 2009).  Additionally, the analysis 
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of variance (ANOVA) conditions were not met since the variables were ordinal and not 
quantitative.  Because neither a chi-squared test nor an ANOVA test was valid to use in 
this analysis, a Mann-Whitney U test was determined most appropriate (Dr. P. Curtiss, 
personal communication, May 14, 2009).  Table 20 presents the author’s dissertation 
survey Mann-Whitney U results.  Because the p-values are all greater than .05, the results 
demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship (Field) between the 
adoption of the information security policy and the incidence and severity of security 
breaches.   
 
Table 19.  Doherty & Fulford – Table 3 The Relationship Between the Adoption of 
Information Security Policy and the Incidence and Severity of Security Breaches  
 
Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from  
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security 
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 30,  
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford. 
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Table 20.  Law Firms – Relationship Between the Adoption of Information Security 
Policy and the Incidence and Severity of Security Breaches 
 
Incidence of Breaches 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Severity of Worst Breach 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Type of Breach 
U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Computer virus 658.00 0.275 419.00 0.652 
Hacking Incident 702.50 0.864 33.00 0.175 
Unauthorized access 594.00 0.211 126.00 0.448 
Theft of resources 652.00 0.499 277.00 0.950 
Computer-based fraud 703.50 0.808 61.50 0.428 
Human Error 664.00 0.502 508.00 0.929 
Natural Disaster 668.50 0.554 45.00 0.210 
Damage by Employees 636.00 0.186 26.00 0.207 
 
2. Are law firms that have had information security policies in place for numerous years 
likely to have fewer computer security breach incidents in terms of both frequency 
and severity than those that do not have information security policies in place 
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?   
     Table 21 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study.  Doherty 
and Fulford found “that older policies are associated with less severe breaches.  However 
. . . there is no strong or consistent evidence in support of the hypothesis . . .” (p. 31).  
Table 22 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficient used for the author’s 
ordinal data collected with regard to the age of the information security policy and the 
incidence/severity of security breaches.  Since the p-values are all greater than .05, the 
results demonstrated no statistically significant associations (Field, 2009) between the 
age of information security policies and the incidence and severity of security breaches.   
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Table 21.  Doherty & Fulford – Table 4. Relationship between the Age of 
Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches  
 
Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from  
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security 
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 31,  
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford. 
 
Table 22.  Law Firms – Relationship Between the Age of Information Security 
Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches   
 
Incidence of Breaches 
(Spearman's Rho) 
Severity of Worst Breach 
(Correlation) 
Type of Breach 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Spearman’s 
Rho Value 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Computer virus 0.14 0.302 -0.01 0.941 
Hacking Incident 0.05 0.735 0.09 0.735 
Unauthorized access 0.05 0.717 -0.10 0.592 
Theft of resources 0.11 0.418 0.13 0.427 
Computer-based fraud 0.06 0.670 0.11 0.668 
Human Error 0.08 0.582 0.07 0.669 
Natural Disaster -0.14 0.324 -0.09 0.710 
Damage by Employees 0.07 0.619 0.16 0.521 
 
3. Do law firms that have updated their information security policies on a regular basis 
have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those 
that have not updated their information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, 
p. 26)? 
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     Table 23 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study.  Doherty 
and Fulford found “no statistically significant associations between the frequency with 
which the InSPy is updated and the incidence and severity of any of the eight types of 
security breach.” (p. 32).   Similar to Doherty and Fulford, the author of this dissertation 
investigation compressed the categorical scales of how often the information technology 
security policy was updated (more than every two years, every two years, every year, 
every six months, less than every six months) to greater than or equal to once a year and 
at least once a year.   Table 24 presents the mean rank for this item.  Table 25 presents the 
author’s dissertation survey Mann-Whitney U results. Since the p-values are all greater 
than .05, the results demonstrated no statistically significant associations (Field, 2009).   
Table 23.  Doherty & Fulford – Table 5. Relationship Between the Frequency of 
Updating the Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security 
Breaches  
 
 
Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from  
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security 
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 32,  
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford. 
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Table 24.  Law Firms – Relationship Between the Frequency of Updating the 
Information Security Policy and the Incidence of Security Breaches 
 
How often is the IT security policy updated? Type of Breach 
< Once a year  
Mean Value 
≥ Once a year 
Mean Value 
Computer virus 27.27 16.50 
Hacking Incident 26.07 25.50 
Unauthorized access 25.30 27.00 
Theft of resources 23.84 33.33 
Computer-based fraud 25.14 24.00 
Human Error 25.19 27.75 
Natural Disaster 24.36 25.50 
Damage by Employees 24.71 27.08 
 
Table 25.  Law Firms – Relationship Between the Frequency of Updating the 
Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches 
 
Incidence of Breaches 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Severity of Worst Breach 
(Mann-Whitney U Test) 
Type of Breach 
U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Computer virus 78.00 0.083 65.50 0.586 
Hacking Incident 132.00 0.715 6.50 0.789 
Unauthorized access 123.00 0.757 26.00 0.094 
Theft of resources 79.00 0.096 49.00 0.170 
Computer-based fraud 123.00 0.593 6.00 0.695 
Human Error 118.50 0.656 54.00 0.110 
Natural Disaster 120.00 0.744 13.00 0.593 
Damage by Employees 116.50 0.422 10.50 0.498 
*Grouping Variable: How often is the IT security policy updated? 
4. Are law firms that have an information security policy with a broad scope likely to 
have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those 
organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
     Table 26 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study.  Doherty 
and Fulford found “with regard to the severity of threats, there are no statistically 
significant associations between number of issues covered by the policy and the severity 
of security breaches.” (p. 33).   Table 27 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation 
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coefficient results of this dissertation investigation for the relationship between the range 
of issues covered by the information security policy and the incidence/severity of security 
breaches.   The results demonstrated a significant but weak relationship.  It was found 
that a significant association exists when the number of issues covered in the information 
security policies increase, the number of thefts of resources also tends to go up.  
However, since the p-value is less than .05 the correlation is not very strong because it is 
greater than .8 or less than -.8 (Field, 2009).  
 
Table 26.  Doherty & Fulford – Table 6. Relationship Between the Range of Issues 
Covered by the Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security 
Breaches   
 
Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from  
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security 
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 32,  
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford. 
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Table 27.  Law Firms – Relationship Between the Range of Issues Covered by the 
Information Security Policy and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches   
 
Incidence of Breaches 
(Spearman's Rho) 
Severity of Worst Breach 
(Correlation) 
Type of Breach 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Spearman’s 
Rho Value 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Computer virus -0.13 0.314 0.05 0.722 
Hacking Incident 0.05 0.699 0.00 1.000 
Unauthorized access 0.18 0.192 0.01 0.961 
Theft of resources 0.38 0.004 -0.18 0.256 
Computer-based fraud 0.04 0.783 -0.09 0.721 
Human Error -0.04 0.775 -0.25 0.089 
Natural Disaster 0.16 0.260 0.02 0.950 
Damage by Employees 0.13 0.359 -0.14 0.559 
 
 
 
5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of best practices likely to have fewer 
security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those organizations 
that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
     Table 28 presents the published results from the Doherty and Fulford study.  Doherty 
and Fulford found that “there is a statistical association between the summated success 
factors and security breaches for two out of the 16 tests conducted. . . . given that only 
two of the 16 tests were significant, there is insufficient evidence to support hypothesis . . 
. it must be rejected.” (p. 34).   Table 29 presents the Spearman’s Rho correlation 
coefficient results of this dissertation investigation for the relationship between the range 
of issues covered by the successful adoption of success factors and the incidence/severity 
of security breaches.  Since the p-values are all greater than .05, the results demonstrate 
no statistically significant associations (Field, 2009). 
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Table 28.  Doherty & Fulford – One-way ANOVA between the Successful Adoption 
of Success Factors and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches  
 
Note. Adapted with permission of the Publisher (see Appendix A) from  
©2005 Information Resources Management Journal article, "Do Information Security 
Policies Reduce the Incidence of Security Breaches: An Exploratory Analysis," p. 33,  
by N.F. Doherty and H. Fulford. 
 
 
Table 29.  Law Firms – Spearman’s Rho Between the Successful Adoption of 
Success Factors and the Incidence/Severity of Security Breaches   
 
Incidence of Breaches 
(Spearman's Rho) 
Severity of Worst Breach 
(Correlation) 
Type of Breach 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Spearman’s 
Rho Value 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Computer virus -0.04 0.796 -0.22 0.131 
Hacking Incident -0.02 0.883 -0.05 0.840 
Unauthorized access 0.13 0.321 -0.09 0.614 
Theft of resources 0.19 0.165 0.06 0.706 
Computer-based fraud -0.15 0.262 -0.39 0.110 
Human Error 0.06 0.638 -0.13 0.394 
Natural Disaster -0.06 0.680 -0.19 0.400 
Damage by Employees 0.10 0.459 -0.04 0.876 
 
     Table 30 presents the responses and percentages for each of 10 success factors’ 
importance of best practices for the effective implementation of IT security in 
respondent’s law firm(s).  
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 Table 30.  Law Firm – Success Factors’ Importance of Best Practices 
 
Item Not at All Important 
Not Very 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Extremely 
Important N/A 
Ensuring security policy 
reflects business objectives 0 0 10 33 18 0 
Percentage: 0% 0% 16% 54% 30% 0% 
An approach to 
implementing security that is 
consistent with the law firm 
culture 
0 2 7 33 19 0 
Percentage: 0% 3% 11% 54% 31% 0% 
Visible commitment from 
management 0 0 4 15 42 0 
Percentage: 0% 0% 7% 25% 69% 0% 
A good understanding of 
security risks 0 0 5 21 34 0 
Percentage: 0% 0% 8% 35% 57% 0% 
A good understanding of 
security requirements 0 0 6 22 33 0 
Percentage: 0% 0% 10% 36% 54% 0% 
Effective marketing of 
security to all law firm 
employees/ lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
0 1 10 34 16 0 
Percentage: 0% 2% 16% 56% 26% 0% 
Distribution of guidance on 
IT security policy to all law 
firm employees/lawyers or 
other members of the firm 
1 1 10 28 20 0 
Percentage: 2% 2% 17% 47% 33% 0% 
Providing appropriate 
training and education to all 
employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
0 3 11 30 17 0 
Percentage: 0% 5% 18% 49% 28% 0% 
Comprehensive 
measurement system for 
evaluating performance in 
security management 
1 4 25 17 13 0 
Percentage: 2% 7% 42% 28% 22% 0% 
Provision of feedback 
system for suggesting policy 
improvements 
2 9 26 19 4 0 
Percentage: 3% 15% 43% 32% 7% 0% 
 
     Table 31 presents the responses and percentages for each of these 10 success factors 
(best practices) for the effective adoption of IT security in respondent’s law firm(s).   
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Table 31.  Law Firm – Success Factors’ Adoption of Best Practices 
 
Item Not at All Successful 
Not Very 
Successful 
Somewhat 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Extremely 
Successful N/A 
Ensuring security policy 
reflects business objectives 1 6 26 19 8 1 
Percentage: 2% 10% 43% 31% 13% 2% 
An approach to 
implementing security that is 
consistent with the law firm 
culture 
1 6 19 25 9 1 
Percentage: 2% 10% 31% 41% 15% 2% 
Visible commitment from 
management 3 12 20 16 8 1 
Percentage: 5% 20% 33% 27% 13% 2% 
A good understanding of 
security risks 3 3 20 26 8 1 
Percentage: 5% 5% 33% 43% 13% 2% 
A good understanding of 
security requirements 2 5 22 23 8 1 
Percentage: 3% 8% 36% 38% 13% 2% 
Effective marketing of 
security to all law firm 
employees/ lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
2 19 26 9 4 1 
Percentage: 3% 31% 43% 15% 7% 2% 
Distribution of guidance on 
IT security policy to all law 
firm employees/lawyers or 
other members of the firm 
1 10 26 15 8 1 
Percentage: 2% 16% 43% 25% 13% 2% 
Providing appropriate 
training and education to all 
employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
3 21 23 10 3 1 
Percentage: 5% 34% 38% 16% 5% 2% 
Comprehensive 
measurement system for 
evaluating performance in 
security management 
8 26 17 5 2 3 
Percentage: 13% 43% 28% 8% 3% 5% 
Provision of feedback 
system for suggesting policy 
improvements 
8 25 18 8 0 2 
Percentage: 13% 41% 30% 13% 0% 3% 
 
     Doherty and Fulford (2005) conducted a Cronbach’s alpha measure of the 10 success 
factors which was found to be statistically significant with a score of 0.87.  Similarly, the 
author of this dissertation investigation performed a Cronbach’s alpha internal reliability 
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test of the 10 success factors using SPSS™.  According to Sekran (2003), a Cronbach’s 
alpha of over .60 is considered to be statistically significant with those over .80 to be 
good reliabilities.  Table 32 presents the results of this test.  Findings indicated the 
Cronbach’s alpha measure of the 10 success factors of this dissertation investigation to be 
statistically significant with a score of 0.89. 
Table 32.  Law Firms – Cronbach Alpha Internal Reliability Test of 10 Success 
Factors  
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items 
0.895 0.896 10 
 
     Table 33 presents the responses and percentages for whether law firm computers are 
shut down for inactivity after a defined period.  More than one-half (67%) of the 
respondents indicated law firm computers are not shut down for inactivity after a defined 
period. 
Table 33.  Law Firm Computers Shut Down for Inactivity After A Defined Period 
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Yes 27 31% 
No 59 67% 
Do Not Know 2 2% 
 
     Table 34 presents the responses and percentages for each security issue covered in IT 
security policies and/or separate procedures or standards in the respondent’s law firm(s).  
The personal usage of information systems was the highest percentage (63%) in the 
policy document only category, with one-half of law firm respondents reporting a policy 
document only for Internet access (50%), and just under one-half had a policy document 
only in regard to violations and breaches (49%). Almost one-fourth of the responses 
under the stand-alone procedures or standard only category were in regard to 
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contingency planning (23%), while close to one-half of the respondents indicated policy 
document and supplementary procedure or standards were in place for disclosure of 
information (45%), Internet access (43%), and mobile computing (42%).   
Table 34.  Law Firm – Security Issues Covered in IT Security Policies and/or 
Separate Procedures or Standards 
 
Item Policy Document Only 
Stand-Alone 
Procedure or 
Standard Only 
Policy Document & 
Supplementary Procedure 
or Standard 
Disclosure of information 21 7 27 
Percentage: 35% 12% 45% 
System access control 24 12 21 
Percentage: 40% 20% 35% 
Internet access 30 3 26 
Percentage: 50% 5% 43% 
Viruses, worms & Trojans 26 10 19 
Percentage: 43% 17% 32% 
Software development 12 2 7 
Percentage: 20% 3% 12% 
Contingency planning 18 14 13 
Percentage: 30% 23% 22% 
Encryption 12 7 9 
Percentage: 21% 12% 16% 
Mobile computing 16 7 25 
Percentage: 27% 12% 42% 
Personal usage of Information 
Systems 37 3 19 
Percentage: 63% 5% 32% 
Physical security 20 8 21 
Percentage: 34% 14% 36% 
Violations and breaches 28 5 21 
Percentage: 49% 9% 37% 
 
     Table 35 presents the responses and percentages for whether IT security policies are 
approved by respondent’s law firm management.  More than 90 percent of respondents 
(93%) indicated law firm management does approve IT security policy documents. 
Table 35.  Law Firms – IT Security Policy Documents Approved By Management 
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Yes 57 93% 
No 3 5% 
Do Not Know 1 2% 
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     Table 36 presents the responses and percentages for whether law firm IT security 
policy is communicated with all law firm employees/lawyers or other members of the 
firm and relevant third party service providers.  More than one-third of respondents 
(33%) only communicated approved IT security policy documents to law firm 
employees/ lawyers or other members of the firm.  Just over one-fourth of respondents 
(28%) communicated all policies with law firm employees/lawyers/other members and 
third parties.  One-fifth of respondents (20%) indicated only certain policies were 
communicated, while less than one-fifth of respondents (16%) do not communicate 
policies to relevant third parties. 
Table 36.  Communication of Law Firm Approved IT Security Policy Documents  
 
Item 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage 
Yes – all of them are communicated to law firm 
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm and 
relevant third party service providers 
17 28% 
Yes – but not communicated to relevant third party 
service providers 10 16% 
Yes –  but only communicated to law firm 
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm 20 33% 
Yes – but only certain ones are  communicated 12 20% 
No – none of them 0 0% 
Do not know 2 3% 
 
 
     Table 37 presents the responses and percentages for whether the law firm IT security 
policy is published.  More than 90 percent of respondents (92%) indicated that their law 
firm published IT security policy documents. 
Table 37.  Publication of Law Firm IT Security Policy Documents 
 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Yes 55 92% 
No 4 7% 
Do Not Know 1 2% 
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6. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, are law firm employees more 
likely to by-pass security measures in order to complete the task (Post & Kagan, 
2007)? 
     Table 38 presents the mean and standard deviation for the scanning or installation of 
security measures using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely 
likely). 
Table 38.  Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an 
Assignment – Use of Security Measures 
 
Item Mean Std. D. 
Scan a file for viruses 2.40 1.497
Install security software updates 2.03 1.299
Install a digital certificate 1.94 1.207
Install an ActiveX control from an unknown source 3.25 1.243
 
     Table 39 presents the frequency and percentages with which an employee/lawyer in 
each respondent’s law firm scans a file for viruses if under a time deadline to finish an 
assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely likely).  
This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large).  The 
majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is not at all likely or not very 
likely that employees/lawyers in their law firms would scan a file for viruses when under 
a time deadline to finish an assignment. 
Table 39.  Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an 
Assignment – Scan a File for Viruses 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Scan a file for 
viruses Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not At All 
Likely 14 40% 10 58% 8 36% 3 22% 
Not Very 
Likely 6 17% 3 18% 9 41% 2 14% 
Somewhat 
Likely 5 14% 3 18% 1 5% 2 14% 
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 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Very Likely 3 9% 0 0% 2 9% 2 14% 
Extremely 
Likely 7 20% 1 6% 2 9% 5 36% 
 
     Table 40 presents the frequency and percentages with which an employee/lawyer in 
each respondent’s law firm installs security software updates if under a time deadline to 
finish an assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely 
likely).  This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large).  
The majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is not at all likely or not 
very likely that employees/lawyers in their law firms would install security software 
updates when under a time deadline to finish an assignment. 
Table 40.  Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an 
Assignment – Install Security Software Updates  
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Install security 
software 
updates 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not At All 
Likely 14 40% 11 65% 10 45% 7 50% 
Not Very 
Likely 8 23% 3 17% 9 40% 3 22% 
Somewhat 
Likely 7 20% 1 6% 1 5% 0 0% 
Very Likely 2 6% 1 6% 1 5% 2 14% 
Extremely 
Likely 4 11% 1 6% 1 5% 2 14% 
 
 
     Table 41 presents the frequency and percentages at  which an employee/lawyer in 
each respondent’s law firm installs a digital certificate if under a time deadline to finish 
an assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely to 5 =extremely likely).  
This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large).  The 
majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is not at all likely or not very 
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likely that employees/ lawyers in their law firms would install a digital certificate when 
under a time deadline to finish an assignment. 
Table 41.  Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an 
Assignment – Install a Digital Certificate 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Install a 
digital 
certificate 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not At All 
Likely 19 54% 10 59% 9 41% 6 43% 
Not Very 
Likely 8 23% 3 17% 7 32% 4 29% 
Somewhat 
Likely 3 9% 1 6% 3 14% 3 21% 
Very Likely 3 9% 2 12% 2 9% 0 0% 
Extremely 
Likely 2 5% 1 6% 1 4% 1 7% 
 
  
     Table 42 presents the frequency and percentages with which an employee/lawyer in 
each respondent’s law firm installs an ActiveX control from an unknown source if under 
a time deadline to finish an assignment using a five-point Likert scale (1=not at all likely 
to 5 =extremely likely).  This data are grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, 
and very large).  The majority of law firms in all four categories indicated that it is very 
likely or extremely likely that employees/lawyers in their law firms would install an 
ActiveX control from an unknown source when under a time deadline to finish an 
assignment. 
Table 42.  Law Firm Employees/Lawyers Under a Time Deadline to Finish an 
Assignment – Install An ActiveX Control From An Unknown Source 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Install an 
ActiveX 
control from 
an unknown 
source 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not At All 
Likely 3 9% 3 18% 4 18% 2 14% 
Not Very 
Likely 5 14% 0 0% 3 14% 2 14% 
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 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Somewhat 
Likely 9 26% 6 35% 3 14% 5 36% 
Very Likely 14 40% 6 35% 6 27% 4 29% 
Extremely 
Likely 4 11% 2 12% 6 27% 1 7% 
 
 
7. Are law firm security policies created in response to an information security breach 
incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)? 
     Table 43 presents the frequency and percentages of law firms that created written IT 
security policies in response to an information security breach incident.  Only two law 
firms with written IT security policies created their policies in response to a security 
breach incident. 
Table 43.  Law Firm Size in Number of Users and Existence of a Security Policy 
 
Does your law firm have written 
information technology (IT) 
security policies?  
Were your law firm written IT security 
policies created due to a security 
incident/breach?  Law Firm Size in Number of Users 
Yes No Do Not Know Yes No Do Not Know 
Small  1-150 21 13 1 0 21 0 
Percentage: 61% 38% 1% 0.00% 100% 0.00% 
Medium  
151-250  Users 10 7 0 1 8 1 
Percentage: 59% 41% 0.00% 10% 80% 10% 
Large 251-500  Users 19 3 0 1 17 1 
Percentage: 86% 14% 0.00% 5% 90% 5% 
Very Large  
>500  Users 11 3 0 0 10 1 
Percentage: 79% 21% 0.00% 0.00% 91% 9% 
 
     Table 44 presents the results from the Spearman’s Rho test on each pair of variables 
(past and future Internet effect on security breaches) and the perceived need for 
information security policies using a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5 
=strongly agree).    Since the p-values are less than .05 (Field, 2009),  there are 
significant (p-values = .019, .031, and .034) relationships, but because the correlation 
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coefficients (p-values = .249, .230, and .227) are all below .500 (Field), the correlations 
are weak between the Internet’s projected future effect on information technology 
security breaches and the perception that the need for security policies is greater today 
than it was one, three, and five years ago.  There is also a significant (p-value = .029) but 
weak correlation (p-value = .232) between the Internet’s effect on IT security breaches 
experienced over the past few years and the perception that the need for security policies 
is greater today than it was three years ago. 
Table 44.  Law Firms – Spearman’s Rho Between the Internet’s Effect on Breaches 
and the Need for Policies   
Over the Past Few Years, 
Internet Has Greatly 
Increased the Number of 
Security Breaches Experienced
(Spearman's Rho) 
In the Coming Years, the 
Internet Will Greatly Increase 
the Risk of IT Security 
Breaches 
(Spearman's Rho) 
Type of Breach 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Need for policies – greater 
today than one year ago .187 .081 .249 .019 
Need for policies – greater 
today than three years ago .232 .029 .230 .031 
Need for policies – greater 
today than five years ago .165 .124 .227 .034 
 
 
     Table 45 presents the responses and percentages for whether the perceived amount of 
attorney-client and/or work product communications over electronic networks in a 
respondent’s law firm(s) is greater today than it was one, three, and five years ago using a 
five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5 =strongly agree).   Over one-half of law 
firms perceived that attorney-client and/or work product online communications are 
greater today than one year ago (59%);  over three quarters reported greater attorney-
client and/or work product online communications today than three years ago (85%); and 
over 90 percent reported greater attorney-client and/or work product online 
communications than five years ago (92%). 
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Table 45.  Law Firm – Attorney-Client Work Product Communication Over 
Electronic Networks 
 
Item Strongly Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The amount of attorney-client work 
product communication over 
electronic networks is greater today 
than it was one year ago. 
1 3 7 25 52 
Percentage: 1% 3% 8% 28% 59% 
The amount of attorney-client work 
product communication over 
electronic networks is greater today 
than it was three years ago. 
0 0 0 13 75 
Percentage: 0% 0% 0% 15% 85% 
The amount of attorney-client work 
product communication over 
electronic networks is greater today 
than it was five years ago. 
0 0 0 7 81 
Percentage: 0% 0% 0% 8% 92% 
 
8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests a part of 
law firms’ validation of the intended security policies (Myler & Broadbent, 2006; 
Verdon, 2006)? 
     Table 46 presents the frequency and percentages of security tasks performed by the 
respondent law firms during the preceding 12 months.   
Table 46.  Law Firm – Performance of Security Tasks During the Past 12 Months 
 
Item Not at All 
More 
Than 
Once a 
Year 
Once a 
Year 
Once a 
Month 
Every 
Day 
Do Not 
Know 
Perform a vulnerability 
assessment that scanned the law 
firm networks to identify 
potential security risks. 
34 15 24 8 3 3 
Percentage: 39% 17% 28% 9% 3% 3% 
Hire an outside consultant to 
perform a risk assessment to 
identify the potential threats, 
probabilities, and impact of 
threats to the law firm's 
58 6 20 1 0 3 
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Item Not at All 
More 
Than 
Once a 
Year 
Once a 
Year 
Once a 
Month 
Every 
Day 
Do Not 
Know 
management controls, 
operational controls, and 
technical controls. 
Percentage: 66% 7% 23% 1% 0% 3% 
Conduct an in-house risk 
assessment of security threats 
performed by the members of 
the law firm IT department 
and/or information security 
department. 
38 12 25 9 0 3 
Percentage: 44% 14% 29% 10% 0% 3% 
Provide employee training 
sessions on information security 
awareness and incident 
reporting. 
53 14 15 3 0 2 
Percentage: 61% 16% 17% 3% 0% 2% 
Use managed security services 
of a third party. 50 5 7 1 22 2 
Percentage: 57% 6% 8% 1% 25% 2% 
Encrypt e-mail messages 42 11 2 6 25 2 
Percentage: 48% 12% 2% 7% 28% 2% 
Encrypt hard drive data 56 6 2 6 14 4 
Percentage: 64% 7% 2% 7% 16% 5% 
Review the information security 
policies of the law firm 23 20 36 4 1 3 
Percentage: 26% 23% 41% 5% 1% 3% 
Revise the information security 
policies of the law firm 32 15 35 3 0 1 
Percentage: 37% 17% 41% 3% 0% 1% 
 
     Table 47 presents the results from a Spearman’s Rho test on each pair of variables 
(security tasks and frequency performed) in relationship to the law firm size. The “Do 
Not Know” responses were treated as missing variables and therefore were not included 
in the computations (Field, 2009).  Since the p-values are less than .05 (Field, 2009), 
there are significant relationships between a vulnerability assessment (p-value = .005), 
use of an outside consultant (p-value = .003), encryption of e-mail (p-value = .001), 
123 
 
encryption of hard drive data (p-value < .001), and revision of a law firm’s information 
security policies (p-value = .036).  However, because the correlation coefficients are all 
below .500 (Field), the correlations are weak between a vulnerability assessment (p-value 
= .302), use of an outside consultant (p-value = .321), encryption of e-mail (p-values = 
.347), encryption of hard drive data (p-values = .441), and revision of a law firm’s 
information security policies (p-values = .228).   
Table 47.  Law Firms – Spearman’s Rho Between the Law Firm Size and Each Pair 
of Variables 
 
Law Firm Size 
(Spearman's Rho) 
 
Security Measures 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Two-Sided 
Significance 
Perform a vulnerability assessment that scanned the law firm 
networks to identify potential security risks. .302 .005 
Hire an outside consultant to perform a risk assessment to identify the 
potential threats, probabilities, and impact of threats to the law firm's 
management controls, operational controls, and technical controls. 
.321 .003 
Conduct an in-house risk assessment of security threats performed by 
the members of the law firm IT department and/or information 
security department. 
.131 .234 
Provide employee training sessions on information security awareness 
and incident reporting. .011 .920 
Use managed security services of a third party. .084 .447 
Encrypt e-mail messages .347 .001 
Encrypt hard drive data .441 .000 
Review the information security policies of the law firm .180 .100 
Revise the information security policies of the law firm .228 .036 
 
 
     Table 48 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to performing a vulnerability assessment 
within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated a significant difference between all 
four categories of law firms (p-value = .043).  Table 48 also presents the Mann-Whitney 
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U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in 
regard to performing a vulnerability assessment.  There was evidence of a significant 
difference between the small and large law firms (p-value = .039) and the small and very 
large law firms (p-value = .015) with regard to performing a vulnerability assessment 
within the past 12 months.   
Table 48.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Perform a Vulnerability 
Assessment 
 
All Four 
Categories 
(Small, Medium, 
Large, and Very 
Large) 
Small and 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-
Value 
U Test 
Value 
Two-Sided 
Prob. 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
Perform a vulnerability 
assessment that scanned 
the law firm networks to 
identify potential security 
risks. 
.043 232.50 .039 126.00 .015 
 
 
     Table 49 presents the frequency and percentages of vulnerability assessments 
performed within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.  This data are 
grouped by law firm size (small, medium, large, and very large).  The majority of small 
law firms (59%) and over one-third of medium law firms (35%) never perform 
vulnerability assessments. By contrast, almost one-half of large law firms (45%) and one-
third of very large law firms (31%) perform a vulnerability assessment once a year.  A 
few large law firms (10%) and very large law firms (8%) performed vulnerability 
assessments every day. 
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Table 49.  Law Firm Size and Perform a Vulnerability Assessment  
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 20 59% 6 35% 5 25% 3 23% 
Once a Year 7 20% 4 24% 9 45% 4 31% 
More Than 
Once a Year 5 15% 4 24% 4 20% 2 15% 
Once a 
Month 2 6% 3 17% 0 0% 3 23% 
Every Day 0 0% 0 0% 2 10% 1 8% 
 
     Table 50 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a 
risk assessment within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated a significant 
difference between all four categories of law firms (p-value = .002).  Table 50 also 
presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which 
law firm sizes differed in regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a risk 
assessment within the past 12 months.  The author identified a significant difference 
between the small and very large law firms (p-value = .002) and the medium and very 
large law firms (p-value = .001) with regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a 
risk assessment. 
Table 50.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Hiring of An Outside 
Consultant 
 
All Four 
Categories 
(Small, Medium, 
Large, and Very 
Large) 
Small and 
Very Large
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Very Large
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Medium 
and Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Medium 
and Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-
Value 
U Test 
Value 
Two-Sided 
Prob. 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
Hire an outside consultant 
to perform a risk .002 124.50 .002 45.00 .001 
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All Four 
Categories 
(Small, Medium, 
Large, and Very 
Large) 
Small and 
Very Large
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Very Large
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Medium 
and Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Medium 
and Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-
Value 
U Test 
Value 
Two-Sided 
Prob. 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
assessment to identify the 
potential threats, 
probabilities, and impact of 
threats to the law firm's 
management controls, 
operational controls, and 
technical controls. 
 
 
     Table 51 presents the frequency and percentages of hiring an outside consultant to 
perform a risk assessment within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.  The 
majority of small (79%), medium (88%), large (54%), and very large (29%) law firms 
reported not having hired an outside consultant to perform a risk assessment within the 
past 12 months.  One-half of the very large law firms (50%) reported hiring an outside 
consultant to perform a risk assessment once a year, while small (9%), medium (12%) 
and large law firms (36%) reported less frequency of hiring an outside consults to 
perform risk assessments. 
Table 51.  Law Firm Size and Hiring of An Outside Consultant 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 27 79% 15 88% 12 60% 4 29% 
Once a Year 3  9% 2 12% 8 40% 7 50% 
More Than 
Once a Year 4 12% 0 0% 0 0% 2 14% 
Once a 
Month 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 7% 
Every Day 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
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     Table 52 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to conducting an in-house risk assessment 
within the past 12 months. The results demonstrated no significant difference between the 
responses of all four categories of law firms (p-value = .320).  Table 52 also presents the 
Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes 
differed in regard to conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months.  
The results demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with 
medium law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .225) 
with regard to conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months. 
Table 52.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and In-House Risk Assessment 
 
All Four Categories 
(Small, Medium, Large, 
and Very Large) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-Whitney 
U Test) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-Value U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Conduct an in-house risk assessment 
of security threats performed by the 
members of the law firm IT 
department and/or information 
security department. 
.320 717.50 .225 
 
 
     Table 53 presents the frequency and percentages of conducting an in-house risk 
assessment within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.  The majority of 
small (50%), medium (59%), and large law firms (42%) reported not having conducted 
an in-house risk assessment.  One-half of the very large law firms have conducted an in-
house risk assessment once a year, with over one-quarter of the very large law firms 
(29%) performing an in-house risk assessment once a month. 
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Table 53.  Law Firm Size and In-House Risk Assessment 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 17 50% 10 59% 8 42% 3 21% 
Once a Year 8 23% 3 17% 7 37% 7 50% 
More Than 
Once a Year 6 18% 2 12% 4 21% 0 0% 
Once a 
Month 3 9% 2 12% 0 0% 4 29% 
Every Day 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
     Table 54 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to providing employee training sessions on 
information security awareness and incident reporting within the past 12 months.  The 
results demonstrated no significant difference between all four categories of law firms (p-
value = .770).  Table 54 also presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in 
an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in regard to providing employee 
training sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting.  The results 
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with medium 
law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .867) with 
regard to providing employee training sessions on information security awareness and 
incident reporting within the past 12 months. 
Table 54.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Employee Training 
 
All Four Categories 
(Small, Medium, Large, 
and Very Large) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-Whitney 
U Test) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-Value U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Provide employee training sessions on 
information security awareness and 
incident reporting. 
.770 842.00 .867 
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     Table 55 presents the frequency and percentages of providing employee training 
sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting in relationship to the 
law firm size within the past 12 months.  The majority of small (63%), medium (59%), 
large law firms (70%), and very large law firms (54%) reported not having provided 
employee training sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting 
within the past 12 months.   
Table 55.  Law Firm Size and Employee Training 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 22 63% 10 59% 14 70% 7 54% 
Once a Year 5 14% 4 23% 3 15% 3 23% 
More Than 
Once a Year 7 20% 3 18% 3 15% 1 8% 
Once a 
Month 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 2 15% 
Every Day 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
     Table 56 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large)  with regard to using managed security services of a third 
party within the past 12 months.   The results demonstrated no significant difference 
between all four categories of law firms (p-value = .094).  Table 56 also presents the 
Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes 
differed in regard to using managed security services of a third party.  There is no 
evidence of  a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law 
firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .524) with regard 
to using managed security services of a third party within the past 12 months. 
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Table 56.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Third Party Services 
 
All Four Categories 
(Small, Medium, Large, 
and Very Large) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-Whitney 
U Test) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-Value U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Use managed security services of a 
third party. .094 812.00 .524 
 
     Table 57 presents the frequency and percentages of using managed security services 
of a third party within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.  The majority 
of small (59%), medium (75%), and large law firms (68%), reported not having used 
managed security services of a third party within the past 12 months.   Over one-quarter 
of small law firms (29%) and almost one-half of very large law firms (43%) reported 
using managed security services of a third party every day. 
Table 57.  Law Firm Size and Third Party Services 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 20 59% 12 75% 14 68% 4 29% 
Once a Year 2 6% 4 25% 2 9% 3 21% 
More Than 
Once a Year 2 6% 0 0% 2 9% 1 7% 
Once a 
Month 0 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 
Every Day 10 29% 0 0% 2 9% 6 43% 
 
     Table 58 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting e-mail messages within the past 
12 months.   The results demonstrated a significant difference between all four categories 
of law firms (p-value = .009).  Table 58 also presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that 
were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in regard to who 
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encrypted e-mail messages.  There was evidence of a significant difference between the 
small and medium (p-value = .018), small and large (p-value = .029), and small and very 
large (p-value = .001) law firms who encrypt e-mail messages. 
Table 58.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Encrypt E-mail Messages 
 
All Four 
Categories 
(Small, 
Medium, 
Large, 
and Very 
Large) 
Small and 
Medium 
(Mann-
Whitney 
U Test) 
Small and 
Medium 
(Mann-
Whitney 
U Test) 
Small and 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney 
U Test) 
Small and 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney 
U Test) 
Small and 
Very Large 
(Mann-
Whitney 
U Test) 
Small and 
Very Large
(Mann-
Whitney 
U Test) 
 
Security 
Measures 
Kruskal-
Wallis P-
Value 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
Encrypt e-mail 
messages .009 185.50 .018 248.00 .029 111.50 .001 
 
 
     Table 59 presents the frequency and percentages of encrypting e-mail messages within 
the past 12 months in relationship to the law firm size.  The majority of small law firms 
(73%), and over one-third of medium (35%), and large (43 %) law firms, reported never 
having encrypted e-mail messages within the past 12 months.   Small (18%), medium 
(35%), large (38%), and very large (36%) law firms reported encrypting e-mail messages 
every day. 
 
Table 59.  Law Firm Size and Encrypt E-mail Messages 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 25 73% 6 35% 9 43% 2 14% 
Once a Year 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 14% 
More Than 
Once a Year 2 6% 4 24% 3 14% 2 14% 
Once a 
Month 1 3% 1 6% 1 5% 3 22% 
Every Day 6 18% 6 35% 8 38% 5 36% 
 
132 
 
 
     Table 60 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting hard drive data within the past 
12 months.  There is a significant difference between all four categories of law firms (p-
value = .001).  Table 60 also presents the Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in 
an effort to identify which law firm sizes differed in regard to encryption of hard drive 
data.  There is a significant difference between the small and large (p-value = .005) and 
small and very large (p-value < .001) law firms that reportedly encrypt hard drive data. 
Table 60.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Encrypt Hard Drive Data 
 
All Four 
Categories 
(Small, Medium, 
Large, and Very 
Large) 
Small and 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
Small and 
Very 
Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-
Value 
U Test 
Value 
Two-Sided 
Prob. 
U Test 
Value 
Two-
Sided 
Prob. 
Encrypt hard drive data .001 237.50 .005 89.00 .000 
 
 
     Table 61 presents the frequency and percentages of encrypting hard drive data within 
the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.  The majority of small (88%), medium 
(63%), and large law firms (57%), reported never encrypting hard drive data within the 
past 12 months.   One-third of large law firms (33%) and more than one- third of very 
large (39%) law firms repeatedly encrypt hard drive data every day. 
Table 61.  Law Firm Size and Encrypt Hard Drive Data 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 30 88% 10 63% 12 57% 4 31% 
Once a Year 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 7% 
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 Small Medium Large Very Large 
More Than 
Once a Year 0 0% 3 19% 2 10% 1 7% 
Once a 
Month 2 6% 2 12% 0 0% 2 16% 
Every Day 1 3% 1 6% 7 33 5 39% 
 
 
     Table 62 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from all four size categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to reviewing the law firm information security 
policies within the past 12 months.   The results demonstrated no significant difference 
between all four categories of law firms (p-value = .410).  Table 62 also presents the 
Mann-Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes 
differed in regard to review of the law firm information security policies.  There was no 
evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law 
firms or the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .145) with regard 
to reviewing the law firm information security policies within the past 12 months. 
Table 62.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Review of Information 
Security Policies 
 
All Four Categories 
(Small, Medium, Large, 
and Very Large) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-Whitney 
U Test) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-Value U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Review the information security 
policies of the law firm .410 691.50 .145 
 
     Table 63 presents the frequency and percentages of reviewing the law firm 
information security policies within the past 12 months in relationship to law firm size.  
Over one-third of small (35%) and over one-third of medium (35%) law firms reported 
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not having reviewed information security policies within the past 12 months.   Small 
(38%), medium (30%), large (60%), and very large (47%) law firms review information 
security policies once a year. Small (27%), medium (30%), large (20%), and very large 
(15%) review information security policies more than once a year. 
Table 63.  Law Firm Size and Review of Information Security Policies 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 12 35% 6 35% 3 15% 2 15% 
Once a Year 13 38% 5 30% 12 60% 6 47% 
More Than 
Once a Year 9 27% 5 30% 4 20% 2 15% 
Once a 
Month 0 0% 1 5% 1 5% 2 15% 
Every Day 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 8% 
 
     Table 64 presents the results from a Kruskal-Wallis test used to determine whether 
there is a difference in the responses from the four categories of law firms (small, 
medium, large, and very large) with regard to revising the information security policies 
within the past 12 months.   The results demonstrated no significant difference between 
all four categories of law firms (p-value = .219).  Table 64 also presents the Mann-
Whitney U p-values that were derived in an effort to identify which law firm sizes 
differed in regard to review of the law firm information security policies.  There was no 
evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law 
firms and the combination of large with very large law firms (p-value = .056) with regard 
to revising the information security policies within the past 12 months. 
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Table 64.  Law Firms Grouped – Law Firm Size and Revise Information Security 
Policies 
 
All Four Categories 
(Small, Medium, Large, 
and Very Large) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-Whitney 
U Test) 
Small/ Medium 
and Large/ 
Very Large 
(Mann-
Whitney U 
Test) 
 
Security Measures 
Kruskal-Wallis P-Value U Test Value Two-Sided 
Prob. 
Revise the information security 
policies of the law firm .219 660.00 .056 
  
    Table 65 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to revising the 
information security policies in relationship to the law firm size within the past 12 
months.  The majority of small (51%) and medium (47%) law firms reported not having 
revised the information security policies within the past 12 months.   The majority of 
large (65%) and very large (62%) law firms revise the information security policies once 
a year. 
Table 65.  Law Firm Size and Revise Information Security Policies 
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not at All 18 51% 8 47% 4 20% 2 15% 
Once a Year 10 29% 4 24% 13 65% 8 62% 
More Than 
Once a Year 7 20% 4 24% 3 15% 1 8% 
Once a 
Month 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 2 15% 
Every Day 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
     Table 66 presents the frequency and percentages of auditing and enforcing the 
documented IT security policy in relationship to law firm size.  The majority of small 
(67%) and medium (63%) law firms reported their law firms do not audit and enforce the 
documented IT security policy.   More than one-half of large law firms (59%) and more 
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than two-thirds of very large (82%) law firms audit and enforce the documented IT 
security policy. 
Table 66.  Law Firm Size and Audit and Enforce Documented IT Security Policy 
 
Does your law firm audit and enforce the 
documented IT security policy?  Law Firm Size in Number of Users 
Yes No 
Small  1-150 7 14 
Percentage: 33% 67% 
Medium 151-250  Users 3 5 
Percentage: 37% 63% 
Large 251-500  Users 10 7 
Percentage: 59% 41% 
Very Large >500  Users 9 2 
Percentage: 82% 18% 
    
      Table 67 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to IT security policy 
audited by an independent third party.  The majority of small (95%) and medium (78%) 
law firms, and over one-third of large (35%) law firms, and over one-fourth of very large 
(27%) law firms reported never having the IT security policy audited by an independent 
third party.   Small (5%), medium (22%), large (24%), and very large (18%) law firms 
have the IT security policy audited by an independent third party more than every two 
years.  Large (29%) and very large (18%) law firms have the IT security policy audited 
by an independent third party every year. 
Table 67.  Law Firm Size and IT Security Policy Audited By Independent Third 
Party  
 
 Small Medium Large Very Large 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Never 19 95% 7 78% 6 35% 3 27% 
More Than 
Every 2 Years 1 5% 2 22% 4 24% 2 18% 
Every 2 Years 0 0% 0 0% 2 12% 4 37% 
Every Year 0 0% 0 0% 5 29% 2 18% 
Every 6 
Months 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
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 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Less Than 
Every 6 
Months 
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
   Table 68 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the dissemination of the 
security policy.  The majority of very large (100%), medium (90%) law, and large (84%), 
and less than one-half of small (48%) law firms reported disseminating the IT security 
policy to law firm employees/lawyers or other members of the firm on the law firm 
intranet.   The majority of small (81%), medium (80%), large (84%), and over one-half of 
very large (64%) law firms reported disseminating the IT security policy to law firm 
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm in the staff handbook. 
Table 68.  Law Firm Size and Dissemination of the Security Policy 
 
Law Firm Intranet  Staff Handbook Law Firm Size in 
Number of Users Checked Did Not Check Checked Did Not Check 
Small  1-150 10 11 17 4 
Percentage: 48% 52% 81% 19% 
Medium  
151-250  Users 9 1 8 2 
Percentage: 90% 10% 80% 20% 
Large 251-500  Users 16 3 16 3 
Percentage: 84% 16% 84% 16% 
Very Large  
>500  Users 11 0 7 4 
Percentage: 100.0% 0% 64% 36 % 
 
9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and smaller law firms (less than 250 
users) differ in whether they have written information security policies (Gibney & 
Corham, 2008)? 
     Table 69 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the results from a Chi-
Square test on the existence of a security policy in relationship to the law firm size where 
the four categories of law firms are placed into the combination of small with medium 
law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms.  The “Do Not Know” 
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responses were treated as missing variables and therefore were not included in the 
computations (Field, 2009).  The results demonstrated significant test results (p-value = 
.024) indicating that the law firm combination of large with very large law firms tend to 
have more written information security policies than the combination of small with 
medium law firms. 
Table 69.  Law Firm Groups – Law Firm Size and Written Information Security 
Policy 
 
Written Information 
Security Policy?  
  
Chi-Square 
Law Firm Size in Number of 
Users 
Yes No Two-Sided Prob. 
Small  1-150  
or Medium 151-250  Users 
31 20 
Percentage: 61% 39% 
Large 251-500  or Very Large 
>500  Users 
30 6 
Percentage: 83% 17% 
.024 
 
     Table 70 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the results from a 
Fisher’s exact test on the existence of a security policy in relationship to the law firm size 
where small law firms is measured against very large law firms. The “Do Not Know” 
responses were treated as missing variables and therefore were not included in the 
computations (Field, 2009).  The results demonstrated no significant difference between 
small law firms and very large law firms (p-value = .328) with regard to larger law firms 
having more information security policies than smaller law firms. 
Table 70.  Small  vs. Very Large Law Firm and Written Information Security Policy 
 
Written Information 
Security Policy?  
Law Firm Size in Number of 
Users 
Yes No 
  
Fisher’s Exact Test. 
Small  1-150  21 13
Percentage: 62% 38%
Very Large >500  Users 11 3
Percentage: 79% 21%
.328 
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10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) and larger law firms (more than 251 
users) differ in whether written information security policies were due to information 
security breach incidents (Gibney & Corham, 2008)? 
     Table 71 presents the frequency and percentages with regard to the results from a 
Fisher’s exact test on information security breach incidents in relationship to the law firm 
size where the four categories of law firms are placed into the combination of small with 
medium law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms.  The results 
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of large with very large 
law firms and the combination of small with medium law firms (p-value > .999) with 
regard to information security breaches.  An analysis of small law firms and very large 
law firms was not possible because no one in either group indicated that the law firm’s 
written IT security policies were created due to a security breach incident. 
Table 71.  Small  vs. Very Large Law Firm and Information Security Breach 
Incidents 
 
Information Security Breach 
Incidents?  
Law Firm Size in Number of 
Users 
Yes No 
  
Fisher’s Exact Test. 
Small  1-150  
or Medium 151-250  Users 
1 29 
Percentage: 3% 97% 
Large 251-500  or Very Large 
>500  Users 
1 27 
Percentage: 4% 96% 
>.999 
 
Summary of Results 
     In this chapter, the author provides the in-depth analyses of the findings of all research 
questions posited in this dissertation investigation.  Findings from the Zoomerang survey 
of law firms are presented in Tables with an explanatory synopsis for each of the 
140 
 
following:  law firm demographics, the relationship between information security policy 
adoption, the age of information security policy, frequency of updating the information 
security policy, range of issues covered by the information security policy, successful 
adoption of success factors, adoption of best practices, and incidence by severity of 
security breaches.  Communication of law firm approved IT security policy documents, 
best practices, and use of security measures were also presented in Tables.  Based on the 
data collected, the author determined that written information security policies were not 
generally created in response to a security breach incident. 
     The projected future effect of the Internet on breaches and the perception of the need 
for policies demonstrated evidence of significant but weak correlations with regard to the 
perception that the need for security policies is greater today than it was one, three, and 
five years ago.  In conjunction with Internet use, the perception of attorney-client work 
product communications over electronic networks was that it is greater today than one, 
three, and five years ago. The dissemination of security policies was primarily through 
the law firm intranet and/or the staff handbook.  This type of dissemination is passive 
since it requires the law firm employees/lawyers to actively review these without any 
ramifications if they do not review them on a regular basis (J. Heath Rush, personal 
communication, June 30, 2009). 
     Law firm size and the use of audits to enforce documented IT security policies results 
showed that small and medium law firms typically did not audit and enforce policies 
whereas large and very large law firms were more inclined to audit and enforce IT 
security policies. The data demonstrated that law firms of all four size categories of law 
firms (small, medium, large, and very large) generally did not use an independent third 
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party to audit the policies.  The hiring of an independent third party for audits of IT 
security policies would be a discretionary budget item (J. Heath Rush, personal 
communication, June 30, 2009) if not mandated by law.  Thus, this finding is not 
unexpected. 
     The results also demonstrated the perceived performance of security measures within 
the past 12 months by each law firm.  Evidence of significant, but weak correlations 
exists between the survey items: vulnerability assessments, use of an outside consultant, 
encryption of e-mail, encryption of hard drive data, and revision of a law firm’s 
information security policies.  Those survey items demonstrating no evidence of 
significant differences were in-house risk assessments, employee training, use of 
managed security services, and review of a law firm’s information security policies. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
     This chapter articulates the conclusions drawn from the author’s analysis of responses 
to the dissertation research questions.  Next, this chapter discusses the implications of 
these conclusions and reviews the contributions of this research to the body of knowledge 
relating to information security policies and computer security breach incidents.  
Recommendations for future research are included.  This chapter concludes with a 
summary of this dissertation investigation. 
Conclusions 
     Doherty and Fulford (2005) performed an exploratory analysis of security policies and 
security breach incidents that highlighted the need for supplemental research with 
different target populations.  This dissertation investigation advanced the research of 
Doherty and Fulford by targeting information security policies and security breach 
incidents in law firms.  The goal of this dissertation investigation was to determine 
whether there is a correlation between the timing of security policy development 
(proactive versus reactive policy development) and the frequency and severity of security 
breach incidents in law firms of varying sizes. 
     The author distributed a survey to ILTA members that was comprised of  Doherty and 
Fulford’s (2005) original survey questions, augmented by additional questions designed 
to elicit information specific to information security policy development and security 
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breach incident detection in law firms.   This dissertation investigation questioned 
whether law firms are proactive in their information security policy development or 
reactive to computer security breach incidents.  In this dissertation, the author further 
investigated whether law firms utilize risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, 
and/or penetration tests to validate the intended security policies and ensure the existence 
of adequate safeguards from attackers and/or prevention of unauthorized access to law 
firm confidential information (Myler & Broadbent, 2006).  The population for this online 
survey consisted of law firm IT personnel and others familiar with legal technology in 
law firms. 
     The author’s first research question was: Do law firms that have written information 
security policies have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity 
than those that do not have information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 
25)?   The results demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between the existence of a written information security policy and the frequency and 
severity of security breach incidents within law firms.  Likewise, Doherty and Fulford’s 
survey results showed no significant relationship between the existence of a written 
information security policy and the frequency and severity of security breach incidents 
generally.  This led Doherty and Fulford to reject their working hypothesis that the 
existence of a written information security policy generally would reduce the frequency 
and severity of security breach incidents. 
     It is worth noting that 37% of the survey respondent law firms with written 
information security policies reported experiencing more than six occurrences of 
computer viruses within the past two years.  While this result may support varying 
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hypotheses, it appears unlikely to this author that the existence of a written information 
security policy has the unintended consequence of causing computer viruses.  Further 
research is required to explore whether the increased prevalence of detected security 
breach incidents may correlate with the extent to which a law firm has incorporated 
information technology into its practice and/or the law firm’s level of sophistication to 
detect occurrences of computer viruses. 
     It is also interesting to note that only 4% of the respondents (two law firms with a 
written information security policy and one law firm without a written information 
security policy) indicated that they had experienced 1-5 occurrences of external hacking 
incidents.  The remaining 96% of the respondents indicated that they never experienced 
an external hacking incident.     
     The author’s second research question was: Are law firms that have had information 
security policies in place for numerous years likely to have fewer computer security 
breach incidents in terms of both frequency and severity than those that do not have 
information security policies in place (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?   The results 
again demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the 
length of time that an information security policy was in place in the responding law 
firms and the frequency and severity of the security breach incidents that the law firms 
experienced. This finding correlates with Doherty and Fulford’s general finding of no 
strong or consistent evidence of significance as well.  
     Further research is required to determine the impact of policy review practices on the 
frequency and severity of security breach incidents in law firms with written policies, 
and/or whether the prevalence of security breach incidents turns less upon the mere 
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existence of a written policy and more upon the implementation of information security 
practices without regard to whether those practices are codified into a policy document. 
Additionally, further research is required to determine if having information security 
policies in place provides a better response process with appropriate escalation, 
mitigation, and remediation of threats which in turn assists in the prevention of further 
attacks (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).         
     The author’s third research question was: Do law firms that have updated their 
information security policies on a regular basis have fewer security breach incidents in 
terms of frequency and severity than those that have not updated their information 
security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?   The results again demonstrated no 
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between regular policy updates and the 
frequency and severity of reported/detected security breach incidents. This finding 
reinforces Doherty and Fulford’s findings of no significance.   
     Among the respondent law firms, the results indicated that when IT security policies 
were updated less often, incidence of theft increased.  The results demonstrated a 
significant but weak relationship in this regard among the respondent law firms.  Further 
research is required to determine whether this increased incidence of theft is attributable 
to a failure by law firms to update their information security policies as necessary to 
cover purchases of  new equipment (assets), resulting in heightened risk of theft from 
unclear parameters regarding the use, storage, and maintenance of such equipment (J. 
Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).  Additionally, further research is 
required to determine whether the existence of regular information security policy 
updates correlates with the sophistication of prophylactic measures employed by law 
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firms, resulting in increased detection, not increased incidence, of breaches by firms that 
regularly update their information security policies.    
     The author’s fourth research question was: Are law firms that have an information 
security policy with a broad scope likely to have fewer security breaches in terms of both 
frequency and severity than those organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 
26)?  The results demonstrated a statistically significant but weak relationship between 
the number of issues addressed in an information security policy and the frequency and 
severity of reported security breaches.  When the number of issues addressed in a 
responding law firm’s information security policy increased, the number of reported 
thefts of resources also tended to increase.  Doherty and Fulford’s study found that “the 
range of issues covered is associated significantly with the incidence of both computer-
based fraud and natural disaster.  However, an inspection of the data . . . is inconclusive.” 
(p. 33).  This dissertation investigation supports Doherty and Fulford’s finding of a 
relationship between the breadth of a law firm’s information security policy and the 
frequency and severity of detected/reported security breaches.  And, as with Doherty and 
Fulford’s study, the author’s inspection of the data is inconclusive. 
     The author’s fifth research question was: Are law firms that have adopted a wide 
variety of best practices likely to have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency 
and severity than those organizations that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)?  
The results demonstrated no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between 
the adoption of best practices and the frequency and severity of perceived/reported 
security breaches.  These results are consistent with Doherty and Fulford’s findings of no 
significance as well.  However, further research is required to determine whether the 
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increased perception and reporting of computer security breaches by law firms that have 
incorporated  best practices into their respective information security departments may 
correlate with the level of sophistication within such law firms’ information security 
departments. (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009). 
     More than 90 percent (93%) of respondents indicated law firm management does 
approve IT security policy documents.  Approximately one-third of respondents (33%) 
communicated approved IT security policy documents only to law firm employees/ 
lawyers or other members of the firm.  Just over one-fourth of respondents (28%) 
communicated IT security policies to relevant third party service providers in addition to 
law firm employees/lawyers/other members.  One-fifth of respondents (20%) indicated 
that only certain IT security policy documents were communicated to law firm 
employees/lawyers, other members of the firm and relevant third party service providers.  
Less than one-fifth of respondents (16%) reported that they did not communicate IT 
security policies to relevant third party service providers.   
     Over two-thirds (67%) of the respondents indicated that law firm computers are not 
shut down for inactivity after a defined lapse period.  Further research is required to 
determine whether this finding may be attributable to a reluctance by law firm IT and 
Information Security departments to inconvenience lawyers (J. Heath Rush, personal 
communication, June 30, 2009) or to inhibit their billable hour capabilities (Bisel, 2007).   
     When asked to identify the security issues covered in the reporting law firm’s IT 
security policy and/or through separate procedures or standards, the highest percentage of 
respondent law firms (63%) identified “personal usage of Information Systems” in the 
policy document only category.  One-half of law firm respondents (50%) reported a 
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policy document only for Internet access, and almost one-half (49%) reported a policy 
document only in regard to violations and breaches of security policies.  Almost one-
fourth of the respondents (23%) identified contingency planning under the stand-alone 
procedures or standard only category, while close to half of the respondents reported that 
a  policy document and supplementary procedure or standards were in place for 
disclosure of information (45%), Internet access (43%), and mobile computing (42%).   
     The author’s sixth research question was: When under a time deadline to finish an 
assignment, are law firm employees more likely to by-pass security measures in order to 
complete the task (Post & Kagan, 2007)?  The results demonstrated that in the majority 
of law firms, regardless of size,  it is not at all likely or not very likely that people will 
scan a file for a virus, install security software updates, or install a digital certificate when 
operating under a time deadline to finish an assignment.  Likewise, the majority of law 
firms in all four size categories reported that it is very likely or extremely likely that 
people in their respective law firms would install an ActiveX control from an unknown 
source when under a time deadline to finish an assignment.  Further research is required 
to determine the prevalence with which people within law firms of various sizes use 
security measures when not in a hurry to complete a task. 
     The author’s seventh research question was: Are law firm security policies created in 
response to an information security breach incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 
2005)?  The results demonstrated that, generally, written IT security policies in law firms 
were not created in response to a security breach incident.  These findings suggest that 
information security policies generally are proactively developed by law firms.  Further 
research is required to determine whether law firms respond to media attention to security 
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breach incidents that happen to others (outside of their respective law firms) by creating 
information security policies.  (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).  
Further research also is needed to determine whether law firms create information 
security policies in response to media reports of threats (as distinguished from actual 
security breach incidents) or in response to knowledge of threats among law firm IT 
personnel.    
     The results demonstrated a statistically significant but weak correlation between the 
Internet’s past effect on information technology security breaches and the perception that 
the need for security policies is greater today than it was one, three, and five years ago.  
The results also demonstrated a statistically significant but weak correlation between the 
Internet’s projected future effect on information technology security breaches and the 
perception that the need for security policies is greater today than it was three years ago.  
Over one-half of law firms (59%) perceived that attorney-client and/or work product 
online communications are greater today than one year ago; over three-quarters (85%) 
reported that those attorney-client and/or work product online communications are 
greater today than three years ago; and over ninety percent (92%)  reported that those 
attorney-client and/or work product online communications are greater today than five 
years ago. 
     The author’s eighth research question was: Are risk assessments, network vulnerability 
scans, and/or penetration tests a part of law firms’ validation of the intended security 
policies (Myler & Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006)?  The author identified significant but 
weak correlations between the following survey items:  vulnerability assessments, use of 
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an outside consultant, encryption of e-mail, encryption of hard drives, and revision of a 
law firm’s information security policies.   
     The results demonstrated a statistically significant difference between all four size 
categories of law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to performing 
a vulnerability assessment within the past 12 months. There is evidence of a significant 
difference between the small and large law firms and the small and very large law firms 
with regard to performing a vulnerability assessment within the past 12 months.  The 
majority of small law firms (59%), and over one-third of medium law firms (35%) never 
perform vulnerability assessments, while almost one-half of large law firms (45%) and 
approximately one-third of very large law firms (31%) perform a vulnerability 
assessment once a year.  The results demonstrated that a few large law firms (10%) and 
very large law firms (8%) performed vulnerability assessments every day. 
     The results demonstrated a significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to hiring an outside 
consultant to perform a risk assessment within the past 12 months. Specifically, the 
results demonstrated a significant difference between the small and very large and the 
medium and very large law firms with regard to hiring an outside consultant to perform a 
risk assessment.  The majority of small (79%), medium (88%), large (54%), and very 
large (29%) law firms reported not having hired an outside consultant to perform a risk 
assessment within the past 12 months.  One-half of the very large law firms (50%) hired 
an outside consultant to perform a risk assessment once a year, while small (9%), 
medium (12%) and large law firms (36%) hired an outside consults to perform risk 
assessments once a year. 
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     The results demonstrated no significant difference between the responses of all four 
size categories of law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to 
conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months. Specifically, the 
results demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with 
medium law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to 
conducting an in-house risk assessment within the past 12 months.  The majority of small 
(50%), medium (59%), and large law firms (42%) reported not having conducted an in-
house risk assessment.  One-half of the very large law firms (50%) have conducted an in-
house risk assessment once a year, with over one-fourth of the very large law firms (29%) 
performing an in-house risk assessment once a month. 
     The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to providing employee 
training sessions on information security awareness and incident reporting within the past 
12 months.  Specifically, the results demonstrated no significant difference between the 
combination of small with medium law firms or the combination of large with very large 
law firms with regard to providing employee training sessions on information security 
awareness and incident reporting within the past 12 months.  The majority of small 
(63%), medium (59%), large law firms (70%), and very large law firms (54%) reported 
not having provided employee training sessions on information security awareness and 
incident reporting within the past 12 months. 
     The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to using managed security 
services of a third party within the past 12 months. Specifically, the author identified no 
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evidence of a significant difference between the combination of small with medium law 
firms or the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to using managed 
security services of a third party within the past 12 months.  The majority of small (59%), 
medium (75%), and large law firms (68%), reported not having used managed security 
services of a third party within the past 12 months.   Over one-quarter of small law firms 
(29%) and approximately one-half of very large law firms (43%) reported using the 
managed security services of a third party every day. 
     The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting e-mail 
messages within the past 12 months. The results did, however, demonstrate a significant 
difference between the small and medium, small and large, and small and very large law 
firms that encrypt e-mail messages.  Almost three-quarters of small law firms (73%), and 
over one-third of medium (35%) and large law firms (43 %), reported never having 
encrypted e-mail messages within the past 12 months.   The following percentages of law 
firms reported encrypting e-mail messages every day -  small (18%), medium (35%), 
large (38%), and very large (36%).   
     The results demonstrated a significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to encrypting hard drive 
data within the past 12 months.   Specifically, the author identified a significant 
difference between the small and large and small and very large law firms that encrypt 
hard drive data.  The majority of small (88%), medium (63%), and large law firms (57%), 
reported never encrypting hard drive data within the past 12 months.   One-third of large 
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law firms (33%) and more than one-third of very large (39%) law firms repeatedly 
encrypt hard drive data every day. 
     The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to reviewing the law firm 
information security policies within the past 12 months.  Specifically, the results 
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with medium 
law firms or the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to reviewing 
the law firm information security policies within the past 12 months.  Over one-third of 
small (35%) and over one-third of medium law firms (35%) reported not having reviewed 
information security policies within the past 12 months.   An annual (once a year) review 
of information security policies reportedly occurs in over one-third of small law firms 
(38%), in just under one-third of medium law firms (30%), in almost two-thirds of large 
law firms (60%), and in just under one-half of very large law firms(47%).  Information 
security policies reportedly are reviewed more than once per year in over one-quarter of 
small law firms (27%), approximately one-third of medium law firms (30%), and one-
fifth of large law firms (20%).   
     The results demonstrated no significant difference between all four size categories of 
law firms (small, medium, large, and very large) with regard to revising their respective 
information security policies within the past 12 months.  Specifically, the results 
demonstrated no significant difference between the combination of small with medium 
law firms and the combination of large with very large law firms with regard to revising 
information security policies within the past 12 months.  The majority of small law firms 
(51%), and just under one-half of medium law firms (47%) reported not having revised 
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their information security policies within the past 12 months.   Over two-thirds of large 
law firms (65%) and just under two-thirds of very large law firms (62%) reported 
revising their information security policies once each year. 
     The results demonstrated that approximately two-thirds of small (67%) and medium 
law firms (63%) do not audit and enforce their respective documented IT security 
policies.   More than one-half of large law firms (59%) and more than three-quarters of 
very large law firms (82%) reportedly audit and enforce their respective documented IT 
security policies. 
     The results demonstrated the overwhelming majority of small law firms (95%), over 
three-quarters of medium law firms (78%), over one-third of large law firms (35%), and 
over one-fourth of very large law firms (27%) never had their IT security policy audited 
by an independent third party.   Medium (22%), large (24%), and very large law firms 
(18%) reported having their respective IT security policies audited by an independent 
third party more than once every two years.  Large (29%) and very large law firms (18%) 
reported having their respective IT security policies audited by an independent third party 
every year. 
     The author’s ninth research question was: Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) 
and smaller law firms (less than 250 users) differ in whether they have written 
information security policies (Gibney & Corham, 2008)?  The results demonstrated that 
the combination of large law firms with very large law firms tended to report more 
written information security policies than reported by the combination of small law firms 
with medium law firms.  However, the results demonstrated no significant difference 
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between small law firms and very large law firms with regard to the number of 
information security policies each has adopted.   
     The author’s 10th research question was: Do smaller law firms (less than 250 
employees) and larger law firms (more than 251 users) differ in whether written 
information security policies were due to information security breach incidents (Gibney 
& Corham, 2008)? The results demonstrated no significant difference between the 
combination of large with very large law firms and the combination of small with 
medium law firms with regard to the number of reported information security breaches. 
An analysis of small law firms and very large law firms was not possible in this regard 
because no law responding law firm within  either size group indicated that its law firm’s 
written IT security policy was created in response to a security breach incident. 
Strengths of Study 
     The number of reported security breach incidents is growing exponentially every year 
(Greenberg, 2008; Open Source Foundation, 2008; ITRC, 2009).  With computer security 
breaches growing at a rapid pace, this research is of critical significance.  Data privacy, 
identity theft, and data security breach notification laws are becoming more prevalent 
globally (Gunasekara, 2007; Swire & Bermann, 2007).  As a result, security breach 
incidents must be reported pursuant to these laws (CMS, 2003; Goldberg, 2008; 
Greenberg, 2008; Greene, 2006; Hildebrand & Savare, 2008; Li & Shaw, 2008; Rey, 
2008; Romanosky et al., 2008).  Law firm clients are requesting their lawyers to comply 
with these laws on their behalf when they are hosting the client’s sensitive data, 
including, but not limited to, PII or ePHI (Gunasekara; Wugmeister et al., 2007).  The 
state data security breach notification laws are directly applicable to law firms and 
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thereby require lawyers to disclose data breach incidents to their clients (J. Heath Rush, 
personal communication, June 30, 2009).  This research provided a basis for analyzing 
the applicable laws, the manner in which information security best practices are utilized 
in law firms, and the issues regarding validation of the intended security policies. 
     There are a number of information security surveys, such as the Computer Security 
Institute (CSI), Deloitte-Touche Global Security Survey, Australian Computer and Crime 
and Security Survey, and UK Department of Trade and Industry Security Breach Survey 
which do not specifically target one population (Pfleeger & Rue, 2008).  This survey 
compared the results from the Doherty and Fulford (2005) survey of large organizations 
in the U.K. and furthered their research by extension to a different population in the form 
of law firms. The findings of this dissertation investigation contributed to the body of 
knowledge by exploring the effectiveness of security policies in reducing the number of 
computer security breach incidents and distinguished the differences in security measures 
between small, medium, large, and very large sized law firms. 
Limitations 
 
     The first limitation of this study was the response rate.  ILTA deploys numerous 
surveys (usually not security-based questions) to its members throughout the year and 
typically has a survey response rate over 40%.  ILTA was chosen to deploy this survey 
on behalf of the author to its members due to ILTA’s historically successful survey return 
rate; however, only 7.3% of ILTA’s members returned valid responses to this survey.  
This disappointing response rate presents the significant limitation that the answers of 
those who did not respond to the survey may have been drastically different than those 
who did respond (Richardson, 2009), inasmuch as, they may have had more computer 
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security incidents, a higher significance of severity of computer security incidents, and/or 
less written information security policies. 
     The second limitation of this study was that only ILTA members received an 
invitation to participate in this dissertation investigation.  As a result, the targeted law 
firm population included only active members of ILTA.  At the time of the author’s Web-
based survey ILTA had 1,123 members.  However, there are numerous law firms in the 
U.S. that are not ILTA members.  Non-ILTA members may have responded quite 
differently to this survey.  Additionally, this survey was only a snapshot in time.  
Therefore, generalizing the results of this study to all law firms should be done 
cautiously. 
     A  third limitation of this dissertation investigation was that it can be difficult to obtain 
the level of  trust required to elicit candid responses from individuals to a security survey.  
The respondents who completed this survey may represent law firms that support active 
information security initiatives and have diminished fears of responding to a security 
survey because they understand security concepts.  Those law firms that did not respond 
may have chosen not to do so out of fear that their survey response would disclose 
unreported security breaches or vulnerabilities in their law firm’s information security 
policies or practices.   
Implications 
      The research findings of this dissertation investigation provide valuable insights into 
the information security policies, computer security breach incidents, and security 
measures that exist in law firms of various sizes throughout the world.  The implications 
of this dissertation investigation to information security policies and practices are 
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significant. The body of knowledge pertaining to information security policies and 
practices has been expanded by this dissertation investigation in critical respects beyond 
the research of Doherty and Fulford (2005) and Wiant (2005).   
     The first implication of this dissertation investigation relates to a discovery of whether 
security policies created proactively aid in preventing security breach incidents and how 
security measures are utilized by law firms.  This investigation furthers the research of 
Doherty and Fulford (2005), as well as Wiant (2005) in smaller sized organizations with 
different populations, policies, and compliance issues.  In this dissertation investigation, 
the nature of the organizations studied has been expanded beyond hospitals (Wiant) to 
include an analysis of information security policies in law firms, which have different 
regulatory compliance issues, interdependence on technological connections, and 
populations of employees and clients.  Also, in the author’s research the size of the 
organizations studied was expanded beyond large organizations employing more than 
250 people (Doherty & Fulford,) to include smaller sized law firms including anywhere 
from 1 up to 250 computer users.  Additionally, the geographic boundaries of the 
investigation have been extended beyond Europe to include the U.S., Canada, Australia, 
and the Asia Pacific.     
     The second implication of this dissertation investigation is associated with a 
confirmation of the findings of the Doherty and Fulford (2005) survey showing that 
information security policies are proactively developed.  Dissimilar findings of this 
dissertation investigation revealed that respondent law firms with written information 
security policies reported experiencing more occurrences of computer viruses within the 
past two years.  These findings may imply either that the existence of a written 
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information security policy has the unintended consequence of causing computer viruses 
which would seem highly unlikely or, more likely, that the existence of a written 
information security policy correlates with a law firm’s sophistication to detect 
occurrences of computer viruses, thus explaining the increased prevalence of reported 
computer viruses among law firms with written information security policies.   
     The third implication of this dissertation investigation concerns the reporting of 
external hacking.  This research verifies the conclusions of  Sveen et al. (2007) that 
security breach incidents are under reported.  Given the prevalence of external hacking 
incidents (Richardson, 2009), the author’s finding of virtually non-existent reporting of 
external hacking incidents may indicate one or more of the following: (1) that the 
responding law firms had not detected, or otherwise were unaware of, attempted hacking 
incidents (inadvertent under-reporting); (2) that the responding  law firms were reluctant 
to disclose their potential vulnerability to information security breaches by  
acknowledging incidents of external hacking (intentional under-reporting); and/or (3) 
that, even in the absence of a written information security policy,  the majority of 
respondents had implemented appropriate  safeguards to prevent against external 
hacking.   According to Richardson, based on the propensity of cyber criminals to attack  
systems, and the fact that no firewall or anti-virus stops every attack, it is difficult to have 
perfect security safeguards in place to prevent all external hacking attempts. 
    The fourth implication of this dissertation investigation was the finding that when 
information security policies were updated less often, theft of resources went up.  This 
indicates the importance of regular reviews of the information security policies to 
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incorporate the purchase of new equipment (assets) and to provide guidance for 
employees with regard to how they should protect assets that change within the law firm.   
Recommendations 
     In addition to the further research previously outlined, additional research is 
recommended in this evolving area.  The first research study that might be developed 
from this dissertation investigation would be to conduct research to find how other legal-
related industries, such as corporations and/or application service providers (ASPs) for 
litigation support services, compare in both response rate and findings to the Doherty and 
Fulford (2005) exploratory analysis and this dissertation investigation.  For example, a 
survey of corporate legal departments’ responses with regard to security could be 
compared and contrasted to law firms and would contribute to the information security 
field in revealing whether security is viewed differently in corporate legal departments.  
Additionally, this model could be used to survey ASPs specializing in delivery of 
electronically stored information (ESI) document collections for law firms and corporate 
legal departments to measure whether their views of security policies and computer 
security breach incidents are similar to law firms.   
     A second research study could be developed to discover how to entice respondents to 
reveal security issues within their organization without fear.  There is a paradox with 
reporting security incidents wherein you do not know what you do not know and thus 
under report security breach incidents.  Those law firms that outsource their network 
perimeter activities may not be aware of their third party provider’s efforts in regard to 
protecting against hacking incidents and may not be aware of the attempts against their 
law firm (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 2009).   
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     A third research study could include whether information security policies are 
developed out of fear based on the media attention given to breaches that happen to other 
companies.  Further research is necessary to determine whether the incorporation of best 
practices in a law firm’s information security department correlates with the 
sophistication level of that law firm’s information security department, and might 
correspondingly explain the increased perception and reporting of security breaches by 
law firms that adopt best practices (J. Heath Rush, personal communication, June 30, 
2009).   
     A fourth research study could address the different law firm practice areas and 
whether IT security is more prevalent and/or relevant in one area over another.  Due to 
the nature of intellectual property law firms wherein trade secrets and patent applications 
contain highly sensitive data, there may be a more urgent need for information security 
safeguards and best practices than at a law firm that does not host such highly sensitive 
data.  Additionally, this research study could also examine the differences between a 
more recently created law firm (within the last 10 years) and a more established law firm 
(in existence more than 10 years) to determine if there is a cultural difference in the 
technology utilized and whether as a consequence there are less information security data 
breaches. 
     The emergence and pervasiveness of social networking sites presents additional 
security issues with regard to securing the network of any organization.  Thus, a fifth 
research study could examine the effects of social networking sites on information 
security policy development and its frequency and severity of detected/reported security 
breaches,  and whether security measures/controls assist with the monitoring and 
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detection of data leakage of the organization’s confidential data on these social 
networking sites.   
Summary 
     In this dissertation investigation, the author examined the problem of whether 
information security policies assist with preventing unauthorized parties from accessing 
confidential and sensitive information.  The author further investigated the exploratory 
analysis study of Doherty and Fulford (2005) in this dissertation investigation to 
determine whether security policies aid in abating security breach incidents against law 
firm data and networks.  The author furthered the Doherty and Fulford study by 
identifying whether information security policies were developed in response to computer 
security breach incidents or whether concern for computer security breaches prompted 
the development and implementation of information security policies.  Thus, this 
dissertation investigation posited questions relative to whether information security 
policies, computer security breach incidents, and security measures are utilized to 
safeguard law firm data. 
     The goal of this dissertation investigation was to determine whether law firms are 
proactive in their security policy development or reactive to security breach incidents.  In 
this dissertation investigation, the author investigated whether law firms utilize risk 
assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests to validate the intended 
security policies and ensure the existence of adequate safeguards from attackers and/or 
prevention of unauthorized access to law firm confidential information (Myler & 
Broadbent).         
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     The survey questions regarding security threats, information security policies, and 
successful implementation of information security policies were adopted from the 
original survey instrument received from Doherty and Fulford (2005). Additional 
questions posited by the author included self-efficacy issues, applicable privacy laws, 
management approval and communication of security policies, and utilization of risk 
assessments and other security measures in law firms (Post & Kagan, 2007; Myler & 
Broadbent, 2006; Verdon, 2006).  This dissertation investigation posited the following 10 
specific research questions with the first five questions derived from Doherty and 
Fulford’s research.  The additional five research questions in the Web-based survey were 
designed to investigate how information security policies impact law firms.  The 10 
primary questions investigated in this dissertation investigation included: 
1. Do law firms that have written information security policies have fewer security 
breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those that do not have 
information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?  
2. Are law firms that have had information security policies in place for numerous years 
likely to have fewer computer security breach incidents in terms of both frequency 
and severity than those that do not have information security policies in place 
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 25)?   
3. Do law firms that have updated their information security policies on a regular basis 
have fewer security breach incidents in terms of frequency and severity than those 
that have not updated their information security policies (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 
26)? 
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4. Are law firms that have an information security policy with a broad scope likely to 
have fewer security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those 
organizations that do not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
5. Are law firms that have adopted a wide variety of best practices likely to have fewer 
security breaches in terms of both frequency and severity than those organizations 
that have not (Doherty & Fulford, 2005, p. 26)? 
6. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, are law firm employees more 
likely to by-pass security measures in order to complete the task (Post & Kagan, 
2007)? 
7. Are law firm security policies created in response to an information security breach 
incident (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Wiant, 2005)? 
8. Are risk assessments, network vulnerability scans, and/or penetration tests a part of 
law firms’ validation of the intended security policies (Myler & Broadbent, 2006; 
Verdon, 2006)? 
9. Do larger law firms (more than 251 users) and smaller law firms (less than 250 users) 
differ in whether they have written information security policies (Gibney & Corham, 
2008)? 
10. Do smaller law firms (less than 250 employees) and larger law firms (more than 251 
users) differ in whether written information security policies were due to information 
security breach incidents (Gibney & Corham, 2008)? 
     In this dissertation investigation, the author collected data from law firm IT personnel 
by utilizing Zoomerang, a Web survey tool. Global law firm IT members of ILTA were 
surveyed with 1,123 invitations sent out to the ILTA membership by the ILTA Executive 
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Director, Randi Mayes.  Information was collected based on a Web-based questionnaire 
with multi-choice questions, demographic questions, and Likert-scale questions.  
     Based on the outcomes from this investigation, the author identified a series of 
findings and implications: 
 The results demonstrated in general that written IT security policies in law firms 
were not created in response to a security breach incident.  These findings suggest 
that information security policies are proactively developed by law firms.  
 The author identified a significant but weak relationship between the number of 
issues addressed in an information security policy and the frequency and severity 
of reported security breaches.  When the number of issues addressed in an 
information security policy increased, the number of reported thefts of resources 
also tended to increase. 
 There was evidence of a significant but weak correlation between the Internet’s 
past effect on information technology security breaches and the perception that 
the need for security policies is greater today than it was one, three, and five years 
ago.  The results also demonstrated a significant but weak correlation between the 
Internet’s projected future effect on IT security breaches and the perception that 
the need for information security policies is greater today than it was three years 
ago. 
 The results demonstrated in general the grouping of large and very large law firms 
typically have more written information security policies than the grouping of 
small and medium law firms.  However, there is not a significant difference 
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between small law firms and very large law firms with regard to larger law firms 
having more information security policies than smaller law firms. 
 The author determined that investigation findings did not demonstrate a 
significant difference in security breach incursions between the grouping of large 
and very large law firms and the grouping of small and medium law firms. The 
author was unable to conduct an analysis of small law firms and very large law 
firms because no one in either group responded that their law firm’s written IT 
security policies were developed in response to a security breach incident. 
 The results demonstrated a significant difference between the small and large law 
firms and the small and very large firms with regard to performing a vulnerability 
assessment, since small law firms rarely performed vulnerability assessments 
while large and very large law firms performed them on a regular basis.   
 The majority of small, medium, and large law firms overall rarely hired outside 
consultants to perform risk assessments or conducted an in-house risk assessment 
within the past 12 months, while respondents from one-half (50%) of the very 
large law firms indicated they hired an outside consultant once a year and 
conducted in-house risk assessments once a year. In addition, approximately one-
quarter of very large law firm respondents (29%) conduct in-house risk   
assessments once a month. 
 The majority of all four size categories of law firms (small, medium, large, and 
very large) reported not having provided employee IS training sessions on 
information security awareness and incident reporting within the past 12 months.  
These findings demonstrate the importance of fostering a security awareness 
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culture annually to address human errors and insider threats (Chen et al., 2006; 
Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Kim, 2005; Rotvold, 2008).   
 The author identified a significant difference between the small and medium, 
small and large, small and very large law firms in terms of  encryption of e-mail 
messages. Small law firms reported using e-mail encryption technologies for e-
mail and hard drive data less frequently than medium, large, and very large law 
firms.  While this is not a surprising finding given the financial constraints of 
small law firms, it does provide insight for legislators to apply when they consider 
passing laws mandating that all e-mail messages and hard drives containing PII be 
encrypted (Worthen, 2008).   
 The majority of small and medium law firms reported not having revised the 
information security policies within the past 12 months, while large and very 
large law firms revise them once a year. 
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Appendix B 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
Abbreviation/Acronym Definition 
ABA American Bar Association 
ACC Account Information – Financial  
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation   
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
ASPs Application Service Providers 
Biz Business 
Board Federal Reserve System 
CAN Candidate Numbers 
CCN Credit Card Numbers 
CDs Compact Discs 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
CIO Chief Information Officer 
CMR Code of Massachusetts Regulations  
CoBIT Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
COSO The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission 
CSI Computer Security Institute 
CSO Chief Security Officer 
CVEs Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures   
DOB Date of Birth 
Edu Education 
EHRs Electronic Health Records 
e-library Electronic Library  
EMA E-mail Address 
ePHI Electronic Protected Health Information 
ESI Electronically Stored Information 
EU European Union 
FACTA Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  
FIN Financial 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
Gov Government 
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Abbreviation/Acronym Definition 
GVSU Grand Valley State University  
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HIPAA Health Insurance and Portability and Accountability Act 
HITECH Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act 
HTML Hypertext Markup Language 
IDSs Intrusion Detection Systems 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IIS® Microsoft® Internet Information Server 
ILTA International Legal Technology Association  
IPSs Intrusion Protection Systems 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
IS Information Security 
ISMS Information Security Management System  
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ISSO  Information Systems Security Officer  
IT Information Technology   
ITRC Identity Theft Resource Center 
M.G.L. Massachusetts General Law 
Med Medical 
MISC Miscellaneous 
NAA Names and Addresses 
NCUA National Credit Union Association  
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NRS Nevada Revised Statutes 
NSU Nova Southeastern University 
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
PDF Portable Document Format 
PHI Protected Health Information 
PII Personally Identifiable Information 
PIPEDA Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act  
SB 1386 California Senate Bill 1386 
SCC Statistical Consulting Center 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
SPSS™ Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
SSN Social Security Number 
U.K. United Kingdom 
U.S. United States 
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Abbreviation/Acronym Definition 
U.S. – CERT United States Computer Emergency Response Team 
USB Universal Serial Bus   
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy 
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Appendix E 
Survey Instrument to ILTA Members 
 
Impact of Information Security Policies on  
Computer Security Breach Incidents in Law Firms Study 
 
The series of questions in the following four sections are designed to provide information 
on the impact of information security policies on computer security breach incidents in 
law firms.  The four sections included:   
 
Section 1:    Law firm Information 
Section 2:    Security Breach Information 
Section 3:    Information Security Policies 
Section 4:    Demographic Questions 
 
I appreciate your willingness to participate in this study.  Participation in this study is 
entirely voluntary, with no known risks and no payment provided.  Please be advised that 
all responses were held in strict confidence.  Your name will not be linked to your 
responses.  Your name will also not be used in the reporting of information in 
publications or conference presentations. Only cumulative results were analyzed and 
placed into my dissertation report.  None of the completed questionnaires were reviewed 
by anyone other than me.   
 
Please provide the response that best describes your knowledge for each question.  
Results of this survey were published on the International Legal Technology Association 
(ILTA) Website.   
 
Section 1:  Law Firm Information 
 
1. Please indicate the size of your law firm in number of users.  Please check only one 
response. 
Law Firm Size  Number of Users Please check only one 
response 
Small   <151 Users _____ 
Medium   151-250 Users _____ 
Large   251-500 Users _____ 
Very Large   >500 Users _____ 
 
2. Please indicate the size of your law firm information technology department.  Please 
check only one response. 
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Law Firm IT Dept. 
Size  
Please check only one 
response 
1   _____ 
2-10 _____ 
11-25 _____ 
>25 _____ 
 
3. Which of the following most accurately describes the location(s) of your firm’s 
offices?   Please check only one response. 
 
Location Description Please check only one 
response 
One office in the United States _____ 
One office in the United States as well as international office(s) _____ 
Multiple offices in the United States _____ 
Multiple offices in the United States as well as international 
offices 
_____ 
Multiple offices in the United States and one international office _____ 
One international office in Europe _____ 
 
4. Which of the following best describes your law firm?  Please check only one 
response. 
 
Law Firm Description Please check only one 
response 
United States based law firm _____ 
European Union based law firm _____ 
Canadian based law firm _____ 
Asia Pacific based law firm _____ 
Latin American based law firm _____ 
Other.  Please specify:  ___________________ _____ 
Prefer not to answer _____ 
 
5. Which of the following information security functions does your law firm 
technology-related department(s) provide?  Please check all that apply. 
 
Information Security Functions Please check all that 
apply 
Information security services _____ 
Information security policy development _____ 
Privacy policy development  _____ 
Web page design/development  _____ 
Incident response _____ 
Disaster recovery _____ 
Information security appliance/software implementation _____ 
We outsource all of these functions _____ 
Other.  Please specify:  ___________________ _____ 
Do not know _____ 
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6. Does your law firm have a designated person or a group of people who handle 
security issues?  Please check only one response. 
 
Designated Security Person Please check only one response 
Yes, one person 
 
_____ 
 
Yes, a group of people 
 
_____ 
 
No 
 
_____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
If no or do not know, please skip to question 8. 
 
7. If yes, what is their title?  Please check only one response. 
 
Title Please check only one 
response 
Chief Security Officer (CSO) _____ 
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) _____ 
Information System Security Officer (ISSO) _____ 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) _____ 
Other.  Please specify:  ___________________ _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
Section 2:  Security Breach Information  
 
8. Which of the following privacy and/or security laws is your law firm required to 
comply with?  Please check all that apply. 
 
Privacy and/or Security Laws Please check all that 
apply 
PIPEDA (The Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Document Act) 
 
_____ 
State Data Breach Notification Laws _____ 
European Union Directive on Data Protection _____ 
GLBA (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) _____ 
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) _____ 
FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act) _____ 
FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) _____ 
USA P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act _____ 
APEC Privacy Principals (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) _____ 
Australia’s Federal Privacy Act _____ 
Japan’s Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information _____ 
Other.  Please specify:  ___________________ _____ 
Do not know _____ 
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9. Please record in the table below the approximate number of IT security breaches 
that your law firm has experienced in the past two years:  
 
Security Threats –  
Approximate Number of Occurrences in Last Two 
Years 
0 1-5 6-10 > 10 
Computer virus _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Hacking incident (external) _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Unauthorized access to / use of data (internal) _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Theft of hardware / software _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Computer-based fraud _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Human error _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Natural disaster _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Damage by disgruntled employee  _____ _____ _____ _____ 
 
 
10. Please indicate the severity of the worst breach of each type that your law firm has 
experienced in the past two years, using the scale provided. 
 
Security Threats –  
Severity of Worst Incident in 
Last Two Years 
Fairly 
Insignificant 
Somewhat 
Insignificant 
Neither 
Significant 
nor 
Insignificant 
Somewhat 
Significant 
Highly 
Significant 
Not 
Applicable 
Computer virus _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Hacking incident (external) _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Unauthorized access to / 
use of data (internal) 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
Theft of hardware / 
software 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Computer-based fraud _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Human error _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Natural disaster _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Damage by disgruntled 
employee  
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
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11. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Over the past few years, the 
Internet has greatly 
increased the number of 
security breaches 
experienced. 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
In the coming years, the 
Internet will greatly increase 
the risk of IT security 
breaches. 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
Section 3:  Information Security Policies 
 
12. Does your law firm have written information technology (IT) security policies?  
Please check only one response. 
 
Information Security Policies and 
Procedures 
Please check only one answer 
Yes _____ 
No _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
If no or do not know, please skip to question 25.   
 
13. Were your law firm written IT security policies created due to a security 
incident/breach?  Please check only one response. 
 
Information Security Policies and 
Procedures 
Please check only one answer 
Yes _____ 
No _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
14. How long has your law firm been actively using a documented IT security policy? 
Please check only one response. 
 
Actively Using Information Security 
Policies  
Please check only one answer 
Days _____ 
Weeks _____ 
Months _____ 
Years _____ 
Do not know _____ 
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15. Approximately how often is the IT security policy updated?  Please check only one 
answer. 
IT Security Policies Updated Please check only one answer 
Never _____ 
More than every 2 years _____ 
Every 2 years _____ 
Every year _____ 
Every 6 months _____ 
Less than every 6 months _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
16. Does your law firm audit and enforce the documented IT security policy?  Please 
check only one answer. 
 
Audit and Enforce IT Policy Please check only one answer 
Yes _____ 
No _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
17. Approximately how often is the IT security policy audited by an independent third 
party?  Please check only one answer. 
 
IT Security Policies Audited Please check only one answer 
Never _____ 
More than every 2 years _____ 
Every 2 years _____ 
Every year _____ 
Every 6 months _____ 
Less than every 6 months _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
18. How is the IT security policy disseminated to law firm employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm? Please check all that apply. 
 
IT Security Policies Disseminated Please check all that apply 
Law firm Intranet _____ 
Staff handbook _____ 
Other.  Please specify:  
_____________ 
 
_____ 
 
19. Using the table below, please indicate the security issues covered in your IT security 
policy and/or through separate procedures or standards.  If you do not explicitly 
cover an issue through your policy or a separate stand-alone standard, please choose 
not applicable (N/A). 
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IT Security Issue 
Policy 
Document 
Only 
Stand-Alone 
Procedure or 
Standard 
Only 
Policy Document  
And 
Supplementary  
Procedure Or Standard 
 
N/A 
Disclosure of 
information 
_____ _____ _____  
System access control _____ _____ _____  
Internet access _____ _____ _____  
Viruses, worms & 
Trojans 
_____ _____ _____  
Software development _____ _____ _____  
Contingency planning _____ _____ _____  
Encryption _____ _____ _____  
Mobile computing _____ _____ _____  
Personal usage of 
Information Systems 
_____ _____ _____  
Physical security _____ _____ _____  
Violations and 
breaches 
_____ _____ _____  
 
20. How important do you believe the following factors to be for the successful 
implementation of IT security in your law firm on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the 
least important and 5 being most important: 
 
Factors Not At 
All 
Important 
Not Very 
Important
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
Not 
Applicable 
Ensuring security policy reflects 
business objectives 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
An approach to implementing 
security that is consistent with the 
law firm culture 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Visible commitment from 
management 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
A good understanding of security 
risks 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
A good understanding of security 
requirements 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
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Factors Not At 
All 
Important 
Not Very 
Important
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
Not 
Applicable 
Effective marketing of security to 
all law firm employees/lawyers 
or other members of the firm 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Distribution of guidance on IT 
security policy to all law firm 
employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
Providing appropriate training 
and education to all employees/ 
lawyers or other members of the 
firm 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Comprehensive measurement 
system for evaluating 
performance in security 
management 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
Provision of feedback system for 
suggesting policy improvements 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
21. How successful do you believe your law firm has been in adopting each of these 
factors on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least important and 5 being most 
important: 
 
Factors Not At All  
Successful 
Not Very 
Successful
Somewhat 
Successful
Very 
Successful 
Extremely 
Successful 
Not 
Applicable 
Ensuring security policy reflects 
business objectives 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
An approach to implementing 
security that is consistent with 
the law firm culture 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
Visible commitment from 
management 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
A good understanding of 
security risks 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
A good understanding of 
security requirements 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
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Factors Not At All  
Successful 
Not Very 
Successful
Somewhat 
Successful
Very 
Successful 
Extremely 
Successful 
Not 
Applicable 
Effective marketing of security 
to all law firm 
employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
Distribution of guidance on IT 
security policy to all law firm 
employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
Providing appropriate training 
and education to all employees/ 
lawyers or other members of the 
firm 
 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Comprehensive measurement 
system for evaluating 
performance in security 
management 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
Provision of feedback system 
for suggesting policy 
improvements 
 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
____ 
 
 
22. Are IT security policy documents approved by management?  Please check only one 
answer. 
Information Security Policies and 
Procedures 
Please check only one answer 
Yes  
 
_____ 
No _____ 
 
Do not know _____ 
 
 
23. Are IT security policy documents published?  Please check only one answer. 
 
Information Security Policies and 
Procedures 
Please check only one answer 
Yes  
 
_____ 
No _____ 
 
Do not know _____ 
 
187 
 
 
24. Are approved IT security policy documents communicated to all law firm 
employees/lawyers or other members of the firm and relevant third party service 
providers?  Please check only one answer. 
 
Information Security Policies and 
Procedures 
Please check only one answer 
Yes – all of them are communicated 
to law firm employees/lawyers or 
other members of the firm and 
relevant third party service providers 
 
_____ 
Yes – but not communicated to 
relevant third party service providers 
 
_____ 
Yes –  but only communicated to 
law firm employees/lawyers or other 
members of the firm 
 
_____ 
Yes – but only certain ones are  
communicated 
 
_____ 
No – none of them _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
25. Are law firm computers shut down for inactivity after a defined period?  Please 
check only one answer. 
Information Security  Please check only one answer 
Yes  _____ 
No  _____ 
Do not know _____ 
 
26. When under a time deadline to finish an assignment, how likely would it be for 
people in your law firm to: 
  
Statement Not At All  
Likely 
Not Very 
Likely Somewhat Likely Very Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
Scan a file for viruses _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Install security software 
updates 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
Install a digital certificate _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ 
Install an ActiveX control 
from an unknown source 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
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27. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The need for information 
security policies in law firms 
is greater today than it was 
one year ago. 
 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
The amount of attorney-
client work product 
communication over 
electronic networks is 
greater today than it was one 
year ago. 
 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
The need for information 
security policies in law firms 
is greater today than it was 
three years ago. 
 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
The amount of attorney-
client work product 
communication over 
electronic networks is 
greater today than it was 
three years ago. 
 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
The need for information 
security policies in law firms 
is greater today than it was 
five years ago. 
 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
The amount of attorney-
client work product 
communication over 
electronic networks is 
greater today than it was five 
years ago. 
 
 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
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28. During the past 12 months, how often did your law firm?  Select the answer that 
best applies for each statement. 
 
Statement Not at All 
More Than 
Once a Year 
Once a 
Year 
Once a 
Month Every Day 
Do Not 
Know 
Perform a vulnerability 
assessment that scanned the law 
firm networks to identify 
potential security risks. 
 
 
_____
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____
Hire an outside consultant to 
perform a risk assessment to 
identify the potential threats, 
probabilities, and impact of 
threats to the law firm’s 
management controls, 
operational controls, and 
technical controls. 
 
 
 
_____
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____
Conduct an in-house risk 
assessment of security threats 
performed by the members of 
the law firm IT department 
and/or information security 
department. 
 
 
 
_____
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
_____
Provide employee training 
sessions on information security 
awareness and incident 
reporting 
 
 
_____
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____
Use managed security services 
of a third party 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
Encrypt e-mail messages 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
Encrypt hard drive data 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
Review the information security 
policies of the law firm 
 
 
_____
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
 
_____
Revise the information security 
policies of the law firm 
 
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
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29. Which of the following statements is true for your law firm?  Please check all that 
apply. 
 
 
Statement Please check all that apply 
There is an individual designated as being responsible for 
information security in my law firm. 
 
 
_____ 
There is a separate department in my law firm responsible for 
information security. 
 
 
_____ 
Information security falls upon everyone in the information 
technology department in my law firm. 
 
 
_____ 
No individual is designated as being responsible for 
information security in my law firm. 
 
 
_____ 
 
 
Section 4:  Demographic Questions 
 
These last few questions are to help me get to know you, the respondent, better.  All of 
these responses are optional.  Like all of the questions in this questionnaire, your answers 
were held in strict confidence.  No answers were paired with an individual and only a 
cumulative set of results will be presented in the dissertation. 
30. What is the highest level of education you have completed:     
       Education Please check the appropriate answer 
High School Graduate _____ 
Paralegal Certificate _____ 
Bachelor Degree _____ 
Master Degree _____ 
Juris Doctorate _____ 
Ph.D. _____ 
Other: ________________ _____ 
Prefer not to answer _____ 
 
31. Please state your gender: 
 
Gender Please check the appropriate answer 
Female _____ 
Male _____ 
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32. Please state your age: 
 
       Age Please check the appropriate answer 
18-25 _____ 
26-35 _____ 
36-45 _____ 
46-55 _____ 
56-65 _____ 
65+ _____ 
Prefer not to answer _____ 
 
33. Which title best describes your job level: 
 
Title Please check only one answer 
Associate _____ 
Partner _____ 
Chief Information Officer/Director _____ 
Chief Security Officer/Information 
Security Officer 
 
_____ 
Privacy/Compliance Officer  
Law Firm Administrator _____ 
Chief Executive Officer _____ 
Project Manager _____ 
Legal Technology Manager _____ 
Paralegal/Legal Assistant _____ 
Legal Secretary _____ 
Technician _____ 
Database Programmer _____ 
Database Coder _____ 
Network Administrator _____ 
Other: ____________________ _____ 
 
 
34. Would you be willing to be contacted to answer follow-up questions via an e-mail 
message linking you to a second follow-up Zoomerang survey, if necessary?   
* Please note that your e-mail address will only be used to send you the link to the 
additional survey.  Any and all additional information obtained would be held in 
strict confidence and your name would not be used in the reporting of information. 
 
Agree to Follow-Up Questions Please check only one answer 
Yes _____ 
 
If yes, please provide your e-mail address: 
____________________________________________________ 
 
No _____ 
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Thank you for participating in this study!  Please be advised that all responses were held 
in strict confidence.  Your name will not be linked to your responses and your name will 
not be used in the reporting of information in publications or conference 
presentations. Only cumulative results were analyzed and placed into my dissertation.  
None of the completed questionnaires were reviewed by anyone other than me.   
35. Is there anything additional that you would like to share with the researcher?  Please 
provide your comments in the space provided.     
Comments: 
   
 
Thank you! 
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Appendix F 
Doherty & Fulford Original Survey Instrument  
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Appendix G 
Revised Doherty & Fulford Original Survey Instrument  
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